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"It is remarkable that it is of very rare 
occurrence for evidence of a confession to be 
given when the proof of the prisoner's guilt is 
otherwise clear and satisfactory; but when it is 
not clear and satisfactory, the prisoner is not 
infrequently alleged to have been seized with the 
desire borne of penitence and remorse to supple- 
ment it with a confession; -a desire which 
vanishes as soon as he appears in a court of 
justice. " 
FL y Thompson 118931 08 1 per Cave 1. 
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Chapter 6 The Admissibility of Evidence of Confessions in 
En and -a Comparative Note 
6.1 Introduction 
As has been shown, Scots law has treated the admissibility of 
confessions and admissions almost entirely as a matter of 
discretion based on the notion of fairness. On the other hand, 
prior to PACE, English law approached the matter from two angles, 
In the first place there was a more or less firm exclusionary 
rule of considerable antiquity, ' based on the concept of 
voluntariness and the absence of inducement. Later oppression 
was added as a further criterion leading to automatic exclusion. 
In the second place the judge might rule a confession inadmiss- 
ible in exercise of his general judicial discretion, even though 
the confession was, as a matter of law, voluntary, To put it 
another way, where the Crown failed to prove that the confession 
was voluntary it was inadmissible as a matter of law, but even if 
the Crown overcame this test the confession might still be 
rejected by the Judge on the ground of fairness to the accused. 
In the context of confessionu this exclusionary discrotion was 
often, although by no means exclusively, associated with breaches 
of the Judges Rules. As Lord Devlin has put it : 
"The prisoner is entitled to demand as of right 
the rojection of an involuntary confession. In 
tho care of evidence obtained in breech of the 
Tudgeu Rules he has no such right; the Judge has a 
& 
diccrction tQ admit or rojcct the ovldcnce as he 
Gees fit, ... ° :x 
The Judges Rules were intended to guide the police as to the 
basis on which the courts would exercise their discretion in 
relation to the questioning of suspects. They were rules of 
practice only and did not affect the overriding principle that an 
involuntary confession could never be admissible. The 
distinction has been put thus by Lord Goddard CJ: 
"The test of admissibility of a statement is 
whether it is a voluntary statement. There are 
certain rules, known as the Judges Rule, which are 
not rules of law but rules 
for the guidance of police 
statement has been made in 
accordance with the Rules, 
is not made inadmissible i 
statement, although in its 
can always refuse to admit 
there has been a breach of 
of practice drawn up 
officer; and if a 
circuistances not in 
in law that statement 
F it is a voluntary 
discretion the court 
it if the court thinks 
the Rules. " 
Hates 
Joy p5 
. ^., PO G'riýriýrý1 PP'5 utim in Fn land p37 
3, Lt.. ö YS 1952) 36 Cr APP R. at 93 
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6.2 The Development of the Com~non taw FxciList cnarv Ru'. 
The early history of confessions in England is unclear, English 
law has long distinguished between extra--judicial confessions 
(those made to officials and others before trial) and judicial 
confessions (those made at the trial). A full confession in open 
court was, from the earlest times, treated as equivalent to a 
finding of guilt following trial, Extra-judicial confessions are 
known to have played a part in the criminal process from as early 
as the first quarter of the thirteenth century. It is also known 
that the law excluded involuntary confessions even before the the 
historic decision in Wnrickshal, (1783) 1 Leach CC 263 and it is 
likely that the requirement of voluntariness existed in respect 
of Judicial confessions by the middle of the sixteenth century. 
Torture existed in England in much the %amo way as it did in 
Scotland, It seems to have reached a peak during the second half 
of the sixteenth century but, as in Scotland, it never became a 
routine part of criminal procedure and seems to have been 
principally (though not exclusively) associated with crimes of 
state. Torture was also more commonly used to secure information 
about accomplices then to extract confessions. The use of 
torture in England was not extensive and the researches of J. H. 
Langbein only uncovered 81 cases between 1540 and 1640 where it 
is definitely known that warrants for torture were Issued, 2 tt 
is clear that the Privy Council kept torture under close control 
and never allowed it to fall Into the hands of regular law 
to 
enforcement officers 11 and as in Scotland torture Could not be 
employed without special warrant. Torture in England never 
became institutionalised, largely because there was no need for 
it to become so. The jury standard of proof made it unnecessary 
to provide for extensive and refined evidence-gathering. An 
English jury could convict on whatever evidence persuaded it and 
could convict an less evidence than was required as a pre- 
condition for investigation under torture on the continent. 
Torture was not abolished in England, it simply died out, 4 
England experienced periodic outbreaks of brutal witch-hunting, 
notably around 1645, but Langbein takes care to exclude "coercion 
inflicted without authority" from his definition of torture and 
he also points out that because the witch finders lacked 
conciliar authority for their activities they were liable to 
civil and criminal legal actions, several of which are known to 
have taken place. 15 
According to Mirfield, it is possible that the notion that extra- 
Judicial confessions should not be received unless voluntary 
began to grow up during the "century of torture" between 1540 and 
1640 and most probably from 1600 onwards. The case of Felton 
U 62a) 3 How, St, Tr, 371 has generally been taken as deciding 
that the use of torture was in all cases contrary to common law, 
although the correctness of this interpretation is not beyond 
doubt, but around the same time Coke, who had himself been a 
commissioner for torture, was arguing unequivocally that torture 
11 
was unlawful in all cases.. ' Mirfieid suggests that the 
"voluntary" requirement for extra-judicial confessions arose from 
three factors: (1) the existing requirement for voluntariness in 
relation to judicial confessions; (2) the decision in Tongs 
(1662) 6 How. St. Tr. 225 holding that a confession before a 
Privy Councillor or Justice of the Peace "without torture" would 
remove the need for two witnesses to an overt act of treason 
required by statute; and (3) the view of the court in the same 
case that no promise of a pardon or threats should be made 
towards a witness in any case lest he "did not give the full 
evidence". 
The first clear statement of an exclusionary rule in English law 
appeared, admittedly obiter, in W rickehell where the court 
stated 
"A free and voluntary confession is deserving of 
the highest credit, because it is presumed to flow 
from the strongest sense of guilt, and therefore 
it is admitted as proof of the crime to which it 
refers; but a confession forced fron the mind by 
flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes 
in so questionable a shape when it is to be 
considered as the evidence of guilt, that no 
credit ought to be given to it, and therefore it 
is rejected. " 
12 
Despite this obiter dictum, judicial confidence in confessions 
does not seem to have been generally high during this period, 
although the rule that a person might be convicted on the basis 
solely of his confession and without corroboration of its 
contents dates from 1789.0 
Mirfield follows Wigmore in referring to the years from 1800 to 
1852 as the period of "sentimental irrationality". During this 
period the courts were keen to exclude confessions, seemingly 
concentrating solely on whether there had been a threat or 
promise and rarely asking whether the threat or promise would 
have been likely to induce a false confession. The law also 
tended to become rigid and unable to adapt to the circumstances 
of the individual case, leading to absurdities such as Croydon 
(1846) 2 Cox CC 6? where it was held that "you may as well tell 
me about it" was equivalent to "you had better tell me", it being 
settled law that any statement along the lines of the latter 
would lead to exclusion. 9 Undue attention was also paid to the 
propriety of the conduct of the person questioning the suspect, 
this also tending to produce absurdities and decisions which are 
impossible to support on any sort of objective critera. 10 
Professor R. W. Baker has described this period in the following 
terms: 
"The early years of the nineteenth century saw a 
great swing away from the notions which had 
prevailed two hundred years before. The period of 
old toryism was superceded by a new spirit of 
13 
liberalism. Confessions were excluded upon proof 
of the most trivial inducement and it was not 
until the case of R, v Baldry in 1852 that some 
proportion was introduced into what we can only 
call liberalism run wild. " 11 
Three reasons have been suggested 12 for this situation: 
(1) accused persons being predominantly from the lower social 
classes might be thought likely, by judges, to have an attitude 
of subordination to those in authority over them, especially 
landowners and employers. Thus trivial inducements and 
meaningless threats might be effective to make their confessions 
unreliable; (2) at this time there was no formal system of 
criminal appeal and this may have predisposed judges to resolve 
doubts about admissibility in favour of the accusgd; (3) the 
accused had no general right to counsel's assistance before 1836 
and he was generally incompetent to testify before 1898. 
A similar explanation has been furnished by Lord Hailshanu 
"... at that time almost every serious crime was 
punishable by death or transportation. The law 
enforcement officers formed no disciplined police 
force and were not subject to effective control by 
the central government, watch committees or an 
inspectorate. There was no legal aid. There was 
no system of appeal. To crown it all the accused 
was unable to give evidence on his own behalf and 
14 
was therefore largely at the mercy of any evidence 
either perjured or oppressively obtained, that 
might be brought against him. The judiciary were 
therefore compelled to devise artificial rules 
designed to protect him against dangers now 
avoided by more rational means. " 10 
Passing reference has been made to the leading case of Baldry 
(1852) 2 ! er 430. Professor Baker describes this case as 
introducing some proportion to the admission of confessions, but 
it would be wrong to think that it resulted in a drastic change 
of approach by the courts. In Baldry a police constable had told 
the accused what he was charged with and had then cautioned him 
that "he need not say anything to criminate himself, what he did 
say would be taken down and used as evidence against him. " 
Notwithstanding this warning, Baldry confessed to murder. Lord 
Campbell CS considered that the policeman's words did not amount 
to a promise or threat to induce the prisoner to confess, but he 
thought it proper to reserve the question for the Court of 
Criminal Appeal who agreed that the confession had been rightly 
admitted and took the opportunity to overrule a number of earlier 
cases to the opposite effect. Parke B. put the matter clearly: 
"By the law of England in order to render a 
confession admissible in evidence it must be 
perfectly voluntary; and there is no doubt that 
any inducement in the nature of a promise or of a 
threat hold out by a person in authority vitiates 
15 
a confession. The decisions to that effect have 
gone a long way; ... but I think there has been 
too much tenderness towards prisoners in this 
matter. I confess that I cannot look at the 
decisions without some shame when I consider what 
objections have prevailed to prevent the reception 
of confessions in evidence; and I agree ... that 
justice and common sense have, too frequently, 
been sacrificed at the shrine of mercy. " 
The cases which followed Baldrywere largely concerned with 
whether the particular form of words used could be regarded as a 
threat or promise held out by a person in authority and if they 
could, the confession was excluded. By the close of the 
nineteenth century the exclusionary rule, although still 
theoretically based on the idea that confessions which followed 
threats or promises were of doubtful reliability, was being 
applied in this rigid and technical way and the courts were still 
stopping short of asking the next logical question namely whether 
the particular threat or promise made the particular confession 
unreliable in the particular circumstances. 
Notes 
1, Minieid pp 42-43 
2, Langbein Tortur] and tho taw of Priof (Chicago, 1977) p91 it seq, The 
author restricts his consideration to "Judicial torture", is the use of 
physical coercion by officers of the state in order to gather evidence for 
Judicial proceedings, 
3. Langbein op cit p136 
d. Langbein op cit pp138.139 
5, Langbein op cit p210 note 49 
6. Mirfieid p45 
16 
7 Mirfield pp48-50 
8, Wheeling (1789) 1 Leach CC 311 (n) 
9, This point was put completely beyond doubt by Garner(l848) 1 Den 329 
10, eg Sexton (1823) quoted by Mirfieid p51 
11, The Ylaarsjy Rule (London, Pitman, 1950) p54 
12, Mirfield p 52, quoting Wigmore 
13, (APP" v PingýLin,. (19761 AC 574 at 600 
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6.3 The Mature Excllusionary Rule 
The classic statement of the common law exclusionary rule as 
developed by the English courts is in the judgment of Lord Sumner 
in the Privy Council case of Ibrahim vR (19141 AC 599. In this 
case a soldier in the Indian army was arrested and charged with 
the murder of an officer. The arrest took place immediately 
after the crime and some 10 to 15 minutes later the commanding 
officer asked Ibrahim "Why have you done euch a senseless act? " 
The soldier immediately replied "Some three or four days he has 
been abusing me; without a doubt I killed him". It was argued 
that the trial judge ought to have excluded this evidence in 
exercise of his discretion although there was no evidence that 
the soldier had been subjected to any pressure of fear or hope. 
Lord Sumner': words have been much quoted: 
"It has long been established as a positive 
principle of English criminal law that no 
statement by an accused is admissible in evidence 
against him unless it is shewn by the prosecution 
to have been a voluntary statement in the sense 
that it has not been obtained from him either by 
fear of prejudice or hope of advantage exercised 
or held out by a person in authority. " 
Mirflaid points out that Lord Sumner makes no mention of 
"threats" or "promises" and consistently makes use of the phrases 
"fear of prejudice" and "hope of advantage". Hic conclusion is 
18 
that his Lordship was restating the established rule in his own 
terminology rather than trying to change the law. I In any event, 
this formulation was to become the basis of the exclusionary rule 
as operated by the English courts for the next seventy years. 
The clearest statement of the mature exclusionary rule is found 
in principle (e) of the Judges Rules of 1964 which laid down: 
"that it is a fundamental condition of the 
admissibility In evidence against any person, 
equally of any oral answer given by that person to 
a question pint by a police officer and of any 
statement made by that person, that it shall have 
been voluntary, in the sense that it has not been 
obtained from him by fear'of prejudice or hope of 
advantage, exercised or held out by a person"in 
authority, ' or by oppression. "' - 
The only departure from Lord Sumner's words 11 is the addition of 
the phrase "or-'by oppreusion. '" - This 'addition 'appears to derive 
from an obiter dictum of Lord Parker CJ in'Calli. o V Gunn (1963) 
48 pR 36 a case which was not directly concerned with 
confessions but rolatod 'to the taking of fingerprints. Hie 
Lordship pointed out that a much stronger rule applied to the 
admissibility of statomento"to the police and confessions than 
applied to other evidence and added: 
"There it i,, a fundamental principle of law that 
no anower to'a question and no statement is 
admissible unless it is sSowr by the prosecution 
19 
not to have been obtained in an oppressive manner 
and to have been voluntary In the sense that it 
has not been obtained by threats or' inducements, " 
The question of what amounted to "oppression" was considered in R. 
v Prtest1ey 1965) 51 Cr App RI where Sachs J. said that it 
"imports something which tends to sap and has 
capped that free will which must exist before a 
confession is voluntary. " 
His Lordship'dlso pointed out that"the decision on whether there 
had been oppression in an individual case would depend on many 
elements., 
"They include such'-things es"the length of time of 
any individual period of quä boning, the length 
of time intervening between periods of quest- 
ioning, whether the accused person had been given 
proper refreshment or not, 'pnd the characteristics 
of the person who makes the statement. What may 
be oppressive as regards a child, 'an1nvalid, or 
an old man, -or somebody inexperienced in the ways 
of this world'may: turn out not to be-oppressive 
when `one' finde"that 'the accused `person is of a 
tough character and'an experienced man of the 
world. " 
The existence-of the "oppression""head of the exclusionary rule 
was recognised by the Court of Appeal in-$v Prager (1972) 56 Cr 
20 
App R 151. Their Lordships adopted the definition of oppression 
put forward by Sachs J. in Priestley and also a passage from an 
address by Lord MacDermott to the Bentham Club 2 when his 
Lordship defined "oppressive questioning" as: 
".;. questioning which by its nature,, duration_or 
other attendant circumstances (including the fact 
of custody) excites hopes. (such as the'hope of 
release) or fears, or so affects the mind of the- 
suspect that his will crumbles and he speaks when 
otherwise he. would have remained- silent. "ýý . 
Professor Cross has, pointed out 3 that ,a 
literal interpretation 
of Lord MacDermott's words could have unfortunate consequences 
since "if the rare case of a contrite man who makes a more or 
less spontaneous confession is excluded, every confession that,,,,, 
was ever made was probably made in consequence of questioning but 
for which the maker would have stayed silent. " 
In a series of cases between Prajz2C and the passing of, PACE, *. 
the Court , of Appeal set a very high threshhold before custodial 
interrogation became oppressive per se. Although the actual 
point at which oppressiveness arrived would, depend on the 
circumstances of the case, the character of the suspect was of 
considerable relevances 
",., serious and experienced criminals when they 
are-apprehended must, and do, expect their 
interrogation by trained and. experienced police 
21 
officers will be vigorous. Long and repeated 
questioning will not necessarily amount to 
oppression. " 11 
The phrase "person-in authority", which was certainly in use-by 
the 1820s, 41 was never authoritatively defined but a definition 
of-sorts was offered in Dookinenan v-R (12823 1 AC 20 when 
Viscount Dilhorne quoted with approval a statement by a Canadian 
judge that "A person in authority means, generally speaking, 
anyone who has authority or-control over the accused or over the 
proceedings or the prosecution-against him. " The concept also 
extended to-one who was acting in tho prosence`and without the 
dissent of such a parson. ' 
It also followed that if the inducement had come from`one who was 
not a "person in authority" the confession would not necessarily 
be excluded. The test applied in'such a situation was whether 
the promise or threat was of a description which might be pre- 
sumed to have had such an effect on the mind of the defendant as 
to induce him to confess. 0 
The categories of "inducement" sufficient to-render a confession 
involuntary have never been closed. " Some of the decisions, 
even comparativ®1y recants are quite absurd and offend against 
common sense. For example in Fv korthem 11967) 52 Cr A12118 97 
the accused, before confessing, had asked the police if it would 
be possible for another offence to be taken into consideration. 
22 
One of the officers said that the police would have no objection 
to this course, " This was held0 by a rather reluctant Court of 
Appeal, to be a sufficient inducement to justify quashing the 
conviction. '0 Again in Rv 2eyeckes (1969) 54_Gr App R-202 a 
conviction-was quashed because the accused asked the police "If-I 
make a statement will I get bail now? " and an officer answerd . 
"Yes". Other examples in a similar vein may be found. 11 
Obviously if violence were used or threatened any resulting 
confession would not be voluntary. Apart from this the 
inducement might take many forms. The threat or promise did not 
have to relate to the charge or contemplated, charge against, the 
defendant but it might relate to some'other matter such as... 
prosecution for another offence. 12 Likewise the threat-or, 
promise did not have to impinge on the defendant personally. but 
might relate to his family, friends or possibly even a total 
stranger. The remoteness of the person concerned would gox, to the 
weight of the evidence that a threat had been made but if the 
threat were established the confession would be inadmissible. 'a 
If the impression produced by the promise or threat was clearly 
shown to have been removed, for example-by lapse of time or a 
subsequent caution by another person of superior rank to: 2 the 
person who had held out the inducement, a subsequent confession 
would be admissible. 
23 
There had been a faint hint of'a liberalisation of the rule in 
D. P, P, yPing Lin (19761 AC 574 where the House of Lords held 
that the prosecution had to show as a matter of fact that the 
threat or promise had not induced the confession. In this case a 
drugs dealer had asked the police, "IV I help the police will you 
help me? " and an officer replied, "I can make no deal with you 
but if you show the judge that you have helped the police to 
trace bigger people I am sure he will bear it in mind when he 
sentences you. " The subsequent statement was held admissible. 
Subsequently. there was a much stronger hint in Rv Rennte (1982) 
74 Cr App R 207 when the Court of Appeal stated that the! law was 
as laid down by Lord Sumner in mahl and it was unnecessary 
and undesireable to complicate matters by considerations of 
whether conduct was "improper" or constituted an "inducement. " 
The sense and spirit of Lord Sumner's principle were more 
important-than the particular wording in which'it was expressed. 
Above all it was to be applied with common sense. The trial 
judge should also remind himself that "voluntary" in ordinary 
parlance meant "of-one's own free will". Interestingly, -this 
decision was criticised as tending to uncertainty in the law. 
However PACE intervened before it became clear whether Rennie 
would in fact have led the courts to a major change of approach. 
The legal burden of proving that a confession was voluntary was 
clearly placed on the prosecution by the decision in R4 v Thom>on 
11893] 2 QB 12 where Cave 3, reviewod a number of earlier 
24 
authorities and laid down the tost: 
"Is it proved affirmatively that the confession 
was free and voluntary - that is. was it preceded 
by any inducement to make a statement held'out by 
a person in authority? If so, and the inducement 
has not-clearly been removed before the statement 
was made, evidence of the statement is 
inadmissible. " 
In the 1960s it was made clear that the standard of proof 
required in this situation was beyond reasonable doubt. -Is- 
Noes 
1, Mirfield pp59-60 - 
2. Reproduced in 1968 Current Legal Problems p1, The passage quoted is at p10, 
See also chapter 9,2 infra 
3, Cross on Evidence (5th edn) p544 
4, -Rv Dodd (1981) 74 Cr App R 50 R an 
119821 Cris LR 821; RM Mackintosh (1982) 76 Cr An f, 177. See also 
Mirfield pp103-106, 
5, Rv 6ow, j, supra quoted by Mirfield p105 
6, Joy p5 st seq 
7, Archbold 1115-32,15-33, The concept of the "person in authority" and the 
issues raised are discussed in depth in Mint leid Cvnlessions - the 'Perron 
in Authority' ReaulrelArrt (19813 Cris LR 92 
8, Archbold 115-44 
9, See generally Archbold 115-34 at seq 
10, It may only be the present writer's common sense which is offended, This 
decision was described as "unexceptionable" by 0,0, Prentice in Confessions 
- Controlling the Polka (1968) 31 l1LR 693, 
11, See Mirfield pp115-117 
12, Comal s loners of Custoes 5 Xcil 
13, Rv Middleton 09743 2 All ER 1190 at 1194 
14, Archbold 115-41,16-42 
1$, J, C, Ssith 119821 Cris LR 111; K. L. M. Smith (1982) 45 MLR 573 at 576, 
16, - Archbold 115-23 
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6.4 Exciusionmry Discretion and the Judges Rules 
So far what has been considered is the English common law 
exclusionary rule whereby involuntary confessions were rendered 
inadmissible in evidence -as a matter of law. It'is now proposed 
to consider the related but distinct issue of-exclusionary 
discretion whereby'a confession which is legally admissible on 
the test of voluntariness is nevertheless excluded by the judge 
in the interests of fairness. " 
The courts have long been opposed to anything in"the nature of a 
cross-examination of a suspect, by the police particularly if that 
suspect happens tobe in custody. - In`Kni! ht'and Theyre (1905) 20 
Cox CC 711 Channell J put it`thus: 
"You are entitled to ask questions for, your' 
information, as to whether-you-will charge the 
man, but the moment you have decided, to charge him 
and'prectically get'him into custody, then, 'in as 
much. as a judge"can't ask a question or a- 
-magistrate, it is ridiculous to suppose that a 
policeman can. " 
Mirfield I subdivides-- exclusionary discretion into two parts 
which he terms the "unfairness discretion" and the "unreliability 
discretion" the former relating<to'unlawful ör improper police 
conduct'-towards-the accused and the latter arising from fear that 
the trier of fact will overestimate the probative value of the 
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confession or its admission will otherwise prejudicially affect 
the accused. It is clear that discretionary-exclusion of 
confessions can be brought into play-by factors other than 
breaches of the Judges Rules '2 but even on that-basis the vast 
majority of cases do relate to the conduct and behaviour of the 
police and Mirfield's division of the discretion is not further 
pursued in this work. 
The first clear sign of the courts excluding 'a-confession as a 
matter of discretion rather than law appeared in Gavin (1885) 15 
Cox CC 656. At this period the courts were beginning to concern 
themselves with police interrogation of suspects. Earlier cases 
had favoured the'-admission-of prisoner's statements even though 
obtained by interrogation. 13 However towards the and of the 
century the view began to change and even before'the beginning of 
the twentieth century it was apparent that the judges were 
concerned to protect suspects from being compelled or persuaded 
by policemen to incriminate themselves. From Gav onwards the 
trend of the decisions was that once a suspect was taken into 
custody he should not be questioned although it would be 
necessary to wait for the 1964 Judges Rules before any clear rule 
emerged. The unsatisfactory state of the law during this period 
is shown by the fact that even as late as 1960 it was possible 
for the question to be posed, "Do. the (1912/1918 Judges) Rules 
forbid the police to question a person in custody, or do they 
merely advice them that, if they do question such persons, the 
answers may be inadmissible in evidence? " a 
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The first four Tudges Rules were formulated in 1912 with a 
further five Rules following In 1918. The aim of the Rules was 
to regulate the legitimate methods of police inquiry and to 
provide guidance to the police on what was permissible. They had 
no direct, effect on the common law exclusionary rule. The 
relevant 1912/1918 Rules provided as follows: 
1, When a police officer is endeavouring to 
discover the author of a crime,.. there is no, 
objection to his putting questions in respect . 
thereof to any person or persona, whether 
suspected or not, from whom he thinks useful 
information can be obtained. I- 
2. Whenever a police officer has made up his mind 
to charge a person with a crime, he should first 
caution such person-before asking-, any question or 
any further question, as the caca may be. - 
3. -Persons in custody should-not-be questioned 
without the usual caution being first 
-administered. 
4. If the prisoner wished to volunteer any 
statement, the usual, -caution should. -be 
administered. ... 
.,; 
7. A prisoner making a voluntary statement must 
not be cross-examined, and and no questions should 
be put to him about it-except-for the, purpose of 
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removing all ambiguity in what he actually said. 
"6 
In 1930 a Home Office Circular was issued to make it clear that 
"Rule 3 was never intended to encourage or authorise the 
questioning or cross-examination of=a person in custody after he 
has been cautioned, on the subject of the crime for which he is 
in custody, and long before this Rule was formulated, and since, 
it has been the practice for the Judge not to allow-any answer to 
a question so improperly put to be given in evidence; ... " 
The 1964 Judges-Rules 6 made various changes and helped to 
clarify some doubtful areas. For the first time it'was made 
clear'by-the new Rule 1 that a suspect might be questioned while 
in police cuetody, as long as he had not been charged with the, 
offence in question or informed that he might be"prosecuted for 
it. By the now Rule ,2 a'suspect was now to be cautioned when a 
policeman had "evidence which would afford reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that [he] ha[d) committed-an offence" rather than when 
the'policeman had made up his mind to charge him. It-was also 
made clear by the new Rule 3(b) that once an accused had been 
charged or informed that; he was to be-prosecuted, it was only in 
an exceptional case that questions about the offence might be put 
to him. 
The new , Rules were publiehed in an Appendix to Home Office- 
Circular No. 3111964 and in the Appendix they were preceded by a 
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preamble explaining that the Judges control the conduct of trials 
and the admission of evidence, but they do not control, initiate 
or supervise police activities or conduct. It was stated that 
the Rules did not purport to deal with the many varieties of 
conduct which might render answers or statements involuntary and 
hence inadmissible, but they dealt merely with particular aspects 
of the matter. The preamble also set out five gener; l principles 
which the Rules were stated not to affect. Those included as 
principle (C) the entitlement of the suspect to communicate 
privately with a solicitor and as principle (d)"a'requirenent 
that the-police should charge the suspect or inform him that ha 
is may be prosecuted as soon as they have enough evidence"to 
prefer a charge. Principle (a) has been considered above in 
connection with the exclusionary rule. 
The status of the Judges Rules-and their relationship'to the 
common law` exclusionary rule was first subject to judicial 
consideration in R. 
--v 
Vol in 119187 1Kß 531. In this case the 
headless and handless torso of a woman had been found in a parcel 
which also contained a piece of paper with the singular phrase 
"Bladie Belgiam" written on it. Voisin was interviewed by the" 
police and asked to account for his movements at the time when 
the murder was believed to have taken place. He was apparently 
detained in custody for inquiries but the police had not decided 
to charge him and indeed'in the absence of the head of the victim 
identification was not surprisingly proving difficult. Voisin 
made a voluntary statement without being cautioned and then a 
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police officer, again without a caution, asked him whether ho had 
any objection to writing the words, "Bloody Belgian. ". Voisin 
replied "Not at all" and promptly signed hio own death warrant by 
writing "Bladie Belgiern". 
It is not entirely obvious from the report whether. tho Court of 
Appeal, considered that there had been a breach of-the, Judgee 
Rules but,. it was made clear that the Ruleo. did not have the force 
of law and were "administrative directions the observance of 
which the police authorities should enforce upon their, , 
subordinates as tending to the fair administration of justice. ",. 
The court concluded "It is important that they should do so, -for. 
statements obtained from prisoners, contrary to the spirit of 
these rules may be rejected as evidence by the judge presiding at 
the trial, ", This,.; in essence, was the approach which the courts 
were to adopt,. towards the-Judges' Rules until they ware swept 
away by PACE in 1984,1% 
It became well settled that although a breach of the Rules 
themselves or-of principles (a) to (d) of.. tho preamble '. did not 
of. itself bring the exclusionary rule into play,. it did trigger 
the court's discretion to exclude evidence, 
f 
The exercise of the exclusionary discretion was very much 
dependant on the facts and circumstances of the individual case. 
Initially it was used, liberally, and where statements obtained in 
breach of the. Rules were admitted at first instance, the 
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appellate courts not infrequently overturned the conviction. 
This attitude changed after the Second World War and from about 
1950 onwards confessions obtained in breach of the Rules were 
almost uniformly admitted. 8 
At times the English courts seemed to be unaware of the 
fundamental distinction between exclusion by virtue of the 
exclusionary rule and exclusion by diocretion. In the much- 
criticised decision in Frager (1972)_56 Cr App R 151 the 
Court of Appeal blurred the distinction to the point where it 
almost became invisible and virtually submerged breaches-of the 
Judges Rules within the general test of voluntariness related to 
the exclusionary rule Edmund-Davies LJ stating: 
"Their non-observance may, and at times does, lead 
to the exclusion of an alleged confession; but 
ultimately all turne on the judge's decision 
whether, breach or--no breach, it'is shown to have 
been made voluntarily. " 
Prager was not an isolated instance 9 and as'Pattenden and 
Mirfield both point out 'a such an approach leaves the court 
without any discretion to protect an accused person who has been 
unfairly treated. If the prosecution prove the confession to 
have been voluntary it becomes, on this approach, admissible 
almost without further thought. A breach of the Judges Rules 
would only lead to exclusion if it were sufficiently serious to 
lead to either involuntariness or oppression. 
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Later decisions, notably Rv lud on (1980) 72 Cr App R 163 11 
reasserted the more "orthodox" view, but the problem was never 
satisfactorily resolved before the passing of PACE. 
Another problem in relation to discretionary exclusion was the -, 
reluctance of the appellate courts to lay down any guidelines for 
the exercise of such discretion, 12 Pattenden-suggests that the, 
root of both problems, is the confusion about the existence of a 
discretion to exclude a voluntary confession and the uncertainty 
surrounding its exercise, lay in the failure of the courts to 
agree about the object of the discretion. The courts never 
decided whether the discretion should be directed towards control 
of the police, the so-called disciplinary principle, or whether 
the point at issue was reliability. 
Notes 
1, p131, A similar point is made in Cross (6th edn) p171 
2, eg R_v Hudson (1980) 72 Cr App R 163 - detention in excess of period 
permitted by statute; Rv Platt [19817 Crib LR 622 - failure to inform 
father of arrest of mentally subnormal suspect, 
3, eg Thornton (1824) 1 Moody 27; Wild (1835) 1 Moody 452 although in this case 
those holding Wild in custody and interrogating him were not constables, 
See also Joy p34 et seq 
4, See Brownlie Police ýaestioning, Custody and Caution E1960] Cris LR 299 
S. Smith Questioning by the Police, Soss Further Points - 1119603 Cris LR 347 
6, [19641 1 All ER 237 
7, eg Rv toms (breach of principle (c)), See also 
Baldwin I McConville Police Interrogation and the Right to $00 J Solicitor 
E19791 Crim LR 14S 
8, Pattenden rho Judie, Discretion and the Criainsl Trial (Oxford, Clarendon, 
1982) p99; also Mirfleld p146 
9, Mirfield p134-136 
10. Mirfield pp133-134; Fattenden op cit note 8 supra, pp99-100 
11, Discussed in detail in Mirfield Confessions and Oppression (1983) 3 OJLS 289 
12, Mirfield p139 
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6.5 Prcýä is fof Reform of the Er. Tlich Law 
(i) Introduction 
Increasing dissatisfaction with the state of certain aspects of 
English criminal law, which, in the case of confessions, had coma 
to consist of the "Jigsaw pieces of two centuries of police and 
legal history" led to two major reports in the space of less than 
ten years, the Criminal Law Revision Committee's Eleventh Report 
of 1972 1 and the report of the Royal Commission on Criminal 
Procedure of 1981.2 
These two bodioc were different in almost all respects, The CLRC 
is a standing committee set up in 1959 to consider such aspects 
of the criminal law as the Home Secretary might from time to time 
refer to it and to make necessary recommendations. The RCCP was 
appointed in 1978 specifically to study and make' recommendations 
on the process of pro-trial criminal procedure and owed its 
existence in great measure to the outcry which followed the 
Confai t case. 
The CLRC consisted largely of trained lawyers while law/era were 
very much in a minority in the membership of the RCCP. The CLRC 
dealt with the admissibility of confessions in the context of a 
genera]. review of the rules of criminal evidence while the 1CCP 
looked at the issue from the perspective of police investigation 
of crime. The CLRC worked behind closed doors and although it 
solicited evidence it did no research. The RCCP commissioned 
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extensive and far reaching research studies. Not surprisingly 
they reached different conclusions and, unlike the position in 
regard to the right to silence, it was the views of the CLRC 
which were ultimately to prevail. 
Notes 
1. Cend 4991 
2, Cmnd 8092 
(ii) The Commit to 
The CLRC proposed to preserve the existing law in general with a 
relaxation of the strict rule that any threat or inducement made 
a confession inadmissible and with certain alterations in matters 
of detail. A majority of the committee recommended that there 
should be two grounds of exclusion. Firstly any confession 
obtained by oppression should be inadmissible; Secondly a 
confession would be excluded if it resulted from a threat or 
inducement (whether made by a person in authority or not) which 
was "of a sort likely, in the circumstances existing at the time, 
to render unreliable any confession which might be made by the 
accused in consequence thereof. 0-1" 
A minority of the 'committee would have allowed all confessions to 
go before the jury leaving it to them to assess the question of 
reliability. x This is, ' of course. essentially the modern 
Scottish practice. However, the majority of the committee 
considered that there was a danger that when the evidence on 
35 
either side was evenly balanced, "the imnediata effect on the 
jury of the evidence of a confession might be too great to be 
undone, even with the help of the summing up, by the evidence of 
the way in which the confession was 'obtained. " Secondly the 
majority'felt that to remove all restrictions on the edmies- 
ibiltty of confessions, no matter how they were obtained might, 
as they delicately put it, "tempt the police to resort on 
occasions to at least Umall improprieties. " 
The CLRC did not , examine tho issue of discretionary excluNion. 
As previously discussed, -the reaction'to the recommendation of 
the CLRC that the right to silence should be restricted was such 
that their , entire report was shelved. 
Notes 
1, Report pars, 65 and Draft Bill cl, 2 
2, Report paras, 62-63 
3, Report pars, 64 
4, supra chapter 3,1(U) 
J 
(iii) The Cpnfa, it Caee and the Eisher Inquiry 
In November 1972 three youths, Ronald Leighton, Ahmet Salih and 
Colin Lattimore, were prosecuted for the murder of a transvestite 
prostitute called Maxwell Confait whose body was found in a 
burning house in Catford, South London. The only evidence 
against them consisted of confessions and the fact that they had 
been amusing themselves by starting some small fires in the 
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vicinity of Confait's house the day after his death. ' Lattimore, 
the eldest at eighteen, was mentally retarded with a mental age 
of eight and an I. Q. 'of 66. He was also highly suggestible, 
Leighton, aged fifteen, was borderline subnormal with an I. Q. of 
75« Salih by contrast was bright and reasonably intelligent but 
he had just celebrated his fourteenth birthday two weeks before 
his arrest and English was not his first language. Leighton was 
convicted of the murder, Lattimore of manslaughter on the grounds 
of diminished responsibility and all three were convicted of 
arson with intent to endanger life. 
In July 1973 the Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal. How- 
over after a long campaign by the boys' families aided, and'poss- 
ibly encouraged, by media interest, the Home Secretary agreed to 
refer the case back to the Court of Appeal and. in October 1975 
the convictions were quashed. Although their Lordships decided 
that it was not necessary to embark on a detailed analysis. of the 
boys' admissions and the circumstances in which they were made, 
they observed that they contained a number of very improbable 
matters and some striking omissions. -2 
Following this, an inquiry was set up under Str Henry Fisher 
which reported in December 1977, ' Sir Henry's findings must have 
been a grave disappointment to those who wanted to believe that 
three innocent youths had been "fitted up" by the police. He 
found that no police officer had-deliberately falsified the 
record of oral answers given by the boys to police questioning d1 
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that Leighton and Salih could have been present at and taken part 
in the killing of Confait and that the confessions could not have 
been made unless at leaot, one of the throe had been involved in 
the murder and arson. ''"} On the balance of probabilities Sir 
Henry found <a) that Lattimore's confession to the arson was 
true, but-that he was. persuaded by Leighton and Salih to confess 
falsely to having-taken part in 'the killing, and(b)that the 
confessions of Leighton and Salih to having taken part in the 
arson were true; that their answers and statononto as to the 
killing were falsified to the extent necessary to incriminate 
Lattimore; but that both Leighton and Salih were involved in the 
killing. 
,, ý`_ 
However, Sir Henry found that there had been several breachee of 
the Judges Rules and Administrative Diroctions, indludtng the . 
failure to inform the boys of , the rights and facilities available 
to them, particularly legal advice, and in Lattimore' s case, 
prompting and questioning during the taking of a written 
'statement. ' In addition there had been an-improper delay-. in 
charging the boyc,. oven though the police had sufficient 
evidence, because they-wanted to question Leighton further, The 
questioning of Lattimore had been unfair and oppressive because 
, inter alia the police knew he was mentally retarded and had-.. 
nonetheless questioned-him (in a manner found to be in itself 
unfair'and oppressive) in the absence of a parent or guardian. 0 
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Sir Henry found evidence of-ignorance and misunderstanding of 
certain of the Judges Rules and Administrative Directions on the 
part of both the police and the legal profession and he made 
various. suggestions which would have-led to them being strength- 
ened, particularly the right of the suspect to legal advice. 9 
He also advocated tape recording of police interviews, pointing 
out that if the proceedings involving the three boys had been 
recorded his Inquiry might-have been unnecessary. 
When he turned to consider the question of enforcing compliance 
with the Judges Rules, Sir Henry considered that any sanction for 
breach of the Rules should be "certain and regularly applied" and 
at that time it was neither. 14 He was implicitly critical of 
the decision in Prager and pointed out that it was not even 
certain that a breach of the Rules which fell short of rendering 
a confession involuntary was enough to entitle-a judge to exclude 
the confession as a matter of discretion. 
Sir Henry stopped-short of recommending that all confessions 
should be corroborated, -but he did suggest that it should be made 
a rule of law that no person should be convicted on the evidence 
of a confession obtained in one of four specific-situations 
unless that evidence was supported-by other independent evidence. 
The four situations ware: 
(a) a confession obtained, in response to questioning by the 
police, by muane. of a breach of the Judges Rules or 
Administrative Directions, whether or not the'effect of the 
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breach was to make the confession involuntary; 
(b) a confession by a child or young person in response to 
questioning by the police without the presence of a parent, 
guardian or other person not a police officer; 
(c) a confession made by a mentally handicapped person (whether 
or not--known tobe so at the time) in response to questioning by 
the police without the presence of a parent, guardian or. other 
person-not a police officer; and 
(d) an oral confession made in a police station (whether the 
maker was in custody or not) of which a tape recording was not 
available. '' 
Point (d) could, of-course, only take effect if tape recording 
were universally available in police stations. 
ti1irfield comments that the reason for recommending introduction 
of a supporting evidence requirement would seem to be that the 
presence of such evidence will increase confidence in the 
reliability of the confession. If this is so, he argues, the 
recommendations in the report are not entirely satisfactory. 
While it is easy to imagine circumstances in which the presence 
of breaches of rules about questioning will cast doubt on the 
reliability of the confession, it does not follow that any breach 
of any such rule will cost doubt upon reliability. ''- 
This is undoubtedly so, but surely-a partial requirement far 
supporting evidence is better than none at all, - particularly -- 
where the requirement is targetted towards the protection of 
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identifiably vulnerable groups and the suppression of police 
malpractice? 
Although the Fisher Report was only concerned with the circum- 
stances of one rather sordid case, its main value was in high- 
lighting the grossly unsatisfactory state of the law and the 
urgent need for reform, for which it provided a considerable 
impetus. 
Notes _ ,.. _ 1, For full details of this case see Price and Caplan rho Conlatt Confessions 
(London, 1977), See also Irving and McKenzie Polur Interrogation; 7h# 
Effect of the police and Cris1na1 Evidence Act W4 (London, 1939) p219 et 
seq where the authors review the case on the assumption that PACE had been, 
in force, 
2, Price and Caplan op cit p107 
3. Report of an Inquiry by the Hon. Sir Henry Fisher into the Circumstances 
Leading to the Trial of three Persons on Charges Arising out of the Death of 
Maxwell Confait and the Fire at 27 Doggett Road, London SE6, December 13 
1977 HC 90 (hereinafter "Fisher Reporte) -, 4, Fisher Report pare 2,3 
5, Fisher Report pare 2,4 (d) and (e) 
b. Fisher Report pare 2,5 
7, Fisher Report pare 2,11 
8, Fisher Report para 2,13 
9, Fisher-Report paras 2,15-2,29 
10, Fisher Report pars 2,26 
H. ibid 
12, Mirfield pp203-204 
(iv) - The Royal Commission on Criminal Proceduro 
The RCCP accepted that there could be no adequate-substitute for 
police questioning in the investigation and prosecution of crime. 
Their-proposals were considerably more radical than those of the.. 
CLRCI but they ware made along with various other recommendations 
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for improving the accuracy of the record of the interrogation and 
for safeguarding the rights of'the suspect. " 
Although the RCCP has been criticised for dealing with the law of 
evidence in a way which was "vestigial in the extreme", I it 
cannot be'denied that many`of the points mada'in its report were 
very valid. The notion of voluntariness and the application of 
the exclusionary rule was considered to cause much difficulty to 
the police and courts. The oppression concept arg expressed in 
Prap,, A, was criticised on the basis'that it` required a police 
officer under the confusion and pressures of an investigation to 
make an assessment of the character, susceptibilities and mental 
state of`the suspect whom he is'interviewing and then try to 
adopt his questioning to that assessment, "only to find months 
later, that the judge takes a different view. As one of their own 
researchers had observed, "If any person is subject to a rule he 
should know when he is breaking it. This cannot be said of the 
rules governing the conduct of Interviews with respect to 
voluntariness or oppression. ", 2 
The Commission also pointed out that the legal and psychological 
concepts of "voluntarinas&" did not match since the very facts of 
custody and questioning in custody were in themselves coercive. ° 
In order'to ensure that suspects' statements were as reliable as 
possible, there should be "workable and enforceable guidelines 
for the police, criteria that the courts can apply without a feat 
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of imagination that sometimes defies belief, and a clear and 
enforceable statement of'the rights and safeguards for the 
suspect in custody. " 4 The safeguards were to be`embodied in a 
code of practice and were to include a right not to be held 
incommunicado, a right to legal advice, and a right to be fairly 
interviewed and properly cared for while in custody. Additional 
rights to special protection were proposed for vulnerable people. 
Subject to these requirements being met, the RCCP recommended 
that it should be left to the jury to assess the reliability of 
confession evidence upon the facts presented to them. 11 The 
criterion of "voluntariness" was to be removed. 
The RCCP were against the idea of automatic exclusion of evidence 
as a sanction for a breach of the code of practice. Such a' 
breach was to be dealt with as a matter'of police digcipline. It 
was to be left to the defence and the judge to warn'the jury of 
the potential unreliability of a confession obtained in breach of 
the code. 6 However any confession obtained by violence, throats 
of violence, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment would 
automatically be excluded. 7 
Notes 
1, Cross (6th edition) p542 
2, Report pens 4,70-4,72 
3, Report pare 4,73, See also RCCR Research Studies Not 1 and 2 
4, Report pare 4,75 
5, ibid 
6. Report pare 4,133 
7, Report pare 4,132 
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6.6- The Police and Cri Hind Evjdence Act 1984 
The proposal by the RCCP for the unfettered admissibility of all 
confessions°(other than those obtained by violanco etc) did not 
find favour and the legislation which followed is an amalgamation 
of the proposals of both bodies; but with those of the CLRC 
forming the real basis of the modern law of confessions. This is 
now to be found primarily in Part VIII of FACE and also in the. 
Code of Practice issued under Section 66 for the Detention 
Treatment and Questioning of Persons in Custody by Police 
Officers. Although a breach of the provisions of the Code does 
not of itself render the person responsible liable to criminal or 
civil proceedings, but only to disciplinary action, the pro- 
visions o¬ the Code are-admissible in evidence in any proceedings 
and any relevant provision'is to bo takes into account in 
determining any question before the Court. ' Thus the court is 
entitled to have regard to such matters as the length of the 
questioning, breaks for rest and refreshment etc. 
Section 82(1) defines a "confession" as including "any statement 
wholly or partly adverse to the person who made it, whether made 
to ,a person in authority or not and whether made in, words or 
otherwise. " 
By Section 76(1) it in provided that a confession made by an 
accused may b©given in evidence against him in so for as it is 
relevant and not excluded under Section 76(2). This latter 
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subsection sets out, the tact of, admissibility, ,. 
Mich- is clearly 
based on the proposals of the CLRC: 
"If in any proceedings where the prosecution 
proposes to give in evidence a confession made by 
, an accused person, it, is represented to the court 
that the confession may have been obtained - 
(a) by oppression of the person who made it; or, 
(b) in consequence of, anything said or done which 
was likely, -in the circumstances existing at the 
time, to render unreliable any confession which 
might be made by. him in consequence thereof, 
the court shall not allow the confession to be 
given in evidence-against him except in so, far as. 
the prosecution proves. to, the court beyond 
reasonable doubt that the confatsion (notwith- 
standing that it may be tru(3) was not obtained. as 
aforesaid. " I 
"Oppression" is , defined by Section J6 (8) as including "torture, 
inhuman or degrading . treat , ent, and the use or , 
throat of violence 
(whether or not amounting to torture). " 2 Tbip definition, which 
is in part based on Article 3 , of the European, Convention on 
Human Rights, is not exhaustive and what amounts to oppression 
will depend on the circumstances of-the individual, cace. The , 
pre-PACE law will presumably continue to be. relevant in deciding 
whether certain forms of conduct have been oppressive. However 
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in Rv Fulling 119871 ,2 All ER 65 it was made clear that a°° 
narrower view of what constituted oppression was now to be taken. 
In this case the female defendant had initially been interrogated 
without success, but confessed when told that her lover had been 
having an affair with another woman who was at that time being 
held in the next cell. 'According to Ms Fulling she was so upset 
by this revelation that she confessed in order to got out of the 
police station and away from her rival. Her confession was 
challenged on the basis of oppression, but the trial judge 
admitted it and his decision was upheld on appeal. 
The Court of Appeal criticised the common law definition of 
oppression as laid down in PsP as being artificially wide. 
Section 76(2)(b) (ie the potential unreliability test) would, 
their Lordships stated, now cover some of the circumstances which 
would previously have been dealt, with under oppression. Their 
Lordships also laid down that "oppression" should receive its 
dictionary meaning, via: "exercise of power in a burdonsome, 
harsh or wrongful manner; unjust or cruel treatment of suspects, 
inferiors etc.; the imposition-of unreaconable or unjust 
burdens. " The Court also quoted with approval one of the 
dictionary illustrations: "There is not a word in or language 
which expresses more detestable wickedness than oppression, " and 
went on to observe that, "It is hard to envisage any 
circumstances in which°such oppression would not entail some 
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impropriety on the part of. the interrogator. " This approach has 
been criticised, 3 but for the moment it will have to serve. 
Ej ng was followed in R_v Davison t19881 Crim LR 442 where 
there had been a whole series of-breaches of both the Code and 
the Act itself, including unlawful detention and an-improper 
denial of access to a solicitor. Judge Coombe hold that, the - 
police had been exercising their authority in a wrongful manner 
and this was capable of amounting to oppression,:, 
Although it remains to be seen what degree of police misconduct 
is necessary to qualify as oppression, the view has been 
expressed that it would be unfortunate if every breach of the 
detention rules were to result in, -an 
automatic-infercnco of., 
oppression-4 Clearly breaches will tend towards. a cumulative, 
effect, ` and judges will have to ask themselves whether a number 
of breaches (all to the advantage of the interrogator) suggest 
inadvertence or, intention, 
Opprnscion apart, the few now emphasises reliability although the 
teat is not whether the confession is actually unreliable but 
whether the circumstances arc likely to render it unreliable. 
The "person in authority" requirement, has been cwopt away and 
there is no requirement that. the "thing caid or done"-must-be 
said or done by a policeman, nor is it, nocessary that it, should 
be'said or done with the intention of Inducing a confession. It 
has however been held 8 that the subsection is only applicable to 
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a thing said or done by a person other than the defendant 
himself. 
The potential unreliability test `as laid down in Section 76(2)(b) 
is clearly of wider scope than the common-law test of 
voluntariness and the limits of the subsection have yet to be 
explored. Howdver it-has been arguad 15 that the phrase "anything 
said or done" in Section 76(2)(b) is unlikely to be used in 
respect of ordinary, , proper` questioning. Since few confessions 
are entirely spontaneous, " being generally induced by police 
questioning at leant to a point, this view would seem to be 
reasonable, '' 
-1 " 
The two heads; oppression and unreliability, are not mutually 
exclusive and there appears 'to be nothing to prevent the defence 
from challenging a confession on both grounds. 7 
Undcr Section 76(3) the court may take the point of admissibility 
ex proprio motu and in that event the prosecution are again 
required to prove the absence of'oppression or' factors' leading to 
unreliability beyond reasonable doubt. Section 76(4) provides 
that'where a confession is excluded that does not affect the 
admissibility of any facts discovered as a result of the 
confession. 'A confession excluded under Section 76(2) may also 
be admissible under 76(4) as evidence that the accused "speaks, 
writes or expresses himself in"a particular way" but for no other 
purpose. 0 
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Section 77 makes special additional provision for confessions by 
mentally handicapped persons. Where such a confession has been 
made in the absence of an independent adult the judge must warn 
the jury that there is special need for caution before convicting 
in reliance on the confession. This provision will only come 
into play if the confession has managed to pass'the oppression-' 
and unreliability tests. 
Section 78(1), which applies to all prosecution evidence and not- 
merely to confessions, provides: 
"In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow 
evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely 
to be given-if it appears to the court that, 
having regard to all the circumstances, including 
the circumstances in which the evidence'was 
obtained, the admission of -theevidence would have= 
euch an'adverse effect' on the fairness of the 
proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. " 
Thus a confession which has passed the oppression and unrelia- 
bility tests may nevertheless be excluded under Section 78(1) on 
grounds of fairness. 
Finally; Section 82(3) provides: 
"Nothing in this Part of this Act shall prejudice 
any'power of e court to exclude evidence (whether 
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by preventing questions from being put or 
otherwise) at its discretion. " 
It can thus be seen that there are now three separate sections of 
PACE, 76(2), 78(1) and 82(3), which could lead to confession 
evidence being excluded. In addition Section 76(2) contains the 
two tests of oppression and potential unreliability. The precise 
relationship between these provisions, which is by no means 
clear, has exercised some English writers but has not as yet been 
the subject of express judicial decision. It has been argued 
unsuccessfully '° that as Section 76 provided an exhaustive code 
on confessions, Section 78 must have been intended to apply to 
non-confession evidence only. However as Di Birch has pointed 
out, in the course of an exhaustive survey of the, recent major 
decisions, " if Section 76 were repealed tomorrow, it would still 
be possible to exclude all the evidence which'it excludes by 
invoking Section 78. As far as Section 82(3) is concerned, it 
has been suggested '2 that Sections 76 and 78 can only come into 
play before the evidence in question is given and thereafter 
exclusion would have to be under Section 82(3). 
Zander has extracted no fewer than fourteen propositions from, the 
seventy or so cases on Section 78 up-to July 1990. '0 The most 
important are: 
(a) [Proposition 1] The admissibility of confessions can be 
challenged under Section 78 as well as Section 76 ,. (or 82(3)); 
(b) [Proposition 31 Unfairness to the defendant is-not the sole 
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criterion for exercise of the discretion. The judge should 
consider the interests of the prosecution as well as the defence. 
(c) [Propositions 6 and 71 Evidence will not be excluded as a way 
of ponalicing the police. Obviously police misconduct can'be the 
basis of exclusion but wilful. wrongdoing by the police is not a 
requirement for the operation of Section 78, although most cases 
where evidence has been excluded have invlovod breaches of the, 
Act or the Codes 
(d) [Propositions 101 If the suspect has previous convictions and 
experience-of police stations the court's view of breaches of the 
rules by the police may be less severe. - 
One should not make too much of Proposition 3. Since Section 78 
confers a discretion on the'judge«it'is self evident (at least to 
this. writer) that the'exercise of such a discretion requires the 
balancing of competing interests. English law is stilla long 
way from the Scottish test of bilateral fairness. Zander bases 
his proposition on three cases. Firstly Rv O'Loughlin and 
Another-(1987) 85 Cr'App R 157 which is-a first instance decision 
with-nothing to do with confessions.. The question for, the court, 
was whether depositions were admissible as evidence for the 
prosecution in the absence of three-witnesses, two of whom were- 
known to be afraid to come-to court and the third had simply 
vanished.. The prosecution had-to satisfy the-judge beyond 
reasonable doubt that the witnesses had been "kept out of the way 
by the procurement of. the accused" within=the meaning of Section 
13(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1925 and this they failed to 
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do, although it was not-an unreasonable inference from-the 
circumstances. 
Kenneth Jones J. considered that Section 78 required him "to 
balance matters having regard, on the one hand, to the interests 
of the defendant; on the other hand to the interests of the 
public as represented by the prosecution. " In the circumstances 
of the particular case he considered that, "I must take into 
account in exercising my discretion also the interests of the 
Crown, or put another way, I must take account in measuring any 
unfairness to the defendant of the defendant's own activities, or 
if not his own activities the activities of others acting on hie 
behalf. " ThiG is self-evident. It would have been a remarkable 
exercise of-judicial discretion which failed to countenance the 
possibility of the defendant profiting from his own efforts, 
direct or indirect,. -to keep thn, witncssss-cut of the way. It 
hardly marks a major departure in English law, 
The other two cases on which Zander relies do both concern 
confetaionz,, -but both are briefly reported. . In Ry Snitth I1917] 
Crirn LR 579 the view of the court was that "The expression, 
'fairness of the proceedings' is not easy to interpret, It seems 
that the Court Ghou]d act as a balance between the prosecution 
and defence, bearing in mind that it is in the public interest 
that persons who commit offences of=this sort should be brought 
to juotice.! ' In the particular circumstances the court still 
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excluded evidence of an interview which had taken place after the 
accused had been wrongly denied access to a solicitor. 
Finally in v Hughes. £198$7 Cr'm hR X19 the report is even 
briefer. Once again the issue was access to legal advice. In 
upholding the decision of the trial judge to admit evidence of 
damaging admissions made in the absence of°a solicitor the Court 
of Appeal observed that "The effect-of the evidence on the - 
defence was not the sole consideration. (The trial judge] had to 
balance the interests of the prosecution and the interests of the 
defence in deciding what the interests of justice were. " 
Recent cases have shown the English courts holding that where - 
there has been more than one interview, irregularities in'the 
first will be-liable to "taint" the subsequent interview(s) 
leading to the possibility of exclusion-of any confession which 
might be obtained, -In Rv Ismail 119901 Crim LR there had - 
clearly been oppression in the first interview and it was hold 
that. to admit the second would be "to condone the flouting of the 
provisions designed to protect against confessions which were not 
genuine". 
In Rv McGovern ! 199 11 Grrim LE 124 the report: in, leer3 than 
ideally clear but itappears that the defendant; who was of low 
mental capacity was interviewed twice, firstly without a 
solicitor and subsequently in the presence of one. In addition 
the fact of the earlier interview and the wrongful denial of 
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access to legal advice was concealed from the solicitor when she 
eventually did gain access to the accused. A confession was 
apparently made at the first interview and later repeated. As 
the court noted "when an accused person has made a series of 
admissions ... at a first interview, the very fact that these 
admissions have been made is likely to have an effect on the 
person in the course of a second interview. " Accordingly the 
first interview having been in breach of Section 58, the court 
considered that the subsequent one must be similarly tainted. 
One slight oddity about McGovern is that the police would appear 
to have had good grounds, had they so chosen, to invoke the 
exception provided by subsections 58(6) and (8) under which delay 
in permitting access to legal advice may be justified in the case 
of a serious arresteble offence if the exercise of the right to 
legal advice will inter alia lead to interference with or harm to 
evidence connected with a serious arresteble offence or inter- 
ference with or physical injury to other persons. However the 
police failed to follow the correct procedure of obtaining the 
authorisation of a senior officer for the delay and the Crown 
conceded that the first interview was unlawful. 
Finally it should be noted that where the subsequent interview 
can be held not to be tainted by the earlier one, it will be 
admissible. 14 
Notes, 
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6.7 nsr al-Advir,. e Du c i_ an cr 
(1) Scotl nd I_ ,- 
There are major differences in Scottish and English law, 
particularly since'PACE in the question of access to legal 
advice for persons in police cuotody. 
Although tape recording is. gradually being introduced, -it has not 
been made a:: critarion-of'admissibility and it may generally be-,, 
said that, -subject to specific statutory provision a detainee or 
suspect in`the hands of the Scottish police even though he is not 
being interviewed on tape has-no right to legal advice before he 
is charged. 
In Scotland the-normal position. tn solemn procedure is governed 
by Section 19 of the 1975 Act which, broadly stated, entitles a 
person-who has been arrested to have intimation-sent to a 
solicitor, and to haven privat $--interview, with the solicitor- 
before judicial examination., In summary procedure Section 305 
makes similar provision and in both cases the prisoner is 
entitled to be told of his right of access to legal advice. A 
person detained under Section 2 of the 1980 Act is also entitled 
to have intimation sent to a solicitor and to be told of his 
right. ' _; 
However, theme general provioione do not provide , any riEht for e 
Cu5pect actually to sae the solicitor before , he has beon: charged. 
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The only case known to the writer where a person in the hands of 
the Scottish police has a specific right of access to legal 
advice is that of a person arrested or detained under the 
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 which is 
clearly framed on the basis of English practice. 2 
In the case of an ordinary detainee the Thomson Committee had 
specifically recommended that access to a solicitor should be a 
matter of police discretion. ° Otherwise they took the view that 
a solicitor should-not-be permitted to intervene in police 
investigations before charges '- 
"The purpose of the interrogation is to obtain 
from the suspect such informatiQn as he may 
possess regarding the offence, and this purpose 
might be defeated by the participation of his 
solicitor. " 
It is also important to remember that the Thomson Committee made 
its recommendations on the basis that there should be a reliable 
record of police interrogation and in particular that the 
admissibility of-'a statement made before arrest'in answer to 
questioning in a police station should depend on the statement 
having been tape-recorded, -0 
There is a surprising lack of Scottish case law specifically: on 
the issue of-legal advice to persons in custody and such as 
exists is largely unsatisfactory. 6 Judicial references to non- 
existent "rights" are unhelpful. Lord Anderson was simply 
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incorrect when he assorted that: - 
"A person who is accused is entitled, from the 
moment of apprehension, to have the advice of a 
skilled law agent, who will-advise-him whether or 
not he ought to make a statement and what 
statement he ought to make. " ' 
In modern practice once the accused hea'been charged, if he 
wishes to make a voluntary statement, he must, - at that stage, be 
offered the services of a solicitor 0 but otherwiso'his only 
right is (and has been since the passing of the Criminal' 
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1887) to have intimation sent to a, 
solicitor and to an interview with the solicitor prior to 
appearance in court. 
There has never been a Scottish case in which a statement has 
been excluded solely because of the absence of legal advice. The 
closest Scottish law has come to excluding a confession because 
the accused had been wrongly denied accoec to legal advice was 
Lmw V. Mc, Nicol 12-65 -Tr. 
32 where the accused'c solicitor had been 
contacted but was unable to come to the police station immed- 
iately and the police had cautioned and charged the accused who 
had then made a statement before his arrival. However there was 
also an unjustified threat to keep the accused in custody over a 
public holiday and this was an important factor in'the court 
holding the statement to have been-unfairly obtained. 
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What it really comes to is that currently under Scottish law the 
police are under no legally enforceable obligation to allow 
access to legal advice but a statement obtained in the absence of 
such advice may well be liable to exclusion on the grounds of 
unfairness. 
The problems inherent in this situation are, to an extent, offset 
by the very limited periods during which such a person-can be 
detained in Scotland by comparison-with England, A , suspect may 
only be detained for six hours and a person arrested must be 
brought before a court on the next lawful day. -Apart from the 
possibility of "voluntary" attendance, there is no escape route 
to allow the Scottish police to extend these periods. 
Nevertheless it is clearly unsatisfactory that the law on such an 
important point is in such an ambiguous condition and depends on 
legislation more than a century old and conceived on the basis of 
the old form of judicial examination: 
"At a time when questioning by the police was 
frowned-upon, and the judicial. examination would 
have been the first attempt at ascertaining the 
accused's version of events, it might have been 
sufficient protection that the accused be 
forewarned by his solicitor of the perils of 
examination. Nowadays, though, the most important 
part of the questioning will normally have 
ocurred, and any incriminating etatementa been 
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lade, before the examination and often without 
legal assistance. In these circumstances Section 
19 smacks of 'shutting the stable door after the 
horse has bolted. 1" '3 T 
At the moment the situation is fair to no-one. - Opinions may 
differ as to an appropriate solution but it is clear that -the-' 
quo should not be allowed to continue, In the writer's 
view, provided there-is-an accurate-record (ie a tape or video 
recording), and provided also that there are no legislative 
changes to the maximum periods for which persons may be hold by 
the police, the"Thomson Committee's proposal that there should be 
no right for a solicitor to intervene in police proceedings Is 
correct and should become the basis for the law. It appears to 
the writer that-the denial of legal advice for a short period is 
the most practical compromise between the needs of investigation 
of crime and the-rights of the individual. 
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(ii) England 
By contrast with the very limited periods possible in Scotland, 
the modern English law allows detention without charge for up to, 
twenty four hours ' and this may be extended to a maximum of 
thirty six hours by the police themselves. 2 Detention beyond 
thirty six hours requires the-authority of. a magistrate's court ' 
but if this is granted, 'the accused person will be returned to 
the police, and not remanded to prison. 'The, maximum possible 
period of detention is ninety'cix hours. 
Prior to PACE, principle (c)-of the preamble to the 1964 Judges 
Rules and Administrative Directions provided: 
'"4 every person at any stage of an investigation 
should be able to communicate and to consult 
privately with a solicitor= This Is so 'even if he 
is in custody-provided that, in such a case no 
unreasonable delay or hinderance"is caused to the 
-processes of investigation or the administration 
of,, justice by °his doing so. " -- - eý,. 
This was reinforced by-an Administrative Direction which 
provided: ' 
"A person-in custody should'be allowed to"opeak on 
the telephone "to his solicitor or to his friends 
provided that no-hinderance-is reasonably likely' 
to be caused to the processes of investigation or 
to the administration of Justice by his doing so. " 
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However the courts, with a few notable exceptions, 4 were no more 
inclined to exclude confessions obtained in breach of the 
entitlement to legal advice than they were to exclude evidence 
obtained in breach of any other aspect-of-the Judges Rules. 6 
In 1971 Lord Widgery, the then Lord Chief'7ustice, was quoted in 
the press as having said to the American Bar Association: 
"Any rule'requiring the presence of the suspect's 
lawyer during, interrogation is quite unacceptable., ' 
It would no doubt be an excellent thing for an 
independent third party to be present so that he 
could later testify to the court as to what had 
taken place, but the accused's lawyer is not an 
independent party. " 6 
t 
To this the riposte has been made that the solicitor is not meant 
to be independent, he is the bons fide adviser of his client and 
the protector of his interests. 7 Battle lines in this argument 
t 
tended to be drawn along familiar lines. On the one side the 
police would invariably complain that a suspect's solicitor would 
impede the progress of-legitimate police inquiries. There was, 
in England, a deep seated mistrust by the police of lawyers and a 
perception, usually based-on generalisation from the particular, 
that in many cases they were at least as bad as their clients. 8 
On the other side there was widespread suspicion and ignorance of 
what went on in police stations. 
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Research by Zander, "` Baldwin and McConville-11° and Softley It 
showed how unsatisfactory the situation was with Baldwin and 
McConville finding fewer than one defendant-in ten being 
interviewed in'the presence of a solicitor despite the terms of 
the Judges Rules. Admittedly many-defendants did not ask for 
legal advice, but this often arose from ignorance or a conviction 
that the request would be. refused rather than a conscious 
decision not to exercise a, known: right: 12 Most disturbing was 
the number of defendants who had (or. ciaimed, to have had)-: 
requests for-legal advice refused. point blank by the-police. In 
Baldwin and McConville's survey this amounted to 84 defendants 
out of a total of i09 who had requested to be allowed to consult 
a solicitor. -_=IV 
Although the RCCP expressed a measure of scepticism about 
research relying on defendant based samples, it did emphasise the 
need to ensure a "completely effective" right to legal advice. 'I 
Section 58 of PACE '4 broadly endorses the RCCP'e proposals and 
now provides by subsection-(1) that-a person who is in police 
detention shall'be entitled, if ha so requests, to consult a 
solicitor privately-at any time. The police-are required-by the 
Code of Practice to inform the suspect of his rights both orally 
and by written-notice. 
The police are only entitled to dolay compliance with the -. 
defendant's request if-ha is in custody for a "serious arrestablo 
f 
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offence" and the circumstances fall within subsection (8) is they 
have reasonable grounds for believing that compliance would (a). 
lead to interference with or harm to evidence connected with a 
serious arrestable offence or interference with or physical 
injury to other persons or (b)-lead to the alerting of-other 
persons suspected of having committed such an offence but not yet 
arrested for it or (c) hinder the recovery of any property 
obtained as a result. of such an offence. Only an officer of the 
rank of superintendent or over. can authorise delay and then only 
for a maximum of thirty six hours. After this period the right 
to legal advice becomes absolute. 
Since Section-58 cane into force, the Court of Appeal initially 
took. a fairly robust line against the denial of legal advice 
although it has left open the possibility of a retreat. at a later 
stage. 18 In Rv Samuel ('19881-2 A11, RR 115. the defendant was 
arrested on suspicion of armed 'obbery, clearly a "serious 
arrestable. offence", and. questioned by the police on four 
occasions while he-was in-custody. In the course of the second 
interview he asked. to see, a-solicitor. This was refused 
apparently on the grounds that other, euspects might be warned and 
that the recovery. of_outstanding stolen money might be hindered, 
and the refusal was later repeated. The police made no efforts 
to ascertain the identity of the solicitor whom Samuel wished to 
contact; he was in fact a Mr Warner. described by. the Court of 
Appeal as "a. highly respected member of his profession". Despite 
several attempts,, Mr Warner only obtained access to his client. 
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after he had confessed. Evidence of the confession was admitted 
at the trial but on appeal it was held that the trial judge, ought 
to have excluded it under Section 78. 
The Court took the view that the police must be virtually certain 
that a solicitor, if contacted, will thereafter either commit a 
criminal offence or unwittingly pass on a coded message to other 
criminals. Only in the remote event of the police being able to 
produce evidence as to the corruption of a particular solicitor 
would a police officer be able to assert a reasonable belief that 
a solicitor would'commit a criminal offence. They went on to 
hold that a belief that a solicitor would inadvertently alert 
other criminals could only reasonably be hold by the police if 
the suspect was a particularly resourceful and sophisticated 
criminal or the solicitor was particularly inexperiencod or 
naive. In this case the Court concluded that the real reason for 
delaying legal advice was to allow the police a final opportunity 
to question Samuel in the absence of his solicitor, Mr Warner 
had stated in evidence that he would probably on this occasion 
have advised the defendant'to rofu o to answer further questions 
and the Code of Practice expressly disallows denial of access to 
a solicitor on the ground that the solicitor will advice the 
suspect to remain silent. 
Srmo accordingly has had the effect of narrowing greatly the 
interpretation of Section 58(8) and preventing the police from 
making a general unsubstantiated allegation that it war, thought 
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that. otherv might be alerted-if. a solicitor was contacted. In 
effect the police have to be in the position of being able to 
prove that the particular solicitor requested by the suspect was 
corrupt. -- 
An almost identical set of circumstances came before, a differ--,. 
ently constituted Court, of Appeal in Rv ladice [19881 Crim LR 
LQ and a different result followed. While the Court held itself 
to be bound by the restrictive interpretation of Section 58(8) in 
gamuel it hold that the evidence of Alladice's confession was 
rightly admitted since the presence of the solicitor. would have 
added nothing to his knowledge of his rights and would have made 
no difference during the final questioning, -Alladice having 
apparently stated that ho only wanted a solicitor to be present 
to keep a check on police conduct. Interestingly, the court 
observed that-it was time that comment-upon a defendant's silence 
when interviewed should be permitted at his trial together with 
the necessary alterations to the words of-the caution= 16 
However, as Helen Fenwick has observed, 17 it- must be open to 
question whether the suspect-is-the best person to evaluate the 
effect of having legal. adviceand certain, factore in "ktc 
such as the defendant's relative youth and the fact-that the 
admissions he made formed the bests of the came against him, - cast 
doubt on the supposition that the presence of a solicitor would 
have had no effect on the interview. 
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The police clearly regard access to legal advice under Section 58 
as an obstruction, and there was outrage at the decision in 
Semueel. '6 It-would therefore not be surprising if they were to 
attempt to circumvent the law and either deny suspects access to 
legal advice or persuade them not to exercise their right. Two 
recent research studies have reached differing conclusions on the 
extent to which the police comply with the letter and spirit of 
the law. 
Irving and McKenzie in their study in Brighton 19 found that that 
the police were initially punctilious in observing the - 
requirements of PACE in relation to legal advice, although this 
later began to wear off slightly but even so they only found one 
case where-access to advice had been unduly delayed. 20 
The proportion of, suspects receiving legal advice in Brighton 
rose from 1% in 1985 to 11%-in-1986 and 27% in 1987. Most 
interestingly the 1987 research established that "far from 
interfering with the, process of criminal investigation, most 
solicitors are anxious to reach a fully informed conclusion about 
the, police case and to that end they tend to advise clients to 
cooperate with interviews where there appears to be a reasonable 
case to answer. " 2' In addition there was no evidence that the 
presence of solicitors had an adverse affect on the number of 
admissions made by suspects. 
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Irving and McKenzie also suggested that solicitors-would tend to 
advise their clients not to answer questions where the evidence 
against them was weak, or was not fully disclosed by the police. 
In such cases the police might come to believe that the failure 
of the case was "caused" by the solicitor, rather'that the lack 
of evidence or the lack of adequate disclosure. Such a per- 
ception could lead to a`vicious circle with the police becoming 
less cooperative and disclosing less in subsequent cases unless 
positive moves were made to break the vicious circle. However 
the majority of solicitors in Brighton were found to collaborate 
successfully with investigating officers in administering PACE 
and such antagonism as there was tended to develop more out of 
"personal animosities, perceived misconduct, and a variety of 
miscommunication. " 22 
In a considerably more widely based-study involving ten police 
stations 213 sanders and Bridges found a very different picture 
from Irving and McKenzie's description of amicable cooperation. 
They found that while the police now rarely refuse suspects- 
access to'legal advice overtly, many dubious practices and ploys 
are used to ensure that the suspect is either unaware of his 
right to advice or dissuaded from exercising it, These include 
telling the suspect his rights too-quickly, incomprehensibly or 
incompletely, implying that-contacting a solicitor will result in 
release from custody being delayed and failing to inform the 
suspect that legal advice is available free of charge. 
68 
"Informal" interviewing is also a problem and one on which the 
courts have yet to take a clear position. 24 
The crux of the matter isthe, fact that the suspect Is-dependent- 
on the police for information about his rights., The police are 
being asked to safeguard the rights of those with whom they have 
an adversarial relationship and hence to place obstacles in their 
own path. -This, say Sanders and Bridges, is irrational and, -- 
doomed to failure. -. 
If they are accurate, these findings are alarming. 2.11 Since PACE 
police malpractice has probably not been reduced but has been-: 
made less overt and hence more difficult to detect and control. 
("If it isn't in the custody record it didn't happen. ") In 
giving the false impression of complete-police compliance with 
the law, unduly great faith in the police will now be encouraged. 
In the opinion of Sanders and Bridges, the Code of Practice is 
systematically disregarded and the disregard appears to be 
endorsed or even instigated at a high level of command, is by 
precisely those senior officers who should be responsible for its 
enforcement through the discipline code. They suggest that 
unrestrained access to legal advice depends on "the removal of 
the police as gatekeepers. ", The right to legal advice does not 
have any remedy and, - in the absence of a remedy which would cause 
the police to suffer, there is no incentive for them to safeguard 
the suspect's right. Sanders and Bridges suggest that in order 
for the right to legal advice to be invested with more than 
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symbolic value, it should be backed up by criminal liability, or 
at the very least liability in tort on the part of the police. 
If Sanders and Bridges are correct, PACE would appear to have led 
to a situation worse than that which existed before. The writer 
would submit that even in its present unsatisfactory state Scots 
law is preferable. Scots law ensures that the suspect is removed 
from the hands of the police and brought under the protection of 
the court at the earliest possible moment, In this situation 
there is much less need for legal advice. It is submitted that 
English law is fundamentally illogical in permitting the police 
to detain a suspect for up to ninety six hours and question him 
repeatedly during that period, but at the same time expecting 
them to inform him of a right which, if exercised, would be 
likely to prolong the inquiry or possibly frustrate it 
altogether. 
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6.8 Confirm t jon by Subsequent Fact 
It may happen that in the course of making a confession which is 
later held to be inadmissible, an accused brings to light 
evidence which is relevant to the case and which the prosecution 
wish to tender. For example he might say during the course of a 
confession that he threw the murder weapon into a particular 
field or that stolen property is in his house and the object is 
searched for and found. It may, of course, be that the object 
has some evidential value independent of the confession, for 
example the accused's fingerprints might be found on the weapon 
or the stolen property might be in a locked room for which only 
the accused holds the key. However where the confession is 
inadmissible two basic questions arise. (1) How is the law to 
treat such evidence when it is discovered as a consequence of an 
inadmissible confession? and (2) Should the confession or come 
part of it also be admitted if it is verified by the subsequently 
discovered evidence? 
There is an almost complete lack of authority on these questions, 
particularly the former, in Scotland, but prior to PACE the 
situation was precisely the opposite in England with an excess of 
authorities, many of which were mutually contradictory. I There 
would, on the basis of the English cases, appear to be five 
possible answers. to the questions poced above: (a) to admit the 
fact discovered but nothing more; (b) to admit the fact 
discovered, and that its discovery was in consequence of 
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something the accused said, (c) "to- admit'theý fact 'discovered 
together with as much' of the confession as'reläte'& strictly to 
it; (d) to admit the fact discovered and the entire confession; 
and (e) to exclude, the whole confession and all facts discovered 
in consequence of it. 2 
It is possible to find English authority to support any of these 
five propositions and before PACE, the lawýin England wassim. ply 
a mass-and in sore need of'reform. ' The position has"noia'been', ý 
settled by Section 76(4)'of PACE: 
'(4) The fact'that' a confession is wholly or partly 
`äf this saction- shall not xckuded in püra'uanc ` 
affect the admissibility in evidence -- 
(a) of any f'acts'diccovered 'as' a 'result of tKG, 
confession; or 
(b) where the confession is relevant ac-, `6chnwing 
that the accused-cpoakc, ' writes or, exprässcs 
himself its a'partictilar -way, of so much of the- 
confession as'tc'neces'sary to chow-that' he does 
so. 
Section 76(4)(a) effoctively''restaten the hihtoric, position of 
English law foilöwing'thc decision in' the oId' case of  
W2rickshall (1783) 1 .f !i ch1 
263. ° In that case a' female 
prisoner, in the course of an improperly induced confession, said 
that" the stolen: goods were in her` lodgings. ' A' cübsequent 'search' 
revealed that this'was indeed sty, and theI goody were actually 
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found in her bedding. Although the confession was excluded, the 
fact of the finding of the stolen goods was admitted. Section 
76(4)(b) is obviously intended to cover the sort of situation 
which arose in Rv Voisin 119181 1Kß 531.15 
In'Scotland, although Alison favoured the Warickshall rule, 6 the 
only decision bearing on the point. -is a mere°' and it is less 
than ideally clear; particularly in relation to the second 
question. It will be remembered that following an interrogation, 
subsequently found-to have been unfair, -Chalmers'had taken the 
police to a cornfield-where he pointed out'-where'he-had disposed` 
of the deceased's purse, which was duly recovered. -The-evidence 
of the accused's actings in the cornfield was'admitted by'the 
trial"judge, in the absence of authority to the contrary. 
However, his decision was overturned on appeal. Lord Cooper 
referred to the "episode of the'cornfield" and dealt with it 
simply on the basis that°the crucial evidential-paint wag the 
accuysed'a knowledge of the whereabouts of the purse: ' 
"The significance of the episode is plain, for it 
showed that the appellant knew where the purse 
was. If the police had-simply produced, and 
proved the finding of, the purse, that-'evidence- 
would have carried tham little or no'distance in 
this case'towards implicating the appellant. " 
Since the accused's actings in the field were'"part and--parcel of 
the same transaction" as the unfair interrogation, evidence of"- 
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them was inadmissible and there was accordingly nothing to link 
the accused to the purse. The finding of the purse on its own 
was irrelevant and hence the case collapsed. 
Two basic propositions. can be derived from Chalmers. Firstly, 
although the point was, not specifically argued, -the discovery of 
a subsequent fact does not, in Scots'1aw, 'render an otherwise 
inadmissible confession admissible. -'This much at least is clear. 
Secondly, and more doubtfully, the evidence of the finding of the 
purse would have been admissible quantum valeat (which in this 
case was, of, course, nil). At the very least Lord Cooper was-not 
prepared in the circumstances of Calmer to hold that the 
finding was inadmissible. However the point certainly cannot be 
regarded as being beyond. doubt. i 
Given that Scots lawýis unsettled on the issue of, the admiss- 
ibility of a fact discovered in consequence of an inadmissible 
confession, it is appropriate to consider the arguments that. 
might be advanced. One of the main reasons for the unsatis- 
factory state of the pro-PACE law in England was the failure of 
the courts to-decide the policy behind the exclusion of improp- 
erly obtained confessions. This is not-so much-of an. issue in 
Scotland since the sole criterion is fairness to the accused, and 
improperly obtained evidence will be excluded because it has been 
improperly obtained and not because it is unreliable. Similarly 
the courts have not, in general, applied,, the co-called discip- 
linary principle and there are few instances in Scats law of the 
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courts expressly excluding evidence in order to discourage im- 
proper police practices. However, even though the courts may not 
overtly apply the disciplinary principle, the fact that a case 
has collapsed because improperly obtained evidence has been 
excluded is bound to become known to the police and it'is 
reasonable to assume that lessons will be learned. 'In`other 
words the exclusion of evidence will be likely to have an effect 
on police behaviour whatever the court's intention may be. 
Accordingly it might be argued that logic and the need to 
discourage improper police actions must lead to the conclusion 
that where the confession is inadmissible, evidence of 'a "ton- 
sequently discovered fact ought also tobe inadmissible. The 
exclusion of`an improperly obtained confession in order to 
discourage improper police behaviour is inconsistent with the 
admission of evidence discovered in consequence of the 
confession. Although initially attractive, it is submitted that 
this argument is unsound since the existence of the'fact'is a 
matter independent of the ' confession, 
4 
The point may be made clearer by considering the possibility 
that, in the course of an inadmissible confession, A admits to 
having pawned the stolen property in the shop run by B. B is 
seen by the police, remembers A pawning the property, ' which is 
recovered, and in due course he is 'cited as a witness against A. 
An argument that the prosecution should not be allowed to call B 
as a witness against A because hie involvement was discovered as 
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the result of an inadmissible confession is self-evidently unsus- 
tainable '. and in the hypothetical example, B's evidence linking 
A with the property would clearly be admissible. Since B is 
merely a link in the chain. of evidence between A and the 
property,, there is,, it is submitted, no difference in, principle 
between the hypothetical, example and the situation where the 
inadmissible. confession leads simply to the discovery of the 
property itself without B's intervention, the link to A being 
provided by, say, fingerprints. 
On the other hand, if unreliability is considered to be the 
reason for the exclusion of-an-improperly obtained confession, an 
argument can be made that while. there may be a risk that the 
confession is unreliable, no such risk attaches to the 
subsequently discovered fact. It has already been pointed out 
that this is not the basis on which Scote law operates, but such 
an argument would tend towards the conclusion that at least so 
much of-the confession as is verified (and hence-proved reliable) 
by the finding of the fact, should be admitted. 
The Thomson Committee dealt with the issue briefly under 
reference to jalMerr 
"The view that the discovery of the article 
renders any part of the statement admissible has 
been rejected in Scotland. We accept this. Scots 
law excludes evidence on the ground that it has 
been improperly obtained without consideration of 
77 
its reliability. To allow evidence 'of a statement 
to be led because it can be shown to be true might 
encourage police irregularity. On the other hand, 
it does not-follow that evidence of the discovery 
of articles should be excluded merely because the 
information supplied by an accused which led to 
their discovery, is inadmissible. 
We take the view that there is nothing improper in 
'the police asking questions of an accused person 
after charge, for example regarding the where- 
abouts of a missing child or"'stolen property. 
Indeed the police have a duty to ask such 
questions and the'public expect them to do so. 
Although the answers which they receive will not 
be admissible in evidence, the court may allow 
evidence'of recovery, --provided: 
(a)`the prosecution does not disclosed in evidence 
the source of - the information; and 
(b)-the information wae: not obtained by methods 
which the court decides are unfair. 9 
Unless the Thomson Committee were intending to restrict the 
admissibility of recovery solely to the post-charge questioning 
situation, , the difficulty with this approach is that it is 
circular, Apart from post-charge questioning, where any 
resulting statement is inadmissible no matter how "fair" the 
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questioning, it is illogical to say that the evidence is 
admissible unless it was obtained by methods which were unfair, 
since the only basis on which Scots law now excludes confessions 
is that they were unfairly obtained. If the confession is 
excluded because it has been unfairly obtained, ex hypothesi the 
subsequent fact is also inadmissible. This is clearly not in 
accordance with Lord Cooper's opinion in Chalmers nor, it is 
submitted, is it consistent with logic. 
It is submitted that the basis on which Scots law should deal 
with this matter is as suggested by Sheriff Macphail. 10 He 
argues convincingly that the issue should be assimilated to the 
broader question of illegal searches and seizures, with the issue 
becoming one of judicial discrestion: ' 
"If the facts were discovered as a result of 
circumstances particularly unfair to the accused 
or an exceptionally serious illegality, such as a 
confession extracted by brutality, the judge would 
be entitled to exclude the evidence. That would 
then be a particular application of the general 
discretion of the court to admit or exclude 
evidence illegally or irregularly obtained. " 
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6.9 Procedural Aspeetg -'The Voire Dire and the Tri -wi n-a- 
(i) The Present Law 
One of the characteristic features of procedure in England and 
other jurisdictions whose legal systems are essentially English 
is the use of the trial-within-a-trial or-voire dire to determine 
the admissibility of disputed confessions. -'Although Lord 
Justice-General Cooper and Lord Justice-Clerk'Thomson introduced 
it into Scotland, I this foreign procedure has not really 
flourished in the hostile northern climate. Nevertheless it 
retains a toe-hold in Scotland, and indeed one Working Group 
recommended its extension to disputed identification parade 
evidence although fortunately no steps have been taken to 
implement the proposal. 2 
I 
This section examines in general-outline the body of juris- 
prudence which has built up in Englana and-some of the problems 
which have been raised before considering the arguments which 
have been stated both for and against the procedure. 
In a jury trial the question of the admissibility of=a, confession 
is normally a matter for the trial judge although the matter may 
exceptionally arise before the examining Justices in the course 
of committal proceedings. "I Different issues arise in summary 
proceedings and these are considered later. 
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Where the defence intend to challenge the admissibility of a 
confession, they will inform the prosecution who will not mention 
the confession in their opening speech. Thereafter in normal 
course the trial will-, proceed until the point is reached at which 
the prosecution wish=to adduce evidence of the confession when 
the objection will-normally be made., ° Occasionally, it may be 
more convenient for the judge to deal with the issue of . 
admissibility at an earlier stage, for example prior-to opening 
to the jury where prosecuting counsel would be unable to explain 
his. case without referring to the confession. 
It may be remarked in passing that the avoidance of complications 
of this nature is one of the reasons for preferring the Scottish 
procedure under which there are no opening speeches. If for some 
reason it were desired to challenge a confession in, advance of 
trial. in, a Scottish court it would presumably be necessary to. 
apply for a preliminary diet under Section 76(1)(c) of the 1975. 
Act although it is difficult to envisage such a cituation_arising 
as a practical issue. 
Returning to Rnglieh: procedure, at whatever stage the matter is 
raised,, the-judge will conduct a trial on the voire dire to 
decide the question of . admissibility. This will normally be done 
in'the absence of"tho jury, -but only at the request or with the 
consent of the defence, 
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No clear procedural rules appear to have been laid down for the 
trial-within-a-trial and the normal rules of admissibility of 
evidence would not appear to apply. After some initial 
uncertainty the defendant is, in modern ' practice, invariably 
regarded as a competent witness`on`his own behalf at the trial- 
within-a-trial, and older cases to the opposite effect can now be 
regarded as wrongly decided. 6 If the defendant' does give 
evidence he is required to do so on oath 7 and is subject to' 
cross-examination. -'-The permitted extent ofcross-examination is 
more limited than it would be at a normal trial, and prosecuting 
counsel may not cross-examine about matters not relevant to the 
issue before the judge. el 
There is, at present, a conflict of authority on whether the 
defendant may, in' the course of the trial-within-a-trial, be 
questioned as to the truth of'the challenged, statement. In B -v 
Hammond (1941)"28 Cr ApTpp 84 the defendant in" a murder case had 
been subjected to what appears from the report to have been a 
fairly mild cross-examination in the course of which he was-asked 
whether-his confession, which he alleged had been beaten out of 
him, was true. - He admitted that it was true and later" still'in 
the course of the trial-within-a-trial, also admitted to killing 
the victim. The'Courtry°of Appeal held that the question of 
whether the statement was true was "..: -a perfectly natural 
question to put and was relevant to the issue whether the story 
which the appellant was then"attacked'and ill-used by the police 
was true or false. " Humphreys J made an important, and, it is 
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submitted, self-evident, -point when he observed: 
"If a man says 'I was forced to tell the story, I 
was made to say this, that and the other, ' it must 
be relevant to know whether he was made to tell 
the truth or whether he was made to say a number 
of thing which were untrue. " 
Hammo was subject'to criticism, and, 'it is submitted, misunder- 
standing, but nevertheless it became an accepted part of English 
procedure that the defendant could in appropriatecases be 
questioned as "to the`truth'of the statement during the trial- 
within-a-trial. 
However in Wong Kam-Ming yR 019801 AG 247. e majority of the 
Privy Council hold that Hammond was wrongly decided with regard 
to the law of Hong Kong and in that country-a defendant should 
not be questioned on the voice dire as to the truth or otherwise 
of the statement. The sole object of the voire dire was to 
decide on the voluntariness of-the alleged confession in 
accordance with long-established principles. If the accused 
denies the truth of the confession or part of it, this takes 
thing no further as far as his credibility is concerned. However 
if he admits, the truth of the statement that suggests that he - 
tends to tell the truth which in turn suggests that he is also 
telling the truth about police malpractice. ' Lord Hailcham of 
St, "Marylebone dissented on this point and argued that it was not 
possible to say a priori that-in no circumstances is truth or 
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falsity relevant to either-the admissibility'of the disputed 
statement or the cradibility of prosecution or defence witnesses. 
The law has not advanced from this position since 1980 with 
Hammond still technically "un-overruled" in English law but"-with- 
Wong Kam-Ming, strictly only a persuasive authority and'weakened 
by a powerful dissent, now being-accepted as the authoritative 
statement of the law. -It is not-clear how, if at all, 'PACE has- 
affected this "unedifying conflict", °'°. -although' Section 76(2) 
makes it clear (if that were in fact necessary) that the'truth'of 
the statement is not relevant-to admissibility. 11 
At the conclusion of the trial-within-a-trial, the judge will 
rule on the admissibility of the disputed-statement. Thereafter 
the fury will return and, unless the exclusion of the statement 
leads to the collapse of the prosecution, the trial will proceed. 
If the statement is-excluded the jury will learn nothing of the 
matter (although-they will doubtless have their suspicions)- and 
if the Judge rules in favour of admission the evidence will be 
led again in their presence. 
Whether or not the, etatemont has been excluded, the prosecution 
is not permitted to lead as part of its case evidence of what the 
defendant said on the voire dire. However when the fudge has 
ruled in favour of, admiseion and the accused gives evidonce at' 
the main trial, he may be cross-examined on any discrepancies 
85 
between his present evidence and what he said on the 'voir 
dire. 1 
At common law the use of the voire dire procedure-was. not 
compulsory and the defence might-prefer, for tactical reasons, to 
have the evidence led `once only before the jury with only a 
single cross-examination. ' In that event it was open to defence 
counsel to submit, when all the evidence has boen heard, that the 
judge should direct the jury to disregard the confession 
evidence. 'a It is not clear whether this option still survives 
Section 76 of PACE and the-view of the Court of Appeal in L..; v 
Sat-8h mhr t198§1 Grim LR 453 that tha'trial judge has no power 
to exclude a confession under Section 76 once it has been given 
in evidence although it has been stated that such a procedure is 
still available in a summary trial. `14 
If the judge rules in favour of' admissibility, defence counsel. 
may cross-oxamina prosecution witnesses in front of the jury as 
to the circumstances in which the confession was obtained. Is- 
There may be rare occasions where, the trial judge having ruled 
in favour of admissibility, further evidence emerges which causes 
him to revise his opinion, he is entitled to reconsider his 
earlier ruling, I'll wh 
It may happen that the issue of admissibility is only raised for 
the first time'while'the accused is giving evidence and in that 
situation the judge may, in the exercise of his discretion, 
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require relevant prosecution witnesses to be recalled for further 
cross-examination. 17 
When one turns to summary procedure, the position becomes, at 
least to Scottish eyes, somewhat , surreal. , 
Since the justices (or 
the stipendiary magistrate) are the judges of both fact-and law 
and in effect act as both judge and jury it-would seem patently 
unrealstic and wholly artificial. to expect themto. follow the 
voire dire procedure which is based entirely on the notion that 
the admissibility of disputed evidence is=a matter=for the trial 
Judge alone. The position at common law was unclear although it 
would appear that certain justices did try to follow a form of 
voire dire procedure.. ' ý' . 
It is surprising that it was necessary to wait until as late as 
1982 for an authoritative judicial , pronouncement, and when this 
finally came in F. (Anmeant) v Chief Constable--of Kent (19821 
Crim LR 68?, it was stated that the procedure was only appropriate 
in cases tried before a Judge and , 
jury. Incidental matters, said 
the Divisional Court, should be decided as separate issues and 
not as trials-within-trials and there was no need for evidence to 
be repeated after the issue of admissibility had been determined. 
It was quite impossible to, lay down rules as to-when-justices 
should announce their decision on admissibility. Each case was 
different and it was for the justices to ensure that what was 
done was fair to both sides. 
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Once again, however, PACE has intervened and it now appears to be 
the law that justices should hold a trial within a trial but only 
for the purpose of determining an issue under Section 76(2) 
which, it will be. remembered, requires that before a challenged 
confession can be given in-evidence the prosecution must prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that-it was not obtained by oppression or 
in consequence of anything said or. done which was likely to 
render it unreliable, '9 This now presumably means, that the 
justices must hear the evidence, rule on admissibility, and, if 
they-rule in favour, hear the evidence all over again. 
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(ii) The rauments 
(a) England 
English lawyers seem-to be devoted-to the concept, of the-voire- 
dire and there°is very little English criticism of it. Any 
perceived departure from orthodoxy is liable to provoke strong 
adverse comments. ' Such criticism as has been directed at the 
procedure has been muted, even from normally outspoken 
commentators such as Professor Cross, who contents himself with 
tho observation that "Trials within the trial are time wasting in 
cases tried by fury and something of an unreality in cases tried 
before magistrates because the question of admissibility has to 
be dotermined by the same tribunal as that which pronounces on 
liability. " : 2, His conclusion, however, is that the abolition of 
the voire dire would sometimes entail the disclosure to the jury 
of the terms of an inadmissible confession which it would be 
difficult for them to-disregard, leading to the need for. the 
judge to, discharge the jury and order a new trial. ` -. 
In their otherwise iconoclastic Eleventh Report, the Criminal Law 
Revision Committee (by a majority) declined to interfere with it, 
although they did say that they "should have been glad to find a 
way of getting rid of the need to hold a trial-within-a-trial if 
this were possible without causing injustice to the accused. " 11 
The committee acknowledged "undeniably strong arguments based on 
logic"' simplicity and convenience in favour of allowing all 
confessions to go before the jury ... leaving it to them to 
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consider whether to give less weight, or no weight at'all, to the 
confession because of the way in which it was obtained. " 4 and 
referred with approval to dicta of Parke B. and Lord'Campbell° 
C. J. in Baldry 6, both of whom suggested that it might be better 
to let all confessions go before the jury: 
According to the committee'the chief argument in favour of 
adopting this course is that, since the object of the trial is to 
got at the truth, and since a confession may be true even if 
obtained by improper means, -a confession should never be 
inadmissible merely because of the means by which it was obtained 
for the result may be that a dangerous murderer may have to go 
free. There were obvious advantages of simplicity and 
convenience, particularly the ending of the trial-within-a-trial. 
A minority of the committee favoured the adoption of this course 
and would have gone so far as to discontinue the involuntariness 
test. However the majority while acknowledging the`advantagea- 
considered' that auch-a course was too risky for two reasons. 
Firstly the effect on the jury of an induced-confession might be 
too great to be undone by the-evidence of the way in which it was 
obtained. Secondly, the removal of all restrictions on 
admissibility on account of improper methods would "encourage the 
police to resort on occasions to at least small improprieties". $ 
r-^ 
So the moat radical report on criminal evidence thio century 
failed to take the opportunity to rid English procedure of the 
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voire dire and it is difficult to sea another opportunity 
presenting itself in the future particularly in-view of the 
influential opinions expressed in favour of the procedure, -summed 
up thus by Lord Haiisham: 
"Any civilised system of criminal jurisprudence 
must accord to'the judiciary some moans of - 
excluding confessions or admissions obtained by, 
improper methods ... It is therefore of-very great- 
importance-that the courts should continue to 
insist that-before extra-judicial statements can- 
be admitted-in evidence the prosecution must be 
made to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the 
statement was not , obtained in'a manner which 
should be reprobated and was therefore in the' 
truest sense voluntary. " 
The provision in Section 76(2) of PACE-that `the prosecution must 
prove to the court beyond-reasonable doubt that a confession was 
not obtained by oppression. or in consequence of anything likely 
to render it unreliable has now, in effect, made the voire dire 
procedure a statutory requirement. 
Notes 
1, eg L, H, Hoffman äh-it happened to tho Votr £'1re (1967) 83 LQR 338 
2, - Cross (5th edn) p73º a passage omitted trog subsequent editions, 
3, Para 54 
4, Para 62 
5, (1852)-2 Den 430 discussed supra vol, 2 pfd 
6. Pares 63 - 64 
7. Von -Ming vR 119801 AC 247 at 261, The passage was also quoted with 
approval by Lord Fraser of Tullybelton in R v®rophy 01982) AC 476 
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(b) Scotland 
The most comprehensive discussion of the trial-within-a-trial in 
Scotland is in Macphail. I The learned , author points out that. 
although the procedure in Scotland "somewhat resembles" the 
English practice, and may have been suggested by a consideration 
of it, it may also be seen as a development of the Scottish 
practice of hearing argument on an objection to the admissibility 
of a confession in the absence of the Jury before the critical 
evidence was led. Sucha procedure wee unsatisfactory, often 
requiring to be based on disputed hypotheses as to the testimony 
which the witness would be likely to give. 
Sheriff Macphai1 sets. out eight points for, consideration, which 
are overwhelmingly against the trial--within-atrial as a feature 
of Scottish procedure: 
(1) The procedure leads to the repetition and unchallongoable 
reconstruction-of evidence. This is based-on the views of Lord 
, Justice-General-Clyde in horp nv HIM. Advacmta 1988 JC 61 
(2) The procedure appears to contravene the ancient rule 2. that 
the whole evidence muot be taken in the presence of the Jury. - 
(3) The procedure does not accurately reflect any principle that 
all questions of admissibility must be determined by the judge 
alone. If the judge holds, after a trial-within-a-trial that the 
confession is, or may be, admissible, he is atilt required, on 
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the basis of Chalmers to direct the jury to disregard it unless 
they are satisfied that it was made voluntarily. Thus, as 
Sheriff Macphail points out, the jury have to decide the question 
of admissibility for themselves and cannot be concerned solely 
with the probative value of the statement. 
(4) If a relevant consideration is that a confession which was 
not made voluntarily is likely to be unreliable, the procedure 
appears to contravene the principle that the reliability of 
evidence is essentially a matter for the tribunal of fact. 
(5) The procedure is anomalous because it is not generally 
applied in situations where an objection to admissibility of 
evidence other than a confession is taken and there is a dispute 
as to the preliminary facts. 
z 
(6) There is a practical danger that the jury will think they 
have been asked to withdraw because statements prejudicial to the 
accused are about to be made. Difficult considerations arise if 
the judge, having decided in favour of admission then has to 
change his mind because of further evidence led before the jury. 
In such a situation it would be difficult for the jury, howevor 
strongly directed, to exclude the confession from their minds. 
(7) Thera are unresolved questions as to the burden and standard 
of proof at a trial-within-a-trial, 
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(8) Zn view of Murphy v H. M. Advocate 1975 SLT(1I) 17, and Balloch 
v H. M. Advocate 1977 JC 23 the occasions when e judge will 
exclude evidence after a trial-within-a-trial will be few and the 
procedure will simply lengthen the trial without any advantage to 
the administration of justice. 
Sheriff Macphail admits that dispensing with the trial-within-a- 
trial could involve the disclosure to the Jury of a confession 
which the judge might ultimately hold to be inadmissible and in 
such circumstances it might be difficult for the jury to dis- 
regard the confession notwithstanding the Judge's direction that 
they should do so. This, of course, is the crux of the whole 
matter and has been the main reason for the reluctance-to inter- 
Pere with the procedure in England. He suggests that this 
difficulty would not arise if the Crown sought to adduce 
challengeable confessions only in cases where the confession was 
essential for conviction. In such a case, if the judge finds the 
confession to have been inadmissible, he will simply direct the 
jury to return a verdict of not guilty. He considers that the 
"traditional fairness of the Crown Office in refraining from 
adducing evidence likely to be held inadmissible, would go far to 
mitigate any risks in the procedure adumbrated in Thom ". 
While Sheriff Macphail's faith in the fairness of Scottish 
prosecutors is touching, and, the writer would suggest, well 
founded, it is respectfully submitted that this suggestion 
overlooks the practical reality that the Crown often do not know 
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in advance that aconfession is to be challenged, particularly in 
cases where either no judicial examination has been held or the 
accused has declined to answer questions. 3 It may be perfectly 
obvious to the prosecutor that a confession has been unfairly 
obtained and in that situation, clearly it should not be led. 
However the defence are under no obligation to disclose a 
challenge to a confession in advance, challenges are frequently 
made for the first time at the trial and spurious allegations of 
unfairness are matters of routine. Sheriff Macphail's suggestion 
puts an unfair burden on the prosecutor. It is submitted that it 
would be wrong to expect the prosecutor to refrain from leading a 
confession which although not essential to conviction would 
materially bolster the prospects of a dangerous criminal going to 
prison simply in order to avoid the hypothetical possibility of 
the jury not following the Judge's directione. 
Scots law will require to decide unequivocally whether or not the 
jury can be trusted to follow the judge's directions. If it can, 
the trial-within-a-trial is superfluous, If it cannot, the 
implications are grave and much wider than the issues being 
discussed in this thesis. 
At the end of the day, it is submitted that the most telling 
argument against the trial-within-a-trial is the simple fact that 
in the modern state of Scottish law it is largely pointless. As 
Sheriff Macphail wrote in 1976, "The procedure has been in 
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existence for over 20 years, and the number of cases in which it 
has resulted in evidence being excluded'ie very few indeed. " 
Notes, 
1,20,37 et seq 
2. Act 1587 c571 now repealed, 
3, The Thomson Committee recommended that there should be no trial-within-a- 
trial where the challenge was first made at the trial but their recommend- 





Chapter 7 The e s. Scottish 
L2x 
7.1 Introduction 
It was an ancient rule of Scots law that the testimony of a 
single witness was insufficient: 
"Probatioun allanerlie be ane witness, is not 
sufficient of the law; Quoniam in ore duorum sut 
trium staff omne verburd' , 
Hume describes the requirement for corroboration in the following 
tenact 
"No matter how trivial the offence, and how high 
soever the credit and character of the witness, 
still our law is averse to rely on his single 
word, in any inquiry which may affect the person, 
liberty or fame of his neighbour; and rather than 
run the risk of such an error, a risk which does 
not hold when there is a concurrence of testi- 
monies, it is willing that the guilty should 
escape. " 2 
The requirement of corroboration in the law acknowledgsa the rick 
posed by the human fallibility of the fact-finding process, a 
risk which, It has been pointed out, may in fact be double - the 
fallibility of the witness himself and the fallibilty of the 
tribunal which holds the witness to be credible. 0 
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Lord Cameron, one of Scotland's longest-serving judges, frankly 
acknowledged the same point when he wrote: 
"Nothing is more easy than to err in the 
assessment of the credibility or accuracy of 
witnesses, even after subjection to skilled cross- 
examination, and the experience of years confirms 
that view. " 4 
Although substantial inroads have been made into this principle 
in civil matters, it remains one of the most characteristic 
features of Scottish criminal law that crucial facts should be 
corroborated: 
"No person can be convicted of a crime or 
statutory offence, except where the legislature 
otherwise directs, unless there is evidence of at 
least two witnesses implicating the person accused 
with the commission of the crime or offence with 
which he is charged. " Is 
The reference to "two witnesses" in this celebrated quotation is 
perhaps slightly misleading and the less well known exposition in 
Renton and Brown 16 is, it is submitted, more accurate and hence 
preferable:, 
"The basic requirement is that the offence be 
brought home to the accused by evidence from at 
least two sources. The question is not whether 
each of the several circumstances points by itself 
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to guilt of the charge libelled, but whether taken 
together they are capable of supporting the 
inference of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. " 
With the sole exception of a recorded plea of guilty, this 
principle applies to confessions as much as to any other type of 
evidence. In the case of a confession, the corroboration must 
come from an independent source and a confession is not corrob- 
orated by being heard by two or more people. It is also now 
clear that a confession is not corroborated by being repeated 
even in different terms and to different witnesses. 7 Con- 
versely, if the requisite corroboration is available, it is not 
necessary that the confession itself should be spoken to by more 
than one witness. 0 
This chapter explores the issue of corroboration of confessions, 
firstly in terms of the general principles and thereafter 
specifically in relation to the issue of the "special knowledge" 
confession, It will be argued that this latter doctrine has 
resulted in the situation whereby the need for a confession to be 
corroborated (in the generally understood sense of that word) has 
effectively been removed and this is doubly dangerous since it 
has taken place against a background of continuing lip-service to 
the conventional view of the law and since it has not been 
accompanied by any effective safeguard for the accused such 
compulsory tape-recording of police interviews, 
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Notes, 
1, Balfour Practicks 373 
2, Hume ii 383 
3, Anon Corroboration of Evidence in Scottish Criminjl Lam 1958 SLT (News)137 
4, Hammond v kiest j quoted in Macphail 123,02 
5, Morton Y H_M. _Advocate 
1938 IC 58 per L d-C Aitchison p55 
6, pare 19-52 
7, It is surprising that this point which was first raised, but not decided, in 
khan v M. M. Advocate (1883) i Uhite_SG5 should have remained undecided 
for a century until Bainbridge v Scott 1988 SLT 871 
8,1.1A81 y H. M. Ady2.. 8"55 SL , (N) 
6. 
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7.2 Judicial CO-nfeuionS 
<i> Plea of Guilty 
In modern practice a formal, recorded plea of guilty which is 
accepted by the prosecution is conclusive evidence of the 
accused's guilt and the judge will proceed to sentence without 
any further consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence 
against the accused. However it was not always so, in the 
eighteenth century, even though the prisoner pleaded guilty on 
the reading of the indictment and the plea was entered on record 
in the presence of the full assize, this would not authorise the 
judge to award sentence. The charge had to be remitted to a jury 
who had to return a verdict. The prisoner might retract his 
confession before the jury and they might acquit him if they saw 
fit. ' This procedure was abolished, and the modern procedure 
introduced, by the Act 9 Geo. IV c. 29 Section 14. 
Mention should be made of the one known modern Scottish example 
of a false plea of guilty, 2 the extraordinary case of chyle v 
H . M. Advocate 1976 SLT 125 where an innocent accused pled guilty 
with legal advice to a serious charge of assault and robbery and 
was sentenced to nine years imprisonment. Boyle, who was a 
deserter from the forces, was being escorted into military 
custody when he produced from his pocket a newspaper cutting 
about the robbery and told his military escort that he had 
committed the crime, They immediately returned him to police 
custody and he then proceeded to make to the police a "detailed 
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mmd circuntitAntia] c-or t itc " to the chekr~,;, tG which hl lrttr 
plrarl guilty, 
rr. 4ofar as a motive for Boyle's bohjviour could two riiccovored it 
would app* 3r that he con,.. idnrod conditions in 4 civil pri : on 
would b butt or° than thorn In ar tlitiry one and he did not 
a cpo t too ion ; thy a ccrit nc . The nino ya ar3 m uzt have been an 
unpleasant surprise and lie ba-latodty ruht to h vc the 
convit; tion quashad. The report Ia l, argoly concerned with the, 
procedurtal jzouwc, and it ohou W ba notod that the Crown, who 
cork dcd that Coyle was wholly innocent. r ccoptnd that there had 
trrdop-d been miscarriage of Justice, but it to clear that at the 
ort In; j hearing the Crown had acted in good filth and ors tho 
ap, s -ption that they had 6 r+. f ttrtcncy Of ovidcnco, something 
which Lord Cameron attributed to "o-rre: rm In in i ti ation and 
i. rAForrwitlc, n which provi. dcd the proaccutinn with r °)tertal which at 
tho-t it a appeared to cor-roborfst et ho tt an "o dot a Llcd and 
r. ircumn, t ant tal adral rinn and conf ccnion, "" 
A3tEiwi h3 if, r unique c:. 3nn in "rotlanct, rd r+n h-rdly h 
rocard¢ d as a cn . 
1or prcrc ! ent, it is ninvarthrlt^c of conaiclerr bl 
tT, port? fcrs in that it *, hnw , albett in an o: trcmo r. X the 
rtin8"Ors of blind r altan?,, n on the, avt anco of a r: nfosslon. 
A1thvu,, h it rm y not hc; dire -t1v rc xcýýr nt to th^ pr ien± 
th. te irý alow, -, n appropriat o polrit to note th a bizarr can " of 
art 5 Ctf-3e4d fwbo pled pxlf tv to vari. oer, * ct ar,, os of i actmt 4nd other 
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related offences with a girl believed by all concerned, including 
the accused and the girl herself to be his daughter. He was 
later charged with other offences relating to the same girl but 
by this time science had moved on and the evidence was subjected 
to D. N. A. testing which established conclusively that he could 
not have been the girl's father. The earlier conviction was 
quashed of consent. However, it is submitted that this is not 
truly an example of a false confession but is rather a confession 
tendered under essential error which, in these particular circum- 
stances, could not reasonably have been guarded against. 
Notas 
1. Huse it 320; Burnett p576, Sea also chapter 6,2 (i) supra 
2, The examples given by Dickson pp263-265 11380'384 all relate to other 
juriedicitions 
3, Glasgow Herald 6 October 1990 
(ii) Judicial Declaration 
Generally the legal effect of a confession in a judicial 
declaration is similar to that of an extra-judicial confession. ' 
Although obviously a matter of considerable weight, a confession 
in a judicial declaration has never been regarded as conclusive 
evidence and requires to be corroborated by evidence from another 
source. 2 The mere proof of the commission of the crime is 
insufficient to provide corroboration, there must be some 
evidence connecting the accused with the crime. 3 
It is a question of facts and circumstances in each case what 
additional evidence will be sufficient to provide corroboration 
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but a merely suspicious circumstance, such as hiding from 
apprehension, is not enough. 4 
Dickson observes that prisoners are "every day convicted upon 
confessions in their declarations, corroborated by circumstances 
which throw considerable suspicion upon them but which would not 
of themselves prove the prosecutor's case. " Dickson considers 
this just and comments that "a false confession in a declaration 
is very rare and unlikely, indeed, not many degrees less so than 
a false plea of guilty. " s However he also warns against the 
possibility of the statement not having been taken down in the 
prisoner's precise words, its precise meaning thus being mis- 
conceived, and he observes that an intentional mis-statement is 
not impossible. 
The question of sufficiency has not yet arisen in connection with 
the 1980 Act procedures but it is thought that the courts will 
apply the genoral principles of corroboration of extra judicial 
confessions. 
Votes, 
1. Walkers p29 
2. Hume it 324, Alison it 578; Dickson 1339, Archibild Dunca Lq, 
Mac nie (1831) Bell! Notes 239: aanaahan v H. M. Advocate (1888) 1 While 
3, Dunlop and Others (1823) Alison ii 57$-579 and authorities in previous note, 
4, Macdonald p334,5 . 
DutLJ t; , jet Qz31as (]834) Bells Notes 240'. Sohn Buchanan (18371-Sells Notes 240. 
5, Dickson 9339, A false plea of guilty can happen - Boyle v H. M. Advocat 
supra vol, 2 p152 
6, Dickson 1376 
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(iii) The Evidence gf the Accused 
In Drysdale v Adair 1947 S (N) f3 an accused on trial for 
assault admitted in evidence that he had struck a blow but 
explained that it had been done in self defence. The Sheriff- 
Substitute took the accused's admission as corroboration of the 
fact of the assault, but rejected the evidence of self-defence 
and convicted. On appeal the High Court hold that corroboration 
might be obtained from the evidence of the accused without his 
entire evidence being believed. 
The report of Dryedale v. Ad is extremely brief. However, a 
much fuller report is available of McArthur -v 
Stewart i95ý. SiT 
114_ in which case the High Court held that where, in the course 
of giving evidence at his trial, the accused admits a crucial 
fact which was only spoken to by one Crown witness, his evidence 
will provide the necessary corroboration. ' The possibility of a 
prosecutor taking up a case without sufficient evidence in the 
hope of securing an admission from the accused-was deplored 
t 
(rightly> by Lord Carmont. 
This point is probably less likely to arise in practice today in 
view of the provisions of Sections 140A and 345A of the 1975 Act 
(as amended by the 1980 Act) which allow for the making of a 
submission of "no case to answer. " 
The view has been expressed 2 that an admission of guilt by the 
accused in the witness box is conclusive, but there are no cases. 
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Renton and Brown o state that an admission on oath in the witness 
box must be corroborated by evidence from another source. In 
modern practice the question is not likely to be of much 
practical importance since the Crown will, of course, have had to 
lead at least sufficient evidence to overcome a "no case to 
answer" submission before the question of the accused going into 
the witness box will arise. 
It in thought that an admission of guilt in judicial proceedings 
other than the accused's own trial would be treated on the same 
basis as an extrajudicial confession and hence would require 
corroboration in accordance with the normal principles. 
Notes 
1, This point also arose, inconclusively, in tiln v Uhaley 1975 SLT(N) 75 
Z, Lord Cameron Scottish Practice in Relation to Adwfs; iors and Confessions by 
Persons Suspected or Accused of Crime 1975 SLT 265, 
7.3 Extra-judicial Conf^s, ons 
(U Ties Genera Principles 
(a) The Views, of Dickson and Qther Writers 
It has long been the law in Scotland, unlike England, that an 
extra-judicial confession is not of itself full proof of guilt 
and must be corroborated by other evidence, either direct or 
circumstantial, throwing suspicion on the prisoner. ' It is 
impossible, given the infinite variety of forms which such 
confessions can take, to lay down with any precision the amount 
of corroborative evidence required. There are many situations 
where the matter is self-evident; thus a clear confession 
106 
supported by the recovery of a sum of money in the possession of 
the previously destitute accused, 2 or the finding of the accused 
standing over the body of his victim with the murder weapon lying 
nearby. 3 In these and many other situations there can be little 
doubt about the sufficiency of the evidence. Equally, where all 
that is proved is the confession and the commission of the crime, 
this is insufficient, since proof of the crime merely establishes 
that it was committed by someone and does not corroborate the 
accused's confession that he committed it. 
However, cases are often less straightforward than thin, 
particularly where the confession is not supported by real 
evidence, and as Dickson puts it, "it must lie with the fury in 
each case to say whether, looking to the terms of the confession, 
the channel through which it comes, and the corroboratfing 
evidence, they are satisfied that the prisoner is guilty. " 15 
Dickson "I offers some pointers to the assessment of the probative 
value of oral admissions and confessions, to which, it is 
submitted, modern courts should pay more heed than sometimes 
appears to be given. 
The jury ought always to be satisfied of the opportunity for 
observation, the accuracy and memory and the veracity of the 
witness before they attach any weight to his evidence. Dickson 
quotes with approval the following dictum of Baron Parke: 
"It very frequently happens not only that the 
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witness has misunderstood what the party has said, 
but that by unintentionally altering a few of the 
expressions really used, he gives an effect to the 
statement completely at variance with what the 
party really did Say. ** 7 
Only part of the statement may have been heard, and important 
qualifications unnoticed or forgotten. The accused and the 
witness may have attached different meanings to an ambiguous or 
inaccurate expression. In Dickson also stresses the need for the 
the witness to repeat the accused's words verbatim rather than 
his own inference from them and cites an unreported case ' in 
which the accused was indicted for theft of a shawl. A police 
officer deponed that the accused "confessed" but under cross- 
examination conceded that all she had said was that she "had 
taken the shawl". The accused was acquitted on the basis that 
she lacked theftuous intent. 
Dickson is unequivocal in his views on 'the danger of fabricated 
confessions. Given recent events in England the passage is worth 
quoting in full for its prophetic ringt 
"Evidence of oral admissions is also easily 
fabricated, and the chance of detecting its 
untruth is small; for when all a witness speaks to 
is an independent statement, his falsehood is 
almost beyond the reach of cross examination, and 
is seldom contradictory to the proved circum- 
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stances attending the crime. Peculiar caution is 
always necessary when the person repeating the 
supposed confession is an officer engaged in the 
pursuit of criminals for such persons are apt to 
be biassed witnesses, and to attribute a guilty 
meaning to ambiguous, and even to harmless acts 
and words, of persons whom they apprehend. " I° 
However, Dickson goes on to lay the foundation for the modern 
view of confessions when he observes: 
"Extra-judicial confessions ... (if distinctly 
proved), are usually entitled to much weight, and 
strong corroborative evidence will not be required 
to complete the proof of guilt. The peculiar 
value of confessional evidence lies in its 
furnishing the best proof of the intention which 
constitutes the essence of most crimes. " 11 
No subsequent writer has treated the subject of the probative 
value of confessions in as much depth as Dickson and he views 
still retain the highest authority. However, the third edition 
of Renton and Brown contains the succinct and apposite comment: 
"It may also be suggested that suspicion must 
always attach to a statement in the absence of 
which the accused would have had a reasonable 










Hume ii 333; Dickson 1352; Walkers p29, 
JQhtl las äA. ( } ?) Belts Notes2d) 
Nicholas Croebie (17,19) Hume ii_333 
ýorirný}Iv u NJ. Adyor., A t95ß S2 per Lord Patrick at p8t, lord 
Mackintosh ibid 
Dickson 13S2 
Dickson 1377 et seq 
Eiievi. 
In one case from the writer's experience as a prosecutor, the police claimed 
that the accused, on being informed of the charge against him, said "Sure, I 
did that, " which they claimed was an unequivocal confession, However, the 
accused claimed, Quite credibly, that he had said the words in a tone of 
sarcasm and intending then as a denial, 
9, V-2 rth ,n Circuit IS SO 
10, Dickson 4378 
11, Dickson 1379 
12, p413 
110 
(b) The Gasas 
It is surprising how little case law there was on sufficiency 
until comparatively recently. ' The clearest, and still the most 
authoritative, case on the point is Conno ly v H. M. Advocate _1958 
SLT 72 Although Connor contains elements of what would 
today be regarded as a special knowledge confession, that issue 
would have to wait until Manuel v H. M. Advocate__1958 . TC Al for 
full consideration from the High Court and Conno_lly is primarily 
an authority on general principles. 
The circumstances in molly were straightforward. The accused 
was seen by some civilians to be sitting in a car, late at night, 
apparently Just hanging around. The civilians were suspicious 
and reported the matter to the police. The accused was taken to 
the police station (on what basis is not clear) and the police 
returned to the car and stood by it until two men, White and 
Thomson, came round the corner from a street called Rosefteid 
Avenue. On seeing the police White made off and Thomson spoke to 
the officers for a few moments before also taking to his heels. 
Later the same night a quantity of stolen goods was found in a 
house in Rosefieid Avenue, In the police station Connolly made a 
statement, described as "circumstantial and detailed", describing 
how he and Thomson had broken into a shop and transported the 
stolen property to the house in Rosefield Avenue. He was 
convicted after trial and appealed. The High Court, Lord 
4 
III 
Justice-Clerk Thomson, Lord Partick and Lord Mackintosh, rejected 
the appeal. 
Lord Thomson set out the general principles of the law in what 
remains their classic statement: 
"It is a fundamental rule of our criminal law that 
no one can be convicted on the evidence of one 
witness and that there must be testimony 
incriminating the accused derived from two 
separate sources. It is consistent with that 
rule, though whether it is derived from it is not 
certain, that no accused can be convicted on his 
own confession alone. A confession of guilt - 
short of a formal plea of guilty - is not enough. 
There must be evidence from some other source 
which incriminates the accused. If all that the 
Crown can produce is evidence - however complete, 
and exhaustive - that a crime has been committed 
together with evidence, however credible, that the 
accused confessed to having committed it, the 
Crown must fail. There must be something 
incriminatory of the accused spoken to by someone 
other than the-accused. 
While it is necessary that there should be 
evidence from two independent sources, the weight 
to be attached to each source may vary. If Ono 
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source is unimpeachable, the standard required of 
the other may be lower then if the first source 
carries less weight, It is the conjunction of the 
testimonies which is important. " 
His Lordship side-stepped the question of the special knowledge 
issue and stated that he found corroboration in the circum- 
stances, viz the presence of the accused in the car, alone for an 
hour in the vicinity of the place where the stolen goods were 
found at a time which would fit in with the theft and the conduct 
of White and Thomson when they saw the police. According to his 
Lordship, while this was not very strong evidence, when it was 
put alongside the confession, the two in combination were 
"irre ist able. " 
Lords Patrick and Mackintosh both delivered judgments but neither 
adds much to the Lord Justice-Clerk's statcmant of the law, Lord 
Mackintosh did, however, make it clear that "the corroborating 
evidence does not require to be so strong ac would suffice to 
prove the case without the confession. " 
Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson again presided over the High Court 
when their Lordships dealt with cinrieir y Clark 1953 S! T 307. 
This road traffic case marks the first appearance of the High 
Court's frequently repeated view that the corroborative evidence 
need only "afford a sufficient independent check of [an) 
unequivocal admission" in order to satisfy the requirements of 
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the law. Lord Thomson`s judgment is also of interest in that it 
shows, quite overtly, his Lordship calling in question the 
requirement for a confession to be corroborated at all: 
"There is a rule in our law -a somewhat archaic 
rule - the merit of which under modern conditions 
is not always obvious, at all events where the 
admission is beyond suspicion - that short of a 
solemn plea of guilt, an admission of guilt by an 
accused is not conclusive against him unless it is 
corroborated by something beyond the actual 
admission. One reason for this rule is to ensure 
that there is nothing phoney or quixotic about the 
confession. What is required in the way of 
independent evidence In order to elide such a risk 
must depend on the facts of the case, and in 
particular the nature and character of the 
confession and the circumstances under which it is 
made, 11 
Insofar as "phoney and quixotic" means anything at all, it 
appears that his Lordship was considering the possibility of a 
confession by a person who had not committed the crime, a false 
confessor. The importance of the requirement for corroboration 
as a protection for the accused against a fabricated confession 
does not appear to have occurred to his Lordship. Admittedly it 
was to be some years before "verballing" by the police became a 
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perceived problem, but his Lordthip'a obiter commontc show how 
far the pendulum had swung since Dickson's time. 
Subsequant to Sinclair v Clark there has been a series of road 
traffic cases concerning corroboration of the accused's admission 
of driving in which the High Court have repeatedly stated their 
view that very little is required to corroborate an "unequivocal 
admission. " ý3 
Sinclair v Clark has also been cited many times outwith the 
context of road traffic law, notably in Hartley v ILM. Adyrcate 
1,979 sSLT 26 4 where the accused's confession was clearly 
unequivocal and was held to require very little corroboration. 
Although Connolly was not cited in Herds,, it is noteworthy 
that in the latter case Lord Grieve, who of the three judges 
considers the question of sufficiency most fully, referred to the 
requirement of corroboration being met by "something [which] must 
point to the accused as the perpetrator of the crime to which he 
has confessed", a considerably lower standard than Lord Justice- 
Clerk Thomson's statement in Connolly that there had to be 
evidence from two sources which incriminated the accused. 
In Lord Dunpark's opinion confession evidence has a special 
status. 
"The standard of corroboration of an unequivocal 
confession of guilt iss in my opinion, different 
from thn standard to be applied when Leoking 
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corroboration of a Crown eye-witness at a criminal, 
trial or of the evidence of a pursuer or defender 
in a civil case. The reason for the different 
standard is that, unlike such other evidence the 
confession of guilt by an accused person is 
prejudicial to his own interets and may, there- 
fore, initially be assumed to be true. Accord- 
ingly, one is not then looking for extrinsic 
evidence which is consistent with his confession 
of guilt. If therefore, a jury is satisfied that 
a confession of guilt was freely made and 
unequivocal in its terms, corroboration of that 
confession may be found in evidence fjbm another 
source or sources which point to the truth of the 
confession. " 
TudhoRe v Aalaleish 1986 SCCR 559 differs from Sinclair v Clerk 
and its successors in that the admission was not "unequivocal", 
In this case the accused was charged with a number of road 
traffic offences relating to an accident in which her car had 
allegedly collided with a parked vehicle and made off from the 
scene. When the police arrived at the accused's house, appar- 
ently fairly soon after the accident, they found that her, car was 
parked outside showing signs of recent accident damage (although 
nothing that could be related to the parked vehicle) and with the 
engine still warm. Under Section 166 of the Road Traffic Act 
1972 police asked the accused who had been driving the car when 
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it was involved in a road traffic accident, to which she replied, 
"I was driving it a short time ago". 
The Sheriff acquitted on the basis that the Crown had failed to 
set up either an accident involving the accused or an admission 
by her and on appeal his decision was upheld, the High Court 
observing " ... the respondent was ... asked who had been driving 
the vehicle when it was involved in a road traffic accident, her 
reply was not that she had been driving when an accident had 
occurred but that she had been driving the vehicle a short time 
ago. In our opinion that statement cannot be regarded as a clear 
and unequivocal statement to the effect that she was the driver 
at the relevant time. " 
In Alton v If. M. Advocate 1987 SCOR 252 a the accused was indicted 
for murder following a stabbing in a nightclub. The case against 
him was heavily dependent on two statements which it was alleged 
he had made and which amounted to implied admissions. These were 
firstly a remark to police officers, the day after he had been 
cautioned and charged, "Ach, look I gave the knife to a man. It's 
destroyed. " and secondly a statement to a civilian witness 
shortly after the incident to the effect that he (Alton) had 
"chibbed some guy". There was other circumstantial evidence 
against him, particularly from a witness, Hart, who spoke to 
seeing Aiton stab somebody, although he could not identify the 
victim, but the statements were the mainstay of the prosecution 
case. In no sense could either of these statements be classified 
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as an "unequivocal admission" of the murder with which he was 
charged but nevertheless the Crown case was presented on the 
basis that they were the starting point of the evidence and the 
question was whether there was enough to corroborate them, rather 
than the possibly more obvious question of whether the statements 
could corroborate Hart's eyewitness account. The conviction was 
upheld on appeal. 
In Crowe y Mnc? b i1 1987 SLT rfl) 316 the point in issue wawa 
whether the Crown had demonstrated that the accused had knowledge 
and control, and hence possession, of a piece of cannabis found 
in his prison cell. The cannabis was found in the ashtray 
appropriate to the accused's bed and when cautioned and charged 
by the police with possessing cannabis he replied "It wasn't 
exactly in my possession. It was under my ashtray. There is a 
difference. " He was convicted after trial and the conviction was 
upheld on appeal. 
Sinclair y Tudho. pe 1937 SCCR 69C is one of the very few cases 
where the Nigh Court have overturned a conviction based on 
confession evidence, although in thie case the Crown failed on 
the basis that they had not proved that the crime libelled had 
occurred. The accused was found by police officers in Miller 
Street, Glasgow concealing something in the front of his anorak 
and looking about in a suspicious manner. He was stopped and 
found to be in possession of three diaries. Under caution he 
said "Aye, A. K. I stole them out of Nash's at Miller Street. " 
II8 
The only evidence to connect the diaries to Nash's was evidence 
that they were similar to ones stocked there. There was no 
evidence that any theft of diaries, let alone the actual ones 
recovered had taken place. In the circumstances it is hardly 
surprising that the conviction was quashed, although the High 
Court did comment on how near the Crown had come to success and 
implied that things might have been different if the accused had 
been seen to come out of Nash's or if there had been evidence 
that the diaries were unlikely to have been obtained anywhere 
other than in Nash's. 
Sinclair. v Clark was again considered in Greenshields v 14, M, 
Advocate 1289 SCCR 637 the main importance of which lies in the 
fact that it is the first case to deal in any real depth with the 
question of an unclear and equivocal confession. 0 
Greenshields was indicted for a grisly murder which also involved 
the dismembering and burning of the victim's body. He was 
cautioned and charged with murder and with attempting to pervert 
the course of justice by dismembering the body. He replied "You 
don't think I did it myself do you; but I'm telling you nothing 
about it until I see my lawyer. " At his trial the Crown relied 
on this statement as a confession to murder and sought corrob- 
oration in the finding of blood stains, certain other comments by 
the accused and evidence of his behaviour when interviewed by the 
police. However the statement to the police was critical in 
providing a sufficiency of evidence. One factor which 
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complicated the issue was the point, ably argued by defence 
counsel, that the reply could have related to either murder or 
attempting to pervert the course of justice or to both 7 and it 
could have been consistent with the accused admitting that he 
assisted in the disposal of the body but no more. 
While the appeal court agreed that the statement could not be 
regarded as a clear and unequivocal admission, the crucial 
question was whether the jury were entitled to regard it as an 
implied or equivocal admission-of murder. The Lord Justice-Clerk 
put it thus: 
"It is not only clear and unequivocal admissions 
which have evidential value. It has often been 
said that if there is a clear and unequivocal 
admission of guilt, then very little evidence in 
corroboration of such an admission is required. 
That is not to say, however, that something lets 
than a clear and unequivocal admission is of no 
value. The first question must have been for the 
jury to determine whether the reply consistuted an 
admission at aal,, and if so an admission of what. 
If the reply was capable of being treated as an 
admission, then the amount of evidence needed to 
corroborate that admission would depend on the 
circumstances of the case. ... On the assumption 
that the reply was made, it was for the jury to 
determine whether the reply which the appellant 
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made related to the attempt to pervert the course 
of justice only or whether it was a reply to the 
principal charge which was undoubtedly a charge of 
murder. " 
Although the trial had proceeded, and the trial judge had 
directed the jury, on the basis that if the jury accepted the 
police evidence it was open to them to interpret it as an implied 
admission and then seek corroboration in the rest of the 
evidence, the Lord Justice-Clerk was of the view that this was 
not the only way, or even the best way, in which the case could 
have been presented. In his Lordship's view, the case was really 
one of circumstantial evidence with the alleged reply as a 
critical ingredients 
"LOlnce it is recognised that there was never any 
question of the reply being treated as an 
unequivocal or clear admission, and that the jury 
were left to determine whether they were satisfied 
that It constituted an implied admission, the sole 
question in the case became one of sufficiency of 
evidence. I regard the case as a classic one of 
circumstantial evidence; each of the matters 
relied upon Individually may establish very 
little, but in conjunction with one another, the 
facts were in my opinion clearly sufficient to 
entitle the jury to convict the appellant of this 
charge. " 
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The appeal court did not say that the trial Judge was wrong, and 
thus there would appear to be two possible approaches to an 
equivocal admission. Firstly the jury could be directed to look 
at the statement on its own, decide whether it is to be inter- 
preted as a confession, and if so to what, and thereafter to seek 
corroboration in the other evidence. The problem with this 
approach, as Sheriff Gordon points out in his commentary, is the 
difficulty of separating the question of sufficiency of evidence 
from the question of weight of evidence since the corroboration 
needed for an equivocal confession is presumably greater than 
that required for an unegivacal one. The alternative approach, 
favoured by the Lord Justice-Clerk, Is for the Jury to regard the 
evidence as a whole and simply treat the reply as one source of 
evidence, an approach which certainly has the merit of simp- 
licity, and, it is submitted, the further merit of removing from 
the confession the special status which is so often inapprop- 
riately attached to it. 
In summary therefore, the law is settled in the case of the 
unegivocal confession. However, although G e? e d3 has been 
the first case to address the question of the equivocal con- 
fession, the possibility of the two different approaches means 
that it cannot at this stage be regarded as settling the law and 
it will be necessary to await further decisions before it becomes 
possible to identify any trends. 0 
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Finally in McCougan v IL M. Advocate 1991 SCCR 49 a case of child 
sex abuse, it was held of consent by the crown that the accused's 
demeanour and reactions when confronted both by the child's 
parents and the police could not be founded on as providing 
corroboration of his admissions, the logic of this presumably 
being that the reaction emanated from the same source as the 
admissions. 
Notes 
1, The most important of the earlier cases are summarised in Macdonald p334 
2. Although this case was reported in 1958 it was actually decided in 1955, 
3, The other cases in the series are Torrance X Than 1970 JC ; Ledhi y Skeen 
(1278) SCCR Su; pl. 197; äilßv Fitzgerald (1978) SCOR Suppt. 20S; McDonald v 
Smith (1978) SCCR Suppl. 219; McNa Culligan (1978) SCCR Suppi. 222 and 
Lockhart v Crockett 1966 SCOR 6., None of them contribute anything 
material to the development of the law and they are not discussed 
individually, See also Sinclair v MacLeod 1964 JD 19 where in special 
circumstances a conviction was overturned despite an unequivocal admission 
in response to a police requirement. 1 
4, Discussed in relation to admissibility at vol, 1 p418 supra, Sae also Keane 
v Horn (1979) SCCR Suroi 225 
S. Discussed in relation to admissibility at vol, 1 p449 supra 
6. The statement in Tudhoae v Osloleisy was, in effect, held not to amount to 
a confession at all, 
7. In the writer's experience it is by no means uncommon for the police further 
to confuse an already complicated issue by an unnecessary proliferation of 
charges, 
8. In Beattie v Scott 1990 SCCR 296 the defence conceded that the confession 
was unequivocal and the point therefore did not arise, 
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(ii) Circumstances Peculiarly Within the Knowledge of the 
cUS d 
In relation to matters such as driving without a licence or 
insurance or operating an unlicensed television set and the like, 
it is sufficient for conviction for the Crown, in the absence of 
contrary evidence, to lead evidence of an uncorroborated 
admission by the accused that he was unlicensed or uninsured. 
In such cases it is sufficient for the Crown to demonstrate prima 
facie the absence of entitlement to carry on the activity in 
question, the possession of a licence or an insurance certificate 
being facts peculiarly within the accused's knowledge. 
Notes 
1, Milne v Whaley 197S SLT(N) 79 approving John v Humphreys C19551_1_1 ýLR 325. 
and (jay v Tc je 112731 RI j??; Irving v Tudh Pr, 
(iii) "Special Knowledge" 
(a) 
, 
Introducttpn The Views of Allison 
The discussion so far has shown how little additional evidence is 
required to corroborate an unequivocal confession. Nevertheless, 
although the amount of evidence is slight, it must still come 
from outwith the terms of the confession itself. Parallel to the 
development of the general principles, the courts have developed 
the concept of what has colloquially become known as the "special 
knowledge" confession, the basis of which is that the confession 
itself contains information which could only be known to the 
perpetrator of the crime. 
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The first writer to articulate this principle was Alison who 
wrote: 
"Confessions ... come with most effect when they 
are connected, as is very frequently the case, 
with some articles of real evidence, which put it 
beyond a doubt that the statement given is in the 
main true. Thus, if a person is apprehended on a 
charge of theft, and he teils the officer who 
seized him, that if. he will go to such a place, 
and look under such a bush, he will find the 
stolen goods; or he is charged with murder or 
assault, and he says he threw the bloody weapon 
inte such a pool, in such a river, and it is there 
searched for and found; without doubt, these are 
such strong confirmations of the truth of the 
confession, as renders it of itself sufficient, if 
the corpus is established aliunde, to convict the 
prisoner. 
It will be argued that the way in which the Scottish courts have 
interpreted this statement of the law has caused it to become 
separated from its base to the point where Alison would have 
difficulty recognising his own principle but before doing so it 
is pertinent to highlight some of the main elements which make up 
the principle as Alison saw it. 
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Firstly, "real evidence" has been defined by Dickson as "evidence 
derived from things" 2 and is used by the Walkers "to include 
both a thing, which may be a human being, any features of the 
thing which are significant, and the inferences to be drawn from 
the existence of the thing or from its significant features. " 
It is submitted that it is clear from the context that when 
Alison articulated the principle has was thinking solely in terms 
of the finding of physical, corporeal objects which had 
evidential value in themselves. 
Secondly, it is submitted that it is implicit in Alison'e 
statement, that the finding of the real evidence should come 
about as the result of the confession, in other words that the 
details in the confession should be unknown to anyone other than 
the criminal. 
Thirdly, the corpus must be established aliunda In other words 
there must be full legal proof of the commission of the crime. 
There is a surprising absence of authority on this point, but it 
is submitted that this requires the crucial facts of the crime to 
be corroborated. Thus, to take the typical example of theft by 
housebreaking, if the accused's confession contains "special 
knowledge" in relation to the modus operandi of the housebreaking 
and the property stolen this can be corroborated by the evidence 
of the householder. However if the confession only mentions the 
modus and is silent as to the property taken, the householder's 
evidence as to what was stolen must receive corroboration from 
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another source 4 otherwise the court would only be entitled to 
convict of housebreaking with intent to steal. S 
Notes 
1, Alison it 580 
2, Dickson 1815 
3, üalkers p440 4416 
4, eg recovery or the evidence of ,& second witness who can Speak to the 
presence of the stolen property in the house before the cries 
5, This point is not uncommonly overlooked in practice, 
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(b) The First Cases 
As already mentioned, the question of "special knowledge" arose 
in Connolly but the High Court found it unnecessary to decide it. 
Thus the first judicial consideration of Alison's principle came 
in t nuel v H. H. Advocate 1958 IC 41. This case has already been 
discussed at length in the context of admissibility. ' The 
application of Alison's principle to the circumstances of this 
case has been described as a "vivid example of what appears to be 
sound common sense, " 2a sentiment with which the writer 
wholeheartedly concurs. It will be remembered that as the 
result of Manuel's confessions to the police, the grave of Isobel 
Cooke was uncovered and one of her shoes was found. Later as the 
result of a separate confession two guns were recovered from the 
River'Clyde. It would have been impossible for anyone other than 
the perpetrator of the crimes concerned to have known where these 
items of real evidence were to be found. - Lord Justice-General 
Clyde quoted the passage from Alison with approval and commented 
that it "might have been written for this case". 
Following Manuel the principle was next applied in Allen v 
Hamilton 1972 SLT (N) 2 where the accused in addition to making 
an unequivocal admission took the police to the post office where 
he had cashed a quantity of stolen savings stamps. The stamps 
were duly recovered from the postmaster who knew the accused and 
could identify him, as having cashed the stamps earlier that day. 
The most important point about the case, however, is that there . 
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was no evidence other than the accused'-s confession that the 
stamps had been stolen since their rightful owner was unable to 
give evidence for medical reasons. Prima facie this would appear 
to offend against Alison's statement that the corpus must be 
established aliunde Nevertheless the accused was convicted. On 
appeal the defence argued that the Crown had failed to prove the 
commission of a crime. The Crown argued that the accused's 
confession was corroborated by his possession of the stamps. It 
is a matter of regret that the report is brief, and indeed that 
the High Court did not issue written opinions and in the absence 
of further information it is impossible to say whether this case 
still represents a sound statement of the law. It is certainly 
difficult to see any distinction in principle between Allen M 
Hamilton as it is reported and Sinclair v Zud one where, it 
will be remembered, the accused was arrested in possession of 
diaries which he admitted to having stolen from a particular shop 
but where the High Court upheld a defence argument that there was 
no proof of a crime having been committed. 
An attempt to turn a simple admission of guilt into a special 
knowledge confession failed in Walker Y Smith 1975 SLT (U) g5. 
In this case an unsuccessful attempt had been made to break into 
a school. Three panes of glass had been broken in a door and one 
of the two bolts securing it had been withdrawn, the other still 
being in place, When the accused was seen by the police he said 
"Aye you're quite right. It was me. Nobody else was there. " 
When cautioned and charged he replied "I didnae get in because I 
4 
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was disturbed. " Walker was convicted after trial, the Sheriff 
taking the view that the partial unbolting of the door showed 
that the would-be housebreaker was disturbed. Since there was no 
evidence from the Janitor or anyone else that they had disturbed 
the accused, the High Court had little difficulty in overturning 
the conviction and pointing out that the condition of the door 
was "utterly neutral". 
Notes 
i, Supra chapter 5,3 ix 
2,0, Brookens 6udidlord, " A Yarning 1999 JLSS 449 
3. Supra 7.3 (i) (b) 
(c) Smith YAM, Advocate an. tSc es gar' 
The case which can, in many ways, be regarded as the beginning of 
the modern view of special knowledge confessions, and which put 
paid to any notion that the details in the confession should only 
be known to the accuced, is Smith v f1. M. Advocate (1978) SCCR 
Suppl, 20L, In this case, which Is a fairly routine example of 
its type, the accused was indicted on twenty one charges of 
housebreaking and convicted of fourteen. The incriminating 
evidence against him consisted solely of statements allegedly 
made to the police. 
The accused was taken to the police etation to assist with 
enquiries into a series of housebreakings and there, in the time 
honoured manner, announced "I want to get the whole thing off my 
chest". He was then cautioned and went on to say "Look, I've 
done about 20 or 30 houses with that man. I can chow you some of 
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them. " There was some dubiety as to whether he was allowed to 
look at a list of reported housebreakings held by the police, but 
thereafter he took officers on a guided tour of the houses which 
he claimed to have broken into and in each case gave an account 
in "more or less detail" as to how the job had been done and as 
to some. of the things which had been taken away. 
The most remarkable feature of this case is the brevity, almost 
approaching perfunctoriness, with which the High Court dealt with 
the issues raised. There is no consideration of authority or 
principle and, in particular, no consideration of the fact that 
the "knowledge" displayed by Smith was available to the police 
and that come of this might have been passed on when Smith was 
allowed to look at the crime reports: 
It is perfectly clear that a confession can 
receive corroboration if there is not only proof 
of the commission of the crime to which it relates 
but proof aliunde of the truth of the contents of 
the confession, eg if the confession was made at 
the time when only the thief or the houbebreaker 
could have known what happened in the various 
episodes. This is eminently a case in which proof 
of the contents of the confession was ample or at 
least sufficient. The fact of the matter is that 
the confessions were made to circumstances in 
which the accused had not been charged with any 
particular crime, They were made at a time when 
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all that the applicant knew was that the police 
were making enquiries into a series of house- 
breakings in that area. The particular house- 
breakings were not identified to the applicant nor 
did he have at that time any particulars of the 
articles stolen in the crimes. ... Now whether 
or not ... and it is open to question and was a 
matter before the jury, he was allowed to glance 
at the list of reported housebreakings kept in the 
police office, what it certainly true is that 
thereafter he took the police in a police car and 
guided them to the houses ... . Now 
in these 
circumstances, having regard to the way in which 
this transaction developed there is not the 
slightest doubt that the evidence of the house- 
holders confirming the truth of the contents of 
the confession, implicating the appollant as the 
perpetrator of housebreakingn which he himself 
Identified to the police, was sufficient to sot up 
the truth of his confessions. 
This is hardly satisfactory. Although the report is brief and 
includes no details of the evidence or the arguments, it appears 
that the accused only made the general admissions quoted above 
before he got to the police station. Thereafter it appears that 
he might have been shown the police list of reported houoe- 
breakinge before he went out in the police car, which was when 
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the real special knowledge admissions were allegedly made. 
Surely the possibility of the accused having been influenced (to 
put it no higher) by the behaviour of the police merits more than 
the comment that it was "a matter before the jury"? 
Regrettably this decision set the trend for the following cases. 
once again in Wilson v McAughey ! 982 SCOR 39B the opinion is 
brief and lacking in any real consideration of precedent, the 
Sheriff's note being appreciably longer, although at least 
Connglly_ and Manus do receive an honourable mention. In 
Mchughy, the accused was charged with vandalising a mechanical 
shovel by starting its engine and driving it into the River 
Clyde, The machine, which had been parked and secured on dry 
land, was found submerged in the River Clyde with a broken window 
and a flat piece of metal in the ignition. When cautioned and 
charged he replied "How did you know it was me? I smashed the 
window of the digger. I put a piece of wire into the keyhole. 
When I turned it, it started up and started moving. I didn't 
know how to stop it. I jumped out before it went into the water. 
I stood and watched it go under the water. " 
The Sheriff relied on Qonnol1., and Mnnual to conclude that there 
was insufficient corroboration and acquitted the accused on a 
defence submission of no case to answer. The Crown had proposed 
an adjustment to the draft stated case "that the perpetrator 
alone could have known that the windows were sufficiently large 
through which to climb into the cab; that the machine could not 
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be started with a piece of wire rather than an ignition key; that 
the machine went under the water - not towards, but under the 
water and that the machine was parked near a 'coup' or 'rubbish 
tip'" but the Sheriff refused to accept it because these factors 
were not exclusively and solely within the knowledge of the 
accused. On appeal the High Court overturned the acqutttals 
"The law in the situation here could bo summarised 
in the phrase that the respondent could not have 
been able to make the statement which he did if he 
had not been present at the time when the offence 
libelled had been committed. " 
Their Lordehips considered that the finding of the broken window, 
the method of ctarting, the fact that the machine trundled into 
the water and the fact that it wont under the water all corrob- 
orated the accused's incriminating statement, because had he not 
been present he would not have been able to make reference to 
these "very ctgnificant factors". I 
I 
The main point of interest in IU Qn vc uue , 
irx the dictum 
that the confossion is corroborated if the accused could not havo 
made it if he "had not been present at the time when the offence 
.. * had been committed". It is to be hoped that thin in no more 
than a slip of the judicial tongue 2 since it to a clearly ectab- 
lished rule of law that mere presence at the ceene of a crime 
does not, in the absence of special duty, result in reoponc- 
ibility for that crime. '3 It is one thing to cay that the accused 
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could only have made the statement if he had committed the 
offence but it is quite another thing to say that a statement is 
sufficient to convict an accused if it merely indicates his 
presence at the scene. 
In McAvoy vNM. Advocate 1983 SLT 16 special knowledge was only 
one of several issues raised and the case rather stands apart 
from the main canon of cases on special knowledge. However, Lord 
Hunter made an important observation on the weight of evidence 
when he said: 
"I would only add that it is not, in my opinion, 
necessarily fatal to the ratio of tConnoily and 
i, )) that persons other than the accused had 
become aware of the facts and circumstances used 
as corroboration before the confession itself had 
been made. This however does not mean to say that 
passage of time between the date of the crime and 
the date of a detailed confession is of no moment, 
since such a delay might in some circumstances 
make it more likely that an accused person had 
acquired hie knowledge of detail not as a 
perpetrator of the crime or offence but as a 
recipient of information from other sources. " 
Notes 
I, The writer hopes he will not be thought too cynical if he observes that it 
would be a remarkable mechanical shovel which did not submerge when driven 
into the River Clyde off Port Glasgow, 
2. It was, however, repeated in S 13h. S . 
ýtP. h iA3,.. 3tRP 1týC eý,.. ýtß Q 
Office Appeal Circular ASLS3 
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3, Gana and Stoddart p70 
4, Sheriff Macphail (523,302) diplomatically observes that dicta of this nature 
"should not be taken out of context'. 
(d) Statements Partially G ncýsistent and Partially Inconsistent 
Gilmour vH . M. Advocate 19 2 SGCR 590 has already been discussed 
in the context of admissibility. ' However it is also important 
as the first authority on the question of a statement containing 
admissions which are partly consistent and partly inconsistent 
with the facts. Gilmour, who was charged with rape and murder, 
had made two confessions to the police admitting killing the 
victim, but which differed from the known facts in several 
important details. One of the senior police officers involved in 
the case was of the view that the first statement, which embraced 
the drawing of a sketch of the locus, contained so many dis- 
crepancies that it did not form a basis for cautioning and 
charging Gilmour and he ordered his release from custody. The 
second statement was essentially a repetition of the first made 
to different police officers. The discrepancies were undoubtedly 
substantial and were, naturally, fully exploited by defence 
counsel, and the trial judge himself observed that the corro- 
borative sources were few. Regrettably the report does not 
specify fully what the discrepancies were and the trial judge did 
not go into them in detail, but oven some of the matters which 
the trial judge regarded as points of similarity contained much 
that was in fact inconsistent, particularly Gilmour's claim to 
have hit the victim several times on the head with a branch which 
was inconsistent with the medical evidence. 
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After rehearsing the points of similarity, the trial judge 
directed the jury: 
"Now these ladies and gentlemen are the details 
which you might think corroborate the statomont, 
if you ever reach the stage of accepting it as a 
voluntary statement and believing it to be true. 
And as for the discrepancies, you must consider 
whether these discrepancies' and the discrepancies 
in what he said Lin the first statement] were due 
to the statement being fabricated, that is made 
up, or whether they are due to the fact that the 
accused was the murderer but that he was in such a 
state of panic, having been caught unawares by a 
young girl who found him masturbating by the side 
of the path, that he didn't know how far from the 
path they ended up, he didn't know how far they 
had travelled, and he didn't know what he used to 
strangle the girl. " 
On appeal, the trial judge's decision to rehearse the points of 
indentity and not the points of discrepancy was criticised by 
defence counsel. However the High Court did not agrees 
"In our opinion that was not a valid criticism. 
It is not the function of the judge to rehearse 
every piece of evidence in his charge to the jury 
which in our procedure dons not call for a review 
of all the evidence. " 
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Their Lordships then set out how the trial court should approach 
the matter; 
"When looking for points of corroboration 
attention has to be focussed on those parts of the 
evidence which are said to provide that corrob- 
oration. If there is an absence of a point or 
points which have a significance then the jury can 
take these into account when deciding whether or 
not the points of proffered corroboration should 
be accepted, and, if accepted, what weight should 
be attached to them. ... Once [the statements] 
were accepted, the crucial question was whether 
the points of identity were sufficiently 
satisfactory in the jury's mind to constitute the 
required corroboration. It was to these matters 
that the Judge gave detailed and individual 
attention. In our opinion that was a line to take 
which in the circumstances cannot be faulted, 
The High Court went on to make it clear that there was no 
question of anything as crude as numerical superiority entering 
into considerations 
"The argument seemed to be that as there were more 
points of discrepancy than there were of identity 
the jury could not reasonable proceed on the 
points of identity. Counsel started off by 
talking of balance ... but eventually conceded 
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that this was not the proper approach. Manifestly 
it is not a matter of a numerical mathematical 
equation or balance. Where a statement contains 
points of identity and points of discrepancy, 
then, as previously indicated, it is for the Jury 
to decide whether they are going to accept and 
proceed upon the points of identity, and if they 
do so the only question then is whether theca 
points are sufficient in law to constitute 
corroboration of the admission of guilt. In the 
instant case the points of identity, if accepted, 
were clearly sufficient in law, and the judge very 
properly left the issue to the jury. The verdict 
indicates how the jury responded, " 
Thus the position is that where there are both consistencies and 
inconsistencies between the confession and facts, the Jury have 
to decide whether they are satisfied that the confession is 
sufficiently corroborated. This presumes, of course, that the 
consistencies are in themselves sufficient to provide corrob- 
oration, although, if they are not, the case will presumably fall 
on a submission of no case to answer and never reach the jury. 
Notes 
t, supra chapter 6,3 (xv) 
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(e) Decision? 
The case of Annan v Bain §nd Hamill 1986 SCOR 60 ahowo just how 
little is required to justify the application of the "special 
knowledge" tag to a confession. The circumstances were'straight- 
forward. A white Ford Capri motor vehicle was stolen in 
Livingstone and some twelve hours later soma civilians saw it'In 
Glasgow in suspicious circumstances. The civilians attempted to 
detain the occupants of the car while the police were coming but 
the driver made off and was apparently never traced. Bain and 
Hamill, who had only been passangere, also left the car shortly 
before the arrival of the police, but they were detained a short 
time later less than half a mile away. On detention, Bain stated 
under caution "It's a fair cop, we stole the white car. " Hamill 
replied "We tried but got caught, fair enough". After they were 
identified by the civilians they were cautioned and charged with 
stealing the car, Bain replying "We stole it" and Hamill replying 
"He's right". 
In the Sheriff Court it does not appear to have occurred either 
to the pleaders or the Sheriff himself that the alleged 
admissions to the police could be construed as containing 
"special knowledge", The Crown presented the case on the basis 
that the admissions were corroborated by the recent possession of 
the stolen vehicle. The defence argued that there was nothing to 
corroborate the admissions since there was no evidence that Bain 
and Hamill had been present t4har* the vehicle was stolen, and 
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under reference to Hi2son v Tudhope. ' no inference of guilt 
could be drawn from the fact that they were only prevent in the 
vehicle as passengers. Although he was well aware that very 
little by way of corroboration of the incriminating admissions 
would be required to justify a conviction, Sheriff Macphail took 
the view that the evidence relied on by the Crown did not 
corroborate the admissions because it did not point to the guilt 
of the accused. Accordingly he upheld a submission of no case to 
answer. The prosecutor appealed. 
The High Court overturned the Sheriff and in so doing said: 
Now with respect to the Sheriff, he has wholly 
misconceived what the evidence was. In the first 
place the Sheriff was exercised to discover 
whether there was corroboration for the confession 
of Bain that he was a party to the theft and 
whether there was corroboration for the confession 
of Hamill that he was a party to the theft. What 
he did not observe was that in the presence of the 
other they both volunteered the information that 
they together had stolen the white car. The 
confession accordingly contained within it know- 
ledge of theft which could only be held by the 
thieves because at that stage nothing had been 
said to them to indicate that the police were in 
the least bit interested in the theft of a car or, 
if they were, that the car was a white one, 2 so 
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that at the very outset, apart from the fact of 
the confessions ... 'demonstrated knowledge of the 
particular theft which was amply established, the 
statemont by Hamill that he and Bain committed the 
theft corroborated Bain's confession that he had 
been a party to the theft, and by the same token 
the statement of Bain that he and Hamill had 
carried out the theft corroborated Hamill's 
admission, 11 In addition to that evidence, which 
was quite sufficient, there was evidence to 
demonstrate that the confessions were true. That 
evidence is amply provided by proof of the theft 
itself coupled with proof which linked and 
associated the two men with the motor car before 
the police became interested in the affair at 
all. 11 
Once again this case demonstrates the cursory approach of the 
High Court to matters of this nature, with no consideration of 
authority or principle, and the addition in this case of the 
extraordinary statement, placed in italics, that the confessions 
of two accused can be mutually corroborative. This is, as 
Sheriff Gordon points out in hic commentary, contrary to both 
principle and authority. As evidence against Hamill, Bain's 
statement is hearsay and thus inadmissible. What is admiscible 
evidence against Hamill Is his reaction to gain's statement, 
which in this case was explicit assent. 4 The lack of 
t 
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intellectual rigour shown in this case is, to put it no higher, 
unfortunate. 
That having been said, it must be conceded that, if one accepts 
that the reference to the "white car" amounts to special know- 
ledge, 21 Sheriff Macphail was wrong to uphold the submission of 
no case to answer. Indeed on this basis the case contains more 
than a bare sufficiency of evidence, since there was eyewitness 
identification of the accused as having been present at the 
stolen vehicle, However, it is submitted that one of the most 
significant factors in this unfortunate case is the fact that 
until the High Court raised the question of special knowledge it 
had not ocurred to anyone, and in particular it had not occurred 
to Sheriff Macphail whose ability as a legal scholar is well 
known. 
Notes 
1,1993 SCCR 247 
2, If this is factually accurate one is left wondering what the police did say 
to Bain and Hamill when they detained them, Logically there must have been 
a conversation of some sort, Section 2f4) of the 1984 Act requires a 
constable at the time when he detains a person to 'inform the person of his 
suspicion, of the general nature of the offence which he suspects has been 
or is being committed and of the reason for the detention, ' 
3, Author's italics '1 
4, This point is fully discussed under 'Implied Confessions and Admissions' at 
chapter 6,6 supra 
5, Sheriff Gordon does not, Sea his commentary at p63 
M Confes5t4p Contajnjng Dotalls Widely [{Drwr), 
The cases previously discussed chow how far and how rapidly the 
concept of "special knowledge" had departed from the Alieonian 
notion that the information contained in the confession should 
only be known to the perpetrator of the crime. However, in all 
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the cases to date the information given, although not exclusively 
within the knowledge of the perpetrator, could be described as 
being of limited circulation, in the sense that, apart from the 
perpetrator, it was only known to the police and a few indiv- 
iduals directly affected by the crimes. As already mentioned, 
McAvoy v HJ& Advocate had contained a broad hint from Lord 
Hunter as to the view which would be likely to be taken when the 
High Court required to decide the issue of a confession con- 
taining information which was widely known. 
The opportunity came in what became known in Glasgow as the 
"bluebell Woods Murder" - Wilson e Murray vr voce 9 
SCR 217. This case related to the attempted rape and brutal 
murder of the half-sister of the accused Murray whose body, naked 
apart from socks, had been found by a group of children at the 
bottom of a steep slope below a footpath. There were no 
immediate suspects and police inquiries, although intensive, were 
initially unsuccessful. Many people, including the two accuced, 
were interviewed, house-to-house inquiries were made and at one 
point the assistance of the local radio station, Radio Clyde, was 
obtained. In the course of the broadcast it was discloacd that 
the victim had been strangled with her own bracstere. 
The murder had taken place on 22nd May t986 and on 15th June 
Murray was taken to Drumchapel police office in connection with 
an unrelated matter. Quite by coincidence, around the time that 
Murray was taken to Drumchapel, Wilson went voluntarily to 
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Clydebank police station to discuss his earlier statement. (The 
police know that he and Murray had been in the area around the 
material time). Both of them, quite independently, and in 
separate police stations then proceeded to make confessions each 
of which was, according to the Lord Justice-General, "a detailed 
confession of guilt of the murder which, subject to quite 
insignificant differences of detail, was identical [with the 
other]. 11 
The story which emerged was that the accused had been in the 
woods engaging in a homosexual act together when the victim 
happened on the scene and saw what was going on. They were 
terrified that she would report the matter to her parents, and, 
as the Lord Justice General put it, "proceeded to make sure that 
she would be unable to do that. " The details of the statements 
tallied closely with what had been found at the scene of the 
crime particularly in regard to the position of the deceased's 
anorak and Murray also drew a sketch of the position of the body. 
Apart from the confessions there was no Incriminating evidence 
against either accused and, as Sheriff Gordon points out in his 
commentary, some of the most striking dotailc of the confessions 
were not capable of being corroborated by independent evidence of 
their accuracy. The trial judge, Lord Robertson, charged the 
jury as follows: 
"tTNN order to corroborate a co-called acif- 
corroborating confession ' it is not necessary to 
prove that only the perpetrator of the crime could 
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have known all the details in the confession. It 
is for the Jury to decide if the only reasonable 
explanation of the accused's knowledge of these 
details is that he was the perpetrator. Now it is 
sufficient to provide the necessary corroboration 
that the accused gave evidence in his confession 
of knowledge of details which otherwise he'had no 
reason to be aware of. The question therefore for 
the jury is really this., do these confessions .. 
convince you that, quite apart from the account 
given by the accused, they must have boon there at 
the perpetration of the crime in order to give 
that account? ... tilt is entirely 
for you to say 
whether you think, if these statements-are 
accepted as having been given, could these accused 
have given these statements unless they had been 
there and'had known what the details of the crime 
were. That is the test and you will have to apply 
your minds to that if you get to that stage, " 
On appeal, defence counsel conceded that Lord Roberteon'o 
direction to the jury could not be criticised, but it was argued 
that having regard to the widespread knowledge of the details of 
the murder the case should not have been allowed to go to the 
Jury. In dismissing the appeal the Lord Justice-General quoted 
with approval Lord Hunter's dictum to McAvoX and went on: 
"In our opinion the trial judge would not have 
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been entitled in this case to sustain a motion 
that there was no case to answer. There was in 
law quite sufficient evidence capable of providing 
corroboration of these remarkable, almost 
identical confessions made by each appellant in 
separate police stations ... . Each provided an 
identical and powerful motive for the dreadful 
crime, and was redolent of having been made by 
someone who had been present when the crime was 
committed. The evidence of the coincidence 
between the details of the killing which each 
confession disclosed, and what was found after the 
event, was sufficient in law for corroborative 
purposes if the jury were prepared to find that 
the accurate knowledge of the crime revealed in 
the statements of each appellant (sic) was his own 
knowledge as one of the perpetrators. It was not 
t 
for the trial judge to evaluate the weight which 
should be given to the circumstance that by 15th 
Tune 1986 many people knew or had heard of many of 
the datals of the crime. That was essentially a 
matter for the jury to consider under the proper 
directions which were given and that, indeed, it 
precisely what Lord Hunter had in mind when he 
said what he did in (c., oy- »' 
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W11 ". n moved Sheriff Gordon to review the changes in the law 
since Alison's time 2 and to warn against the inherent dangers of 
the way the law was developing. He pointed out that Alison's 
rule was probably. limited to cases where the accused told the 
police things they didn't know and where corroboration was found 
in the fact that the police subsequently went looking for an item 
of real evidence which they found where the accused said it was. 
"A limitation to such cases or at least to knowledge of facto 
unknown to the police, " argues Sheriff Gordon, "would operate as 
a safeguard against the possibility of the police, consciously or 
otherwise, putting words into a suspect's mouth, and such a 
restriction might have been expected in a legal system as 
suspicious of confessions to the police as was the Scots system 
in the 1950s. " However, he points out that there is a parallel 
between the modern view of the sufficiency of confession 
evidence, is that it is essentially a matter for the Jury, and 
the modern view of the admissibility of auch evidence is that it 
is for the jury to decide the issue of fairness, 
Sheriff Gordon goes on to make the point, so often overlooked by 
journalists and others who might be though to know better, 3 that 
it is "a little misleading to say that a person cannot be con- 
victed of a crime in Scotland on the basis only of a confession 
made by him to the police. He can be virtually so convicted, 
providing only that the confession is sufficiently detailed to 
satisfy a jury that it is reliable, and provided that the fact 
that the crime was committed by someone is independently, proved. 
148 
... A jury are entitled to treat a circumstantial confession as 
corroborated by proof of the correctness of the circumstances it 
contains, whether or not these circumstances were previously 
known to the police or indeed were common knowledge, and even if 
it contains other circumstances which are proved to be false. " 
After commenting that the amount of evidence required to 
corroborate a confession is less that that required to 
corroborate an independent witness, Sheriff Gordon concludes, "A 
system which was once very suspicious of confessions in now 
coming close to the ancient view that a confession is 'the queen 
of proofs'". 
Notes 
1. The writer has consciously eschewed the use of this expression which is 
theoretically (if not factually) inept, 
2. Commentary to the report at p223 
3, Mirtleld (p204) appears to be about to fall into this trap, but at p206 he 
observes, under reference to Hartley v Hj. -Advocate that there "seems to be 
a tendency in the Scottish cases to diminish the weight required for the 
supporting evidence almost to vanishing point, * At least English Academics, 
seem to be realising the true situation - see eg R. Pattanden Shu1d 
Confessions be Corroborated? (1991) 107 LQR 317 - even if it still eludes 
the Sunday Post which, as late as lot December 1991, produced a truly awful 
piece claiming that the Guildford Four, Birmingham Six and Tottenham Three 
"couldn't have been convicted" In Scotland, 
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would not have been established. ' Even more intriguingly, what 
would happen if one co-accused were convicted and one acquitted? 
Would the High Court attempt to apply the ratio of Q Lrgour? The 
answers to these questions must, at this rsage, remain 
speculative. 
In the instant case the first admission (and indeed the second 
one also) was quite unequivocal and this undoubtedly influenced 
the decision. Nonetheless it is submitted, with respect, that 
IagDonnld strains the concept of "special knowledge" to breaking 
point. The statement contains no information whatever about the 
commission of the crime. If it had contained some verifiable 
information anout the parts played by the co-accused, the 
position would clearly have been different, but the bald naming 
of them is, it is submitted, no more special than a simple 
confession to the crime. 
In dovat a$L SCj, 
_821 
the accused was charged with 
two charges of vandalising motor vehicle., a motor car on 21 
January 1987, and a motor van on 29 January 1987. The damage had 
been caused by the application of paint stripper to the bodywork. 
Bainbridge was jean by the police on 14 February 1987 and 
interviewed under caution. They told him that there were two 
vehicles involved, that they had both been parked outside the 
4 same restaurant and that paint stripper had caused the damage. 
The accused replied "Aye, I damaged the car and the van. I don't 
like them. I gat a bottle of paint stripper from Pricefighters 
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in Denny. I did the car first and went back and did the van 
later. I put the paint stripper in the bucket in the house. 
just threw the stuff over the motors and ran away. " 
The issue for the High Court was confused by the fact that the 
Sheriff had been persuaded, wrongly, to treat a second confession 
to the owner of the vehicles as corroborative of the confession 
to the police. 2. However, when they came to consider the issue of 
special knowledge, the High Court had no doubts 
"The appellant had special knowledge that a car 
had been damaged and that later a van had been 
damaged. The question for us is whether proof of 
the accuracy of the appellant's knowledge of the 
sequence of events and of the nature of the 
vehicles concerned is sufficient to provide the 
corroboration which the confession required. ... 
The Sheriff plainly took the view that the only 
reasonable explanation for the appellant's special 
knowledge which we have identified to that he was 
the perpetrator of the two acts of vandalism which 
led to his conviction. ... Me reject the 
proposition that there was insufficient evidence 
on which the conviction can be supported. " 
The situation in Moron YH . 
H. Advocata 1992SCCR 40 was unusual 
in that the statement made by the accused was not an admission 
that he himself had committed the murder, but a claim that 
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another man called Morrison had done so and had then told the 
accused about it. The accused's statement revealed a consid- 
erable amount of circumstantial detail, which he claimed to have 
obtained from Morrison. Unfortunately for the accused, Morrison 
turned out to have been in custody on the date of the murder and 
the Crown successfully founded on the accused's statement as 
displaying special knowledge of the commission of the crime. 
c vo and Wilson were considered in Woodland v--Hamilton 1990 
SCOR 15ß. In this case Woodland was charged along with a man 
called Halliday with breaking into a house and stealing a number 
of items including a video recorder. When interviewed under 
caution by the police he said "Aye, Johnny Halliday told me you 
got him and that he said he told the truth so I'll be honest and 
tell you. The video went to Kevin Boyle. The suitcase was 
dumped. It's the only housebreaking I've ever done. " There was 
second admission following caution and charge but it was a simple 
confession, The Sheriff found as a fact that the police had not 
mentioned Boyle's name to the accused before he made this state- 
ment. At the trial Boyle admitted having been in possession of 
the video but denied that he had obtained it from the accused. 
The Sheriff was clearly less than impressed with hic evidence but 
convicted Woodland on the basis that his admission was corrob- 
orated by the fact that Boyle was the resetter of the video 
recorder. Halliday was acquitted. 
153 
An unusually constituted High Court rather surprisingly over- 
turned the conviction. Their Lordships accepted that the test to 
be applied was whether the only reasonable explanation of the 
accused's knowledge was the fact that he was the perpetrator. 
However the reference to Boyle as the resetter came after a 
sentence in which the accused said he had been in conversation 
with Halliday and that Halliday had given him at least some 
information: 
"It is therefore possible that the appellant may 
have obtained the name of Boyle from Halliday. 
Had there been evidence from Halliday to the 
effect that he had given no such information to 
the appellant then it might well be said that the 
only reasonable explanation of the appellant's 
knowledge was that he was the perpetrator. As it 
is however the appellant could have become aware 
of Boyle's involvement even though he himself was 
not the perpetrator of the crime. This is 
particularly so having regard to the lapse of 
nearly eleven months between the date of the crime 
and the data of the confession. " 
Woodland v Hamilton can probably be treated as a decision on itc 
own facts. 
Any hope that Woodland marked the beginning of a reappraisal of 
the application of the "special knowledge" rule was dached by 
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Hutchison v Valentine 1 9ý 0 SCOR 569. This case is certainly the 
most extreme example to date of the application of the rule and 
involves circumstances which, it is submitted, make ,a mockery of 
the idea that a confession requires any corroboration at all, at 
least if the word "corroboration" is used in its normal accepted 
sense. 
Hutchison was charged with breaking into a hotel room and steal- 
ing a television set which had been recovered abandoned in a car 
park, He was interviewed under caution by the police and advised 
by them that a room in the particular hotel had been broken into. 
He then said "I done it on my ain. I canna really mind where 
aboot in the hotel I got it. I was drunk. I dumped it. " 
The Sheriff hold that the confession was unequivocal and there 
was just sufficient other evidence to corroborate it although he 
did not address specifically the issue of special knowledge. 
On appeal the High Court upheld the conviction but on the basic 
that the reference to "it" showed that the accused was aware that 
only one object was involved and the reference to "dumping" was 
consistent with the recovery of the television in the car park: 
"The proper starting point in a case of this kind 
is the confession. It contains within it certain 
elements which require to be contrasted with what 
the appellant was told when he was interviewed by 
the police officers. According to the finding the 
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information which he was given was oimply that a 
room had been broken into in the hotel the 
previous night or the following morning. In reply 
to that information he stated that he had done it, 
and he also made remarks which indicated that he 
was aware that a single piece of property had been 
taken from the room. We take that from the 
reference to being unable to remember where in the 
hotel he got "it" and to dumping "it". There is 
also the point in the confession that whatever had 
been taken from the room had been abandoned at 
some point by the thief. It is a reasonable 
inference therefore from what was said that the 
appellant, unlike somebody who was not aware of 
any of the details of the crime, knew perfectly 
well that what the police officers were talking 
about was a housebreaking which had resulted in a 
single piece of property being taken from the room 
and being left somewhere by the thief rather than 
carried away by him for his own purposes to come 
other place. .,. 
It was said that the reference to "dumping" the 
article is co generic and lacking in information 
that it was not capable of being corroborated by 
the finding of the television receiver in the car 
parking area. We disagree with this oubmicnion, 
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because we think that, on a reasonable con- 
struction of the word "dumping" together with the 
information we have about the recovery of the 
television and the place where it was recovered, 
there is a consistency between the facts and the 
confession. " 
Sheriff Gordon, no enthusiast for the special knowledge 
confession, refrains from comment on this case, but the writer 
submits that it is wrongly decided and it is to be hoped that it 
will be reconsidered by a fuller bench at the first available 
opportunity. It must be doubted whether a "confession" made by 
an accused who was, on his own admission, so drunk that he was 
unable properly to remember what he did, containing nothing by 
way of significant detail and uncorroborated by any independent 
evidence is a proper basis on which to find a cane proved beyond 
reasonable doubt. As recently as 1977, the Thomson Committee 
commented 
"The greatest safeguard against a miscarriage of 
justice is - and should continue to be - the rule 
of law that the Crown must prove its case beyond 
reasonable doubt on corroborated evidence" a 
It is submitted that Hutc iso v Valentino offends against this 
rule of law and this is especially to be regretted since it was 
decided in the period following the release of the "Guildford 
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Four" when the dangers of relying uncritically on uncorroborated 
confessions should have been particularly apparent. 
As one experienced solicitor, puts itt 
"It is easy to see the attraction of the law as 
now applied, To follow the narrow view, as in 
Manuel, would undoubtedly mean that more "thin" 
cases would be thrown out "on a technicality" 
owing to lack of corroboration, but the plus side 
would be that the kind of abomination which 
occurred in the Guildford case would be more 
difficult to sustain. Effectively the broadening 
of the class of self-corroborating admissions can 
result, in real terms, in there being no 
corroboration at all, particularly if corrob- 
oration is to be found in apparent knowledge by 
the accused of matters which are also within the 
knowledge of police officers under pressure to 
solve crimes and bring villains to justice. If 
those police officers are ready to help the 
process along by fabricating confessions based of 
their (as opposed to the accused's) knowledge of 
events, then the accused is in a very dangerous 
position, his conviction or acquittal depending 
not upon questions of legal argument but upon 
factors entirely within the province of the jury - 
fifteen men and women capable of being lied to and 
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misled by any witness prepared, for whatever 
reason, to undertake that course. " 4 
The writer wichen to make it clear that he is not suggesting that 
the police in Hutchison v Valentine (or any of the other cases 
presently under discussion) fabricated or touched up the alleged 
confessions, but the common thread running through all the cases 
is an uncritical acceptance of police veracity and objectivity 
and English and Northern Irish experienco has shown what can 
happen when the trust reposed in the police is abused. 
While Scotland has had its share of well-publicised miscarriages 
of justice, none of them have so far been proved to involve 
confessions, although it is currently being claimed that at least 
one individual is presently languishing in prison as the result 
of just such a miscarriage. 40 However the issue in that 
particular case has at least as much to do with the fact that a 
witness who provided corroboration of the confession has now 
retracted his evidence as it has to do with the confession 
itself. 
Nevertheless there is no reason to suppose that this absence of 
confession-based scandal is anything other than fortuitous and on 
the present state of the law only the most naive could believe 
that Timothy Evans or the "Guildford Four" would be acquitted if 
they were tried in Scotland today. Their only real hope would be 
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the increasing reluctance of juries to convict on evidence coming 
solely from police officers. 6 
Notes 
1, c! d n&v H alts Ll. Q90 SCCR JS discussed At vol, 2 p152 
2. See vol, 2 p48 supra 
3, Third Report (Cmnd 7006) pare 1,09 
4,0, Brookens 64ildfcrd, 4 a'arnlx' 1989 JLSS 448 
4a A, Grosskurth Scotland's Pitfalls (1991) Legal Action 7, Some of the 
factual errors in this article are laughable 
5. See article by Murray Ritchie in the Glasgow Herald June 25 1990, Glanville 
Williams and Adrian Zuckerman have noted the same position in England, 
particularly with regard to "verbals" - see respectively 119791 Crim LR 6 at 
14 and The Principles of Crisina! Evidence p3G 
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7.4 The English Position A Comparative Note 
U) Gees 
Although it has been said ' that in English law "corroboration" 
is not a technical term and simply means "confirmation" or 
"support, " English law tends to use the term in a somewhat 
narrower sense than Scots law. Corroboration in the English 
sense must emanate from a source independent of the witness to be 
corroborated and must implicate the accused in a material 
particular, and, as Cross points out, it follows that not all 
evidence which might, as a matter of common sense, be thought to 
confirm or support the testimony of a witness will necessarily 
satisfy such a requirement. 2 
The general rule of English law is that the court may act on the 
uncorroborated testimony of one witness, and such requirements as 
there are concerning a plurality of witnesses, or some other 
confirmation of individual testimony, are exceptional. However 
it does not follow that an English court must act upon the 
evidence of one witness even if it is unshaken in cross- 
examination or in no other way discredited. 
There are a few insignificant statutory cases where either actual 
corroboration is required, or the judge must warn the jury of the 
dangers of convicting in its absence 4 but generally in no case 
is corroboration positively necessary as a matter of law. 
Equally, in no case is a fudge precluded from warning the jury 
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that it is unsafe to act on certain evidence unless it is 
corroborated, since he has a general discretion to comment on the 
evidence and the reliability of the witnesses. At common law 
there are two classes of cases, namely where the Crown case rests 
on the evidence of accomplices and on the evidence of the 
complainant in a sexual assault, 6 where the judge must give the 
jury a "full" warning on the danger of acting on uncorroborated 
evidence. 
However, the rules relating to warnings to juries "have degen- 
erated into a web of technicalities which often impede justice" 15 
and a "shambles" and a conviction may be quashed where there is 
in fact ample corroborative evidence but the judge has not given 
the jury a warning in appropriate terms. 0 Conversely, as long 
as the necessary warning is given, a conviction based on 
uncorroborated evidence will not be quashed merely on the ground 
that there is only one source of evidence. 
Given the excessive technicality with which the law is now 
burdened it is hardly surprising that there is a conspicuous lack 
of enthusiasm in England for any extension of the pre cent rules 
of corroboration into new areas, 11 Certain of the existing 
requirements, notably those relating to sexual offences, are the 
subject of criticism and are likely to be modified, if not 
removed altogether and, a recent working Paper by the Law 
Commission 10 looks set to lead the way for the removal of most 
of the existing corroboration requirements. 
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Apart from the relatively insignificant case of Section 77 of 
PACE, there has never been any rule in England requiring either 
that a confession should be corroborated or that a judge should 
warn a jury of the danger of convicting in a case depending 
solely on the evidence of an uncorroborated confession. It has 
been settled law at least since 1789 that a person may be 
convicted on the basis solely of his confession and without 
corroboration of its contents " and despite occasional calls in 
the press, both legal and lay, for change, no body of any real 
influence has sought to alter this position. 
In one case, Sykes (1912) 8 Cr App R 223, which incidentally has 
some points of resemblance to Wilson and Murret/ vHM Advocate, 
it was asserted that the need to convict an uncorroborated 
confessions would seldom arise. In this case, the Commissioner 
had directed the jury in the following terms: 
"A man may be convicted on his own confession 
alone; there is no law against it. The law is 
that if a man makes a full and voluntary 
confession which is direct and positive, and is 
properly proved, a jury may, if they think fit, 
convict him of any crime upon it, But seldom, if 
ever, the necessity arises, because confessions 
can always be tested and examined, first by the 
police, and then by you and us in court, and the 
first question you ask when you are examining the 
confession of a man is, is there anything outside 
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it to show it was true? is it corroborated? are 
the statements made in it of fact so far as we can 
test them true? was the prisoner a man who had the 
opportunity of committing the murder? is his con- 
fession possible'? is it consistent with other 
facts which have been ascertained and which have 
been, as in this case, proved before us? " 
This direction was approved by the Court of Criminal Appeal and 
Ridley r added. 
"It was said that the murder was the talk of the 
countryside, and it might well be that a man under 
the influence of insanity or a morbid desire for 
notoriety would accused himself of such a crime. 
I agree that this is so, but it was a question for 
the Jury, and they ought to see whether it was 
properly corroborated by facts, and so they were 
directed. We think that this point of the case 
was quite sufficiently left to the jury and the 
Court thinks that there is no reason for giving 
leave to appeal. " 
A similar point was made by the then Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Sir Norman Skelhorn when giving evidence about the 
prosecution process to the Fisher Inquiry: 
"Well if there was any indication that [the police 
had not looked for supporting evidence), and if 
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the indications were that they had and it was not 
obtainable, then I would have thought that In such 
a case it was very probable that there would be no 
prosecution. " 
And later: 
"On the other hand, one can get, of course, even 
such a confession in circumstances in which one 
says 'Well I think it' s safe'. I mean, one 
element to start with, is that is this a 
confession made when the police go to him, or is 
this a case of a. man who comes along and says '1 
think I should tell you I killed someone or other 
at such and such a place, ' and so on. 12 Wall that 
is a starting point. It makes a fairly big 
difference when one is looking at it. So that I 
would not make a sort of too great a general- 
ication on it , but certainly one would 
look with 
very great care at a completely not only uncorrob- 
orated confession, but a confession with 
absolutely nothing to support it at all, in saying 
'Well it is still right and safe to go on on this 
confession just as it stands. " 113 
Thus the English position scorns to be that although, with one 
partial exception, the law does not positively require a 
confession to be corroborated (in the narrower English sonse), it 
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is unlikely, although by no means impossible, that a prosecution 
will be mounted solely on the basis of an uncorroborated 
confession. In such a case it is open to the trial judge to warn 
the jury about the dangers of such evidence and to direct them 
that they should seek confirmation in other evidence. 
Notes 
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(ii) Supporting e Respect C cs g 
(b) The Fisher Report 
There has been occasional discussion in England of the desir- 
ability of a formal requirement for supporting evidence for 
confessions, the main examples being the Fisher Report and the 
RCCP. As previously discussed, ' Sir Henry Fisher recommended 
that in four situations no person should be convicted on the 
evidence of a confession unless it was supported by other 
independent evidence. These situations all involved the police 
and were (1) a confession obtained in breach of the Judges Rules, 
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(2) a confession by a child or young 
questioned without the presence of a 
confession by a mentally handicapped 
questioned without the presence of a 
an oral confession in a police static 





an of w 
who had been 
or guardian, (3) a 
who had been 
or guardian and (4) 
hich a tape recording 
Fisher also expressed the opinion that the police should always 
look for evidence to support a confession. Interestingly he 
preferred to use the term "supporting evidence" rather than 
"corroboration", the English use of the latter term being 
somewhat narrower than what he had in mind. In Sir Henry's view, 
"supporting evidence" would include evidence which would 
constitute corroboration under English law, is independent 
testimony which affects the prisoner by tending to connect him 
with the crime. However, he also envisaged "supporting evidence" 
including any evidence which tends to show that the confession is 
true, whether or not it emanates from the confessor "or even from 
the confession itself", 2 Although he referred with approval to 
Scottish law, it is interesting to note that this most eminent 
English legal scholar did not regard a special knowledge 
confession as being corroborated in the English sense, Mirfieid 
comments 3 that it seems unlikely that Sir Henry Fisher intended 
English law to differ from the Connoily/ a aal view in Scotland. 
Mirfield argues that although Fisher does not specify the precise 
width of the definition of "supporting evidence, " it should be 
defined to require that some Incriminating fact be supported. 
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Sir Henry also expressed the view that where the prosecution was 
based on a confession the police report should always include a 
reference to the steps taken to obtain supporting evidence, any 
supporting evidence found, in appropriate cases the fact that no 
supporting evidence was found, and any evidence tending to 
contradict the confession, whether or not that evidence was 
admissible in court. 
Notes 
1, Supra chapter 6,5 (ii) 
2, Fisher Report pars 23,3 
3, p20S 
(b) The Royal commission on-Criminal 
The RCCP unequivocally rejected the nation that confessions 
should be supported by other evidence: 
"However we do not accept the suggestion that a 
person should never be convicted upon his 
confession alone uncorroborated by any other 
evidence. To do so would, unless the criteria for 
prosecution were changed, mean that those who were 
willing to confess and to plead guilty could not 
even be charged unless or until other evidence of 
their guilt had been secured. That has such 
considerable implications for the resource and 
organisational aspects of the pre-trial procedure 
and the right of the accused to a speedy disposal 
as to be altogether too drastic a way of removing 
the risk of false confessions. People do confess 
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to offences and are convicted, oometimea on a plea 
of guilty, where there is no other material 
evidence. We do not consider that it would be in 
the interests of justice to introduce rules of 
evidence which would have the effect of precluding 
this. But where the evidence against the accused 
is his own confession, all concerned with the 
prosecution, the police, the prosecuting agency, 
and the court, should, as a matter of practice, 
seek every means of checking the validity of that 
confession. " ' 
To this, and to Sir Henry Fisher's suggestions, it can be 
objected that police officers prepared to fabricate or touch up a 
confession in the first place are hardly likely to trouble 
themselves to search for evidence which might prove the 
confession false, and the circumstances of the Confait case 
showed how easy it was for major discrepancies in evidence to be 
overlooked by the prosecuting authorities due to a combination of 
overwork (on the part of the DPP's staff) and simple failure to 
understand the implications of the situation (on the part of 
prosecuting counsel). 2 
However, the RCCP did recommend something very close to a 
corroboration warning where a confession had been obtained in 
breach of the proposed code of practice on questioning of 
suspects: 
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"But since reliability is the primary purpose of 
the code of practice for interviewing suspects, 
the reliability of confessions obtained in its 
breach must be open to question, and it would not, 
therefore, be right for statement evidence 
obtained in breach of the code to be accepted 
uncritically and without comment by the criminal 
courts. ... The judge should point out to the jury 
or the magistrates be advised of the dangers 
involved in acting upon a statement whose 
reliability can be affected by breach of the code. 
They should be informed that under pressure a 
person may make an incriminating statement that is 
not true, that the code has been introduced to 
control police behaviour and minimise the rink of 
an untrue statement being made and that if they 
are satisfied that a breach of the code has 
occurred it can be dangerous to act upon any 
statement made; accordingly they should look for 
independent support for it before relying upon it, 
The effect of that warning would be that whore a 
breach of the. code has occurred, senior officers, 
and those responsible for advising on the 
prosecution, will need to consider the 
availability of other evidence before deciding 
whether it is proper to permit the prosecution to 
proceed, " 3 
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1, Report pare 4,74 
2, Fisher Report paras 2,29,2,39,2,40 and 2,52 
3, Report para 4,133 
(c) The Law Commission 
For the sake of completeness, reference is made to the Law 
Commission's Working Paper on Corroboration in Criminal Trials. 
This paper does not address itself to the undesireability of 
convicting solely on uncorroborated confession evidence. The 
reason, which one commentator finds unconvincing, 2 is that there 
is no common ground between the problems posed by confession 
evidence and those addressed by the present corroboration rules, 
which are formulated to deal with unreliable prosecution 
witnesses. As the same commentator observes, "To this it might 
be objected that half the problem with confession evidence is 
exactly one of credibility of prosecution witnesses, in so far as 
police officers may invent or enhance statements, and the other 
half is the closely related difficulty of whether to believe what 
the accused said when he was undre extreme psychological pressure 
in the police station, or to prefer what he now says in court. " "I 
It would appear that English law will require to await the rocult 
of the May inquiry 4 for the next major pronouncement on this 
issue. 
Notes 
1, No, 115 (HMSO 1990) 
2, DJ Birch Corroboration in Criminal Trials; a Roview of tha Proposals of tha 
Lab' Commission's £'orking Paper E19901 Crir LR 667 
3, Birch op cit note 2 supra, 
4, Into the convictions of the Guildford Four and the Maguire Seven 
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(iii) The FvreRtton - Section 77 of PACE 1 
The Judges' Rules and Administative Directions had contained in 
Directions 4 and 4A special provisions for the interrogation of 
children and young persons. The essence of Direction 4 was that 
a child or young person should be interviewed in the presence of 
a parent or other non-police adult "as far as practicable. " As a 
result of the Confait case Direction 4A was added in 1976 and 
made similar provision for the interviewing of persons believed 
by the interviewing officers to be mentally handicapped, In 
addition the police were required to take particular care in 
putting questions to such persons and in accepting answers from 
them as reliable. The police were also required to reek 
verification of the facts admitted and to obtain corroboration of 
them. 
The RCCP, whose appointment was, in no small measure, due to the 
circumstances of the Confait case, considered the issue of the 
additional protection required by juveniles and the mentally 
handicapped. 2 They recommended that the police should give 
especial attention to testing the reliability of statements made 
by persons in these categories, 3A minority of the Commission 
had considered that any breach of the rules for the special 
protection of these vulnerable groups should lead to automatic 
exclusion of the confession. The majority, however, disagreed, 
finding such an approach inconsistent with the Commission's 
general opposition to a firm exclusionary rule. Protection was 
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to be achieved by on the spot supervision and the use of the 
police disciplinary code. However there was a unanimous 
recommendation that the jury or the magistrates should have their 
attention drawn specifically to the possible unreliability of 
evidence obtained from a juvenile or a mentally handicapped 
person in the absence (justified or not) of an adult. 4 
The only legislation 6 which followed'an this recommendation is 
Section 77 of PACE, a late government addition to the Bill, 
which makes a unique provision for a special warning Is in the 
case of a confession made by a "mentally handicapped" accused 
outwith the presence of an "independent person, " to essentially a 
non-police adult. Section 77(1) provides that where the court is 
satisfied (a) that the accused is "mentally handicapped", and (b) 
that the confession was not made in the presence of an "indo- 
pendent person, " the jury must be warned that there is special 
need for caution before convicting the accused in reliance on the 
confession and they must be told that the unreliability arises 
because of his mental handicap and because of the absence of the 
independent person, No doubt mindful of the mesa of the general 
law on corroboration warnings, it is specifically provided that 
no particular form of words need be used. Section 77(2) makes 
corresponding provisions for summary trials. 
"Mentally handicapped" Is defined in section 77(3) as involving 
"a state of arrested or incomplete development of mind which 
includes significant impairment of intelligence and social 
173 
functioning. " As Mirfield points out in the course of a critical 
discussion of Section 77,7 this definition excludes the mentally 
ill. However the terms of Section 77 are in addition to the 
possibility of exclusion for unreliability under Section 76(2) or 
unfairness under Section 76(1) or in exercise of the court's 
general discretion under Section 82(3). Therefore, although it 
would certainly have been preferable to make specific provision 
for all mentally ill or handicapped accused, there can be little 
doubt of the Court's power to safeguard the mentally ill within 
the ambit of PACE. 
The writer respectfully agrees with Dr Mirfiold that the failure 
of the legislature to bring juveniles within the ambit of Section 
77 is hard to understand, particularly since Section 77 would 
appear to owe its existence at least indirectly to the Confait 
case. As Dr Mirfieid puts it "What sense is there in making 
special provision for an adult with a mental age of 10, but none 
for a 10 year old? " 
Be that as it may, the terms of the section are clear and it 
therefore remains possible, at least in theory, for an English 
court to convict on the uncorroborated evidence of a confession 
obtained solely In the presence of police officers from a person 
who is a juvenile, or mentally ill, or, for that matter, mentally 
handicapped, although at least in the latter case the jury is, as 
a matter of law, required to be told of the potential dangers. 
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So far there appears only to have been one decided case dealing 
expressly with a failure by a trial judge to give a jury an 
adequate Section 77 warning. 6 In quashing the conviction, the 
Court of Appeal commented that the warning was "an essential part 
of a fair summing up. " 
Notes 
1, See generally Zander p197, Mirfieid pp16S-166 
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Chapter 8 The Accuracy Of The Record 
8.1 ' Introduction 
One of the most intractable problems inherent in confession 
evidence is the question of the accuracy of the record of the 
confession. Many of the difficulties stem from the fact that the 
majority of confessions are-made in police stations with only the 
accused and the police present and either side may have an 
interest in telling something other than the whole truth. The 
issue has rarely been focussed as succinctly as it was by the 
Bennett Committee which investigated the interrogation practices 
of the'Royal Ulster Constabulary in the lato 19740; 
"In addition to the obvious danger that the 
private nature of the interview process may 
encourage abuse, a further important consequence 
Is that arguments about interrogation methods ,,. 
are always conducted in retrospect. No-one 
outside the police service is able to adjudicate 
on what methods should be used in the individual 
case, or to observe whether misconduct is or is 
not-taking place; all they can do is argue about 
it afterwards. Retrospective argument as a means 
of getting at the truth has obvious limitations. "' 
This chapter is concerned with the moano which may be adopted to 
serve the triple purposes of protecting the interacts of the 
suspects, -protecting the police from false allegations, and- 
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providing an accurate record of what took place to assist the 
courts to reach the best possible decision on the issues of 
admissibility and sufficiency discussed in the previous chapters. 
As Mirfield puts its 
"Though the search for the truth is, by no means, 
an absolute goal of the law and procedure 
governing criminal cases, if no countervailing 
principle or policy decisively intervenes, it must 
always be better to arrange trial and pre-trial 
procedures such that the likelihood of findings 
made by the trier of fact being correct is 
increased; other things being equal we had better 
have the truth. " 2 
It should be made clear that the problems posed by "false 
confessors", those eccentric or disturbed individuals who 
"confess" to crimes of which they could not possibly be guilty, 
are outwith the scope of this work as are the psychological 
aspects of police interrogation techniques, which are sometimes 
claimed to lead to innocent persons confessing to crimes which 
they have not committed. Similarly this chapter is not concerned 
with judicial examination, which has its own rules for ensuring 
an accurate record. 
Confession evidence attracts a very high status in the eyes of 
the courts both north and south of the Border, but, as has 
already been pointed out, it is all too easy for an unscrupulous 
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police officer to fabricate a false confession 3 or "touch up" a 
genuine one to make it more convincing, for example by adding in 
some "special knowledge". Dickson's views on this point are 
particularly striking. 4 
On the other hand the accused has an obvious interest in denying 
what he is alleged to have said; oral evidence of what took place 
between the accused and the police is often fiercely disputed and 
such disputes, apart from wasting scarce court time, 6 frequently 
involve quite unwarranted attacks on the integrity of the police- 
men concerned. Matters such as accent, tone of voice or the 
context in which certain things were said may also be of import- 
ance in deciding the admissibility or sufficiency of a con- 
fession. 0 Mendacity apart, the possibility of an honest mistake 
or a lapse of memory cannot be discounted, problems which are, of 
course, by no means exclusive to confession evidence. However, 
one unique feature of confession evidence is identified by 
Mirfieid: 
"91)t is normally acquired by officials aware, at 
the time they acquire it, that it is very likely 
to be presented before a court. It is possible 
for these officials to take steps to ensure that 
the record is both accurate and reliable and (it 
is) possible for the law to require or encourage 
them to take such stehe. 11 ' 
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An accurate record of what transpired between the accused and the 
police will assist in determining whether the accused confessed 
at all, and, if co, under what circumstances and in what terms. 
In other words an accurate record will materially assist a court 
in deciding the difficult issues of fact and law to which 
confession evidence so often gives rise. 
Possible ways of improving the accuracy of the record will be 
considered under three broad headings, viz, improving the 
accuracy of the written record, recording by mechanical means and 
introducing an impartial third party. 
Motes 
1, Report of the Coieitte of Inquiry into Polire Interrogation Procedure, in 
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allegedly made by an accused who had been deaf and dumb since birth, 
4, §1377 and 378 quoted in chapter 7,3 (i)(a) supra 
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amount of time undoubtedly was wasted, For a startling example see ELy. 
Turner (1975) 61 Cr App 
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6. One of the writer's colleagues tells (with great glee) of a Metropolitan 
police officer who had arrested in London a Glaswegian accused on a warrant 
for theft of a large quantity of soft drinks and who informed Glasgow 
Sheriff Court that the accused had replied "it's a fair cop guv, I stole the 
pop. 0 
7, Loc cit note 2 supra 
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8.2 The Written Record 
(i) Written Statements 
Traditionally Scottish law has relied for proof of the accused's 
words on oral evidence from police officers, frequently using 
their notebooks as aides-memoire. ' Written statements by 
accused persons are extremely rare, apart from post-charge 
"voluntary statements. " 2 In current practice an accused's post- 
charge statement will be reduced to writing either by the accused 
himself or, much more commonly, by two officers unconnected with 
I 
the case, and signed by the accused. It will contain an 
acknowledgement of the caution and the offer of legal advice and 
a statement that the accused has either read over the statement 
or had it read over to him. The signed statement will then be 
lodged as a production and spoken to by the officers who took it. 
The origins of this practice are uncertain, although it was 
probably derived from the declaration. Until the practice became 
established, judges (as already noted) tended to regard police 
interrogation as a usurpation of the function of judicial 
examination, an idea which took a long time to die out. 
As recently as 1925 Lewis wrote: 
"Confessions made by an accused person after hn 
has been charged, which have been reduced to 
writing by or at the instance of official persons, 
may be regarded as inadmissible as being in 
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reality declarations of an Inadmissible natura in 
respect of their irregularity. " 3 
Even more recently, in 1966, Lord Kilbrandon was still arguing 
that after charge only a statement made before a magistrate was 
admissible. '1 
It may also be that the modern Scottish practice was at least 
partly influenced by the Judges' Rules in England, but in any 
event it to now of such universal application that it can be 
regarded as being beyond challenge and has been approved by 
judicial comment. 6 On the other hand there is no reported case 
where evidence of a post-charge statement has been held 
inadmissible because the normal practice was not followed. There 
are in fact only two cases directly in point. 
Firstly Hamilton v H, M Advocate 1980 JC 66 is against the idea 
of the written statement being anything more than a simple 
written record of what the accused said. It had been argued that 
where the Crown per incurlam failed to produce the written 
statement, the oral evidence of the police officers as to what 
the accused had said was inadmissible as-not being the "best 
evidence". This argument received short thrift from Lord 
Justice-Clerk Wheatley: 
"This submission proceeds on a misconception, 
When the statement was made it was made orally to 
the interviewing officers. Their appraisement of 
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the statement was what they individually hoard. 
What was said by the applicant was then committed 
to writing by one of them and eventually read over 
to the applicant and signed by him as correct. 
But what the officers heard was primary not 
secondary evidence. The different methods by 
which the officers could speak to what was said by 
the applicant at the time attach to the relia- 
bility and not to the competency of the evidence. 
Committing the statement to writing and getting an 
accused to sign it as accurate may forestall a 
challenge to the accuracy of what is, recorded as 
having been said by him, but that does not render 
incompetent the possibly more vulnerable recoll- 
ection of what was actually said. 
Secondly cordiner v H. M. Advocate 1991 SCOR 652 is clear 
authority for the proposition that the normal practice is simply 
practice and not rules of law and a voluntary statement does not 
become inadmissible merely because it was not taken by an 
independent officer. In this case the accused had asked to speak 
with one of the investigating policemen who want on to record his 
voluntary statement. Such a doparture from normal practice 
simply becomes an aspect of fairness. Cordiner can also be 
regarded as authority for the proposition that where the 
voluntary statement has been both tape-recorded and hand written, 
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it is unnecessary to produce the handwritten statement as well as 
the tape. 
Although a written and signed statement is much more difficult to 
challenge than a policeman's simple oral evidence, a point 
acknowledged by Lord Wheatley, such methods of recording 
confessions have their limitations. The absence of research into 
Scottish police interviewing has already been noted, and in the 
absence of research one simply does not know what happens in 
Scottish police stations, particularly as, in Lord Devlin's 
words, it is the general habit of the police never to admit the 
slightest departure from correctness. However the writer's 
experience as a'prosecutor leads him to think that Professor 
Glanville Williams' description of the pro-PACE situation in 
England may well by equally applicable in Scotiands 
"The statement reads as though it was volunteered 
by the suspect; but in part it may have consisted 
of a monosyllabic answer to a leading question 
asked by the officer, with one or more subordinate 
clauses. Since the statement does not distinguish 
between question and answer, the reader cannot 
tell what facts were suggested to the person 
making the statement by the way in which the 
question was worded. If the question was a 
complex one, the suspect may not have underntood 
it; but this possibility cannot be assessed 
because the question itself is not recorded, And 
183 
the written word does not reproduce the inflection 
of the voice upon which meaning may depend. One 
cannot even be sure that the officer understood 
what the suspect said, or that the suspect 
understood the written statement when he read 
through it or had it read to him. His signature 
is no guarantee that the statement exactly 
represents what he said or wished to say. " 6 
The same point was put slightly differently by the Thomson 
Committee., 
"An unfortunate result of the present state of the 
law is that the police may be tempted to take 
answers given to questioning over a period, put 
them together into a single statement, and present 
that to the court as a spontaneous voluntary' 
statement. Some of us with experience of these 
matters have seen so-called voluntary statements 
which covered so precisely the disparate points of 
the police case as to make their spontaneity 
highly suspect. 7 But in disputes in court as to 
the circumstances in which a statement was made it 
is difficult, if not impossible, for a judge to 
reject the statement as inadmissible on the 
grounds that the police account of the 
circumstances to untrue, " 13 
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Lord Devlin also hit one of the many nails in this issue on the 
head when, in an observation approved by the Thomson Committee, 
he said. - 
"Lawyer-like tendencies flourish to an even 
greater extent among the police than they do at 
the bar or on the Bench. The police have 
sometimes seemed to treat the Judges' Rules as if 
they were a drill manual and to be unwilling to 
admit the slightest deviation from the text. 
Rather than become engaged in a discussion about 
whether a question was or was not necessary to 
remove an ambiguity, some police witnesses seem to 
have preferred stoutly to deny that they asked any 
questions at all and even to maintain that they 
hardly opened their mouths. Consequently 
statements have sometimes been put in evidence 
which have been said to be the prisoner's own 
unaided work as taken down by the police officer 
and in which the prisoner has recounted in the 
stately language of the police station (where, for 
example, people never eat but partake of 
refreshment and never quarrel but indulge in 
altercations) the tale of his misdeeds. " 
The Thomson Committoels'proposals for the taking of voluntary 
statements 'C' were made in the context of their proposal that 
virtually all communications between police and suspect or 
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accused should be tape recorded, and as such they wore not 
particularly radical and largely endorsed existing practice. The 
statement was to be preceded by a caution and an offer of an 
interview with a solicitor, it was to be recorded in a document 
written either by the accused himself or the police as his 
dictation, the document was to contain a signed acknowledgment by 
the accused of his right to silence and the fact that he had 
either seen a solicitor or decided. not to see one, the last page 
was to conclude with an acknowledgment signed by the accused that 
he had read the document over and did not wish to add to it or 
alter it and it was to be signed by one witness. '' The police 
were not to interrupt or ask questions other than what was 
necessary for clarification andtany questions were to be inserted 
in the record of the statement. 
In England the RCCP also endorsed the existing practice, which at 
that time was governed by the Rule IV of the Judges' Rules. They 
noted that the accuracy of written voluntary statements made 
under caution did not seem often to be challenged and they 
declined to support any change that might diminish their use. 
Current post-PACE English procedure is not far removed from the 
Scottish, 13 Paragraph 12 and Annexe D of the Code of Practice on 
Detention, Treatment and Questioning 14 eat out the requirements, 
although if the preceding interview has been contemporaneously 
noted and the record signed by the interviewee, or if the 
interview has been tape-recorded, there is normally no need for a 
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statement under caution, which should only be taken at the 
express request of the person concerned. It should also be 
remembered that PACE procceds generally on the assumption that 
suspects will have legal advice while in custody, 
If a statement is to be taken, the suspect should always be 
invited to write it himself, He should write and sign that he 
makes the statement of his own free will, he acknowledges his 
right of silence and he is aware that the statement may be given 
in evidence. If the statement is to be written by a police 
officer, the suspect must signify in writing that he wishes this 
to be done. The suspect should be allowed to write the statement 
without prompting by the police except that an officer "may 
indicate to him which matters are material or question any 
ambiguity in the statement. " 
Where a policeman is writing the statement he muWt take down the 
exact words spoken. As Zander comments, "faithful compliance 
with this admonition would transform the taking of statements as 
it has been done in the past since it plainly prohibits the very 
understandable practice of police officers putting suspects' 
statements into a coherent tidy form. " However, the policeman 
may ask questions which are "necessary" such questions and the 
answers given being recorded contemporaneously. At the 
conclusion, the suspect should read the statement and make any 
corrections he wishes. He should then sign that he has done so, 
187 
that the statement is true and that he has made it of hic own 
free will. 
Notes 
1, In Scottish law a police officer's notebook, unless lodged as a production 
in its own right, is confidential to the officer and if he does not refer to 
it the defence have no right to see it - Hin been dv Auld 1926 JC A. 
Police officers' notebooks are discussed further infra, 
2, The Thomson Committee (pars 7,14) recommended a procedure for taking pre- 
charge statements and suggested that such a statement should be taken by the 
investigating officer, They expressed no views on the appropriate person to 
take the traditional post-charge voluntary statement, 
3, Lewis p322, founded on 1sQbe. 3.. Cu1h_bert ORAL 1 Bronn 311 and Alexandjt 
Hendry and Janes Craighead 518571 2 Irv. 618 
4, In Andrews (ed) the Accused p65 
5, See Tange y ý, ýAývocate_199"CR 
313 
6, The Authentication of Statements to the Police [1979] Crim LR 6 
7, The writer was once presented with what purported to be a voluntary 
statement by a semi-literate glue-sniffer who had managed to remember the 
location, colour, make and year letter of no fewer than 12 cars he was 
alleged to have violated, Even more amazingly he had remembered them in 
exact chronological ordert 
8, Para 7,11 
9. The Criminal Prosecution in England p39 
10, Para 7,17 
11, In practice the police (at least in Strathclyde) have adhered to the 
previous procedure of having one officer take the statement in the presence 
of another, the statement being signed by both, 
12, Report Para 4,9 
13, See generally Zander p168 
14, References are to the 1990 revision of the Code which comes into force on 
1st January 1991 
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(ii) Notes and Notebooks 
As previously mentioned, Scots law has generally proceeded on the 
basis that the primary evidence of what the accused said is the 
oral evidence of the police officer who heard it anj Scots law 
has never accorded any special legal status to written statements 
or notes of interviews. I In the case of notes in a police, 
officer's notebook, there is, compared to England, a notable lack 
of case law, but the accepted view is that such notes merely 
become part of the officer's oral testimony. 2 While a written, 
signed statement will normally be lodged as a production, it is 
generally not the practice to lodge a policeman's notebook, 
although there is no reason why, in an appropriate case, this 
should not be done. Apart from such unusual situations, the 
"familiar practice in both solemn and summary procedure is that 
the policeman's notebook is not lodged, he is allowed to refer to 
any entry which he made contemporaneously with the events to 
which he is speaking, and the defence advocate may inspect the 
entry if he wishes to do so. " 4 
It is not normal practice in Scotland for the accused to be 
shown, far less asked to sign, notes in a policeman's notebook 
and although officers are frequently asked in court whether the 
note was made at the time, and generally reply in the affirm- 
ative, the issue is rarely explored in depth. It would, in any 
event, be extremely difficult to prove otherwise and there would 
not appear to be any reported Scottish case in which a police 
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officer has been refused permission to refresh his memory from 
his notes because they were not contemporaneous. The rule 
requiring contemporaneous noting is generally applied on the 
common-sense basis that the notes should have been made as soon 
as practicable after the making of the statement but again there 
are no cases. It is thought that, were the matter to arise, the 
Scottish courts would take the same view as the (English) Court 
of Appeal did in Attorney 's ee< of 1979) 
(1979) 69 Crim App R 
__41L which 
approved Archbold's views that 
"... a witness may refresh his memory by reference 
to any writing made or verified by himself 
concerning, and contemporaneously with, the facts 
to which he testifies. 'Contemporaneously' is a 
somewhat misleading word in the context of the, 
memory refreshing rule. It 1e sufficient for the 
purposes of the rule, if the writing was made or 
verified as a time when the facts were still fresh 
in the witness's memory. " 
In Scottish practice it is by no meens'unknown for one police 
officer simply to check and sign the notes in his colleague's 
notebook, a practice which, however undesirable it may be, does 
not appear to have attracted any reported judicial-disapproval. a 
Leaving aside the differences consequent upon tape recording, 
which will be discussed later, Scottish procedure in relation to 
the recording of interviews with cuspecto is still in a compar- 
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atively undeveloped state, a fact which is probably a function of 
Scots Law's historic attachment to viva voce evidence. The 
present position is broadly similar to the pro-FACE situation in 
England and subject to the same criticisms. 6 Verbatim 
contemporaneous records, although not unknown, are rare, prepar- 
ation of notes after the event is the rule rather than the 
exception, suspects seldom see what goes into the notebook, and 
falsification is difficult, if not impossible, to establish in 
court, Above all there is a total absence of any enforceable 
legal requirement that record of interviews be kept in any 
particular format, or indeed that interviews be recorded at all. 
In England the recording of interviews, unlike the taking of 
statements, has been radically affected by PACE. The RCCP had 
based their proposals for improving the accuracy of the written 
record on the promise that "where prepared questionnaires can be 
used or contemporaneous verbatim notes taken there are fewer 
difficulties over challenges at trial to the police record of the 
interview. " 7 Where it was not possible to take a verbatim 
record or full contemporaneous notes "the product of the 
questioning ... should be presented to the court as what it in: a 
minute of the salient relevant points made at the interview. " h° 
If no contemporaneous record had been made, it should be the 
practice for the interviewing officer to note down, in the 
suspect's presence and for his signature, the main relevant 
points made during the interview, including denials as well as 
admissions or damaging statements. 9 
191 
The interviewing of suspects is now governed by paragraph 11 of 
the Code of Practice For The Detention, Treatment and Questioning 
of Persons by Police Officers ("Code C") 14 and detailed rules 
for the keeping of records of interviews are cat out in 
subparagraphs 11.5 to 11.13.11 
Although the Code presupposes interviewing at the police station 
as the norm, the basic requirement now is that "an accurate 
record must be made of each interview with a person suspected of 
an offence whether or not the interview takes place at a police 
station. " Records must be made either on special forms provided 
or in the officer's notebook. 
Broadly stated, the record must be made during the course of the 
interview, unless it is impracticable or would interfere with the 
conduct of the interview, and it must "constitute either a 
verbatim record of what has been said, or failing this, an 
account of the interview which adequately and accurately 
summarises it. " If an interview record is not made contempor- 
aneously, it must be made as coon as practicable after its 
completion and the reason for not completing the record in the 
course of the interview must be recorded in the officer's 
notebook. 
Unless it is impracticable, the ihterviawco should be given the 
opportunity to read the record and sign it as correct or indicate 
the respects in which he considers it inaccurate. Any solicitor 
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or "appropriate adult" present at the interview should also be 
give an opportunity to read and sign the record. There are 
provisions for dealing with suspects who cannot read or refuse to 
cooperate. 
A new provision in the revised Code closes a loophole and 
requires that a record should also be made of any comments made 
by a suspect outwith the context of an interview but which are 
relevant to the offence. Where practicable the suspect should be 
given the opportunity to read the record and sign it as correct 
or indicate the respects in which it is inaccurate. 
Given the record of the English courts in enforcing the Judges' 
Rules, the robustness with which they have enforced compliance 
with the recording provisions under PACE must have come as an 
unpleasant shock to the police. The case of R. v Canale 11990) 2 
All ER 187 is a striking example, not only of the breathtaking 
arrogance with which the police cocked a snook at a whole range 
of requirements of the Code, but also of the forcefulness of the 
Court of Appeal's opinion. 
In C nalg the defendant had been convicted and sentenced to six 
years for conspiracy to rob. He had been interviewed four times 
by the police and at the first and third interviews no contempor- 
aneous record was made, nor was a subsequent record made. The 
second and fourth interviews were contemporaneously recorded, but 
the second one in particular consisted largely of the accused 
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repeating admissions allegedly made at first one. The officers 
concerned had simply noted as the reason for not making a 
contemporaneous record the initials "B. W. " which they later 
explained stood for "best way". This did not impress Lord Lane 
CJ: 
"In the officers' view the reason for failing to 
record the interview contemporaneously was that 
the best way was not to record the interview 
contemporaneously, which of course is not a reason 
at all. In the view of this court, it demon- 
strates a lamentable attitude to the 1984 Act and 
the Codes made thereunder. " 
Such records as had been kept had been neither-on the prescribed 
forms nor in the officers' pocketbooks, one officer astonishingly 
attempting to explain this, by saying that he had left his note- 
book at home when he changed his clothes and the other claiming 
not to have received a notebook since his transfer to the Flying 
Squad a fortnight earlier. (In the writer's opinion, the more 
fact that the police could seriously advance auch excuses shows 
how right the courts have been to take the tough line that they 
have. > 
Lord Lane was unequivocal in his views on both the general iccuo 
and the behaviour of the police in the instant case. - 
"This case is the latest in a number of decisions 
emphasising the importance of the 1984 Act, if, 
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which we find hard to believe, police officers 
still do not appreciate the importance of that Act 
and the accompanying Codes, then it is time that 
they did, The Codes of Practice, and in 
particular Code C relating to interviewe and 
questioning of suspects, are particularly, 
important. 
In the instant case the police officers seem to 
have displayed a disregard of those rules and, In 
light of the initials "S. W. " and what they stood 
for, we feel compelled to say that that was a 
cynical disregard of the rules. The explanation 
put forward ... is that in these preliminary 
conversations, namely interviews i and 3 they were 
endeavouring to tidy up a mass of information .. 
[and] wished to put the matter in apple pie order 
before the contemporaneously recorded interview 
took place, so it would be easier for the jury to 
follow the eventual statements which would be 
exhibits before the jury, Whether that is true, 
we beg leave to doubt. " 
His Lordship reaffirmed the earlier decision of K, t at 9a 
3 All FR 598 and reminded the police that contemporaneous noting 
had a twofold purposes 
"IT)ho importance of contemporaneous noting of 
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interviews can scarcely be overemphasised. The 
object is twofold., not merely is it to ensure so 
far as possible that the suspect's remarks are 
accurately recorded and that he has an opportunity 
when he goes through the contemporaneous note 
afterards of checking each answer and initialling 
each answer, but likewise it is a protection for 
the police, to ensure so far as possible that it 
cannot be suggested that they induced the suspect 
to confess by improper approaches or improper 
promises. If the contemporaneous note is not 
made, then each of those two laudable objects is 
apt to be stultified. " 
In the instant case the trial judgo had been deprived of material 
which should have been before him when he was deciding the issue 
of admissibility, and once he had decided to admit the otate- 
monts, the jury also were deprived of evidence which should have 
been available to them. 
While Scots law likes to think that its genius it its flexibility 
and its preference for broad concepts such as "fairness to the 
accused" rather than the minutiae of technical rules of admiss- 
ibility, there is no doubt that the English courts are now taking 
a much more robust attitude to enforcing upon a reluctant police 
compliance with the requirements for the protection of the 
suspect. It may be that at the moment their attitude is almost 
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over-onthusiastic, but it is clearly appropriate that the police 
should be given, beyond a shadow of a doubt, the clearest 
possible message that a policeman is, as much as anyone else, 
subject to the requirements of the law and attempts to evade the 
requirements will not be tolerated. If this is not done, the 
PACE codes, which, after all, are at least indirectly the result 
of scandals such as Confaft, will simply end up in the same 
lamentable state as the Judges Rules. 
Given the extremely high status which the courts in Scotland 
accord to confessions, and the almost complete erosion of the 
requirement of corroboration, it is submitted that Scots law 
should pay a great deal more attention to the way in which non- 
tape recorded interviews are recorded by the police. In this 
respect, it is submitted that, for once, Scots law should look 
south of the Border. Although the English Court of Appeal has 
perhaps gone slightly too far, the Scots courts could, with 
advantage, adopt a much more critical attitude towards police 
record-keeping than they hitherto have dons. 
Motes, 
1, Scots law is generally reluctant to require the police to record information 
in a particular way as a condition of admissibility, See eg C 1n sMH, .. AdYD-Cate 1982 SCG 108, The position may be different if it is necessary 
for the information to be recorded in a particular way to that, for example, 
its accuracy can be verified - Forbes M H. M. Adyýrate 1990 5U, ß_U 
2, Walkers p363 1341(b) 
3. Macphail e8,47, $8,47, 
4, Macphail 68,47, 
5, cf 2S3] 1 08 6ßö. per Byrne J p686, This decision is criticised 
by R, K, Cooke A Police Officer's Notes 11954] Crin LR 833 
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Police 119793 Crim LR 6, especially ppll-12 
7. Report para 4,12 
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198 
8.3 Re ord n by s pe and Video 
(i) Intro uct on and Early History 
Nowadays it may seem self-evident that a tape recording, or 
possibly a video recording, of what took place between the police 
and the suspect will offer standards of accuracy and completeness 
which cannot be matched by any form of written record. Even 
contemporaneous noting cannot compete since the tone or inflexion 
of the suspects's voice cannot be captured on paper and such 
records are not particularly difficult to falsify. In addition, 
contemporaneous noting interrupts the flow of the interview and 
this may deprive the police of an important psychological 
advantage. The authors of one of the main post-PACE studies of 
police interrogation found that in most interviewe some 40% of 
the time was occupied by silence due to the need for the "scribe" 
to catch up, and contemporanoeus note taking "created a bizarre 
and wearisome atmosphere which stressed the interrogators as much 
as the suspects. " It is surprising that against this background 
they also found that there was no marked effect on the overall 
admission rate. I 
Tentative ctepa towards the recording of police interviews were 
being taken in America in the 194Qe 2 It may well be that the 
Americans harboured fewer illusions about the capacity of their 
police to indulge in questionable and occasionally downright 
illegal practices and in 1942 the American Law Institute in their 
Model Code of Evidence commentedt 
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"In some Instances confessions taken by the police 
have been recorded by a sound film. To impose a 
requirement on the police that they should take no 
confession unless recorded is believed to be 
practicable, effective and desireable. ... 
Certainly wherever it is practicable to supply and 
use the necessary equipment in a reasonably 
efficient manner it should be done and the courts 
should encourage such procedure in any legitimate 
manner. " 
4ý 
It is also noteworthy that there is a reported American example 
of the filming of an interview as early as 1948.4 
The idea that recordings might play a part in the police 
investigation seems to have crossed the Atlantic in the early 
1950s and the first discussion in Britain was in an article by 
T. B. Radley in the Criminal Law Review in 1954.6Tho author, who 
appears to be well-qualified technically, deals with both 
mechanical recording (le by means similar to old-fashioned 
gramophone records) and "magnetic" fie tape) recording. He goes 
into considerable technical detail about how recordings might be 
falsified, although it has to be said that his views of the 
dangers were probably exaggerated even at the time, and sub- 
sequent developments such as the superimposition of time signals, 
the invention of the cassette tape and the development of twin- 
dock recorders have eliminated most of the grounds for his fears. 
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However, Radley was the first British commentator to identify the 
need for independent custody of the tapes as a safeguard against 
tampering: 
The essence of any safeguard which is at once 
real and understandable seems to lie in physically 
guarding the tape as soon as a recording has been 
made on it; and making sure that it is under guard 
until it is needed for a lawful occasion. " 
On the state of knowledge as it was in 1954, Radley's conclusion 
was that it was unsafe for the recorded confession to replace the 
written one, but he recognised the value of recording in its 
ability to capture matters which, even if the writer of a written 
statement wished to record them, could not be captured on papers 
"A written confession can never contain exactly 
all that was said, A recorded confession, 
neglecting forgery, does, It would contain the 
questions of the police as well as the answers to 
them, and every intake of breath and casual cough 
to boot. It might be awkward for either side on 
occasion; but at least it would be the truth and 
nothing but the truth - neglecting forgery. 
CA) recording does contain a whole range of 
material which is beyond the reach of words as 
written down. ... A recording retains the way 
things are said. " 
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For long one of the strongest advocate of tape recording of 
police interviews was Glanville Williams, and he did not restict 
his advocacy solely to confessions., 
"More legal attention should be paid to the first 
statement made by the witness to the police; and 
the making of the statement should be tape- or 
wire-recorded wherever possible. A confession 
made to the police, if tape recorded and then 
sealed, might well have greater probative force 
than a version written by the hand of the 
policeman. " 6 
Williams was to return to thid theme several times in the follow- 
ing years and indeed as early as 1959 he was advocating the use 
by the police of pocket tape recorders. He added to Radley's 
view that tapes should be guarded until required by suggesting 
that they might be sealed and deposited with an independent third 
party such as the clerk of the court, (a suggestion which, 
interestingly, had been made to him by a senior police officer) 
and he also prophesied the twin-deck tape recorder. 7 
In 1960 Justice published a report on preliminary Investigation 
of Offences in the course of which they commented that while it 
was easy for an experienced sound engineer to alter a recording 
and there were no perfect safeguards, "a close watch should be 
kept on technical developments in tape-recording which may lead 
to a satisfactory safeguard against falsification. " They 
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suggested as an experiment the installation of , tape recorders in 
police cars so as to record statements made by witnesses on the 
spot in motoring cases, 0 
One commentator 9 observed that the it was difficult to see why 
the danger of tampering should be such a formidable objection to 
tape-recording and drew an analogy with photographs, which, he 
argued, were equally susceptible to falsification but if properly 
proved were readily accepted by the courts. 
Although taping of police interviews was still a long way off, by 
the early 1960 the courts were beginning to have some experience 
of the evidential use of tape-recording in other contexts and 
although there were difficulties, notably in the use of tran- 
scripts, the tapes themselves were generally admitted in 
evidence. 10 The first, and for many years the only, Scottish 
case involving a tape was Hones mnd Lavery v ILK A vgcate 1.960 
IC 104. 
In this case a blackmail victim was fitted with a concealed 
microphone and transmitter prior to meeting the blackmailer in 
Glasgow Central Station. Police Officers in a room in the., 
station had a receiver, loudspeaker and tape recorder and other 
officers were able to watch the conversation take place although 
they could not hear it. The conversation was transmitted from 
the microphone to the receiver, to the loudspeaker and ultimately 
to the tape-recorder. At the trial evidence was led from a 
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police officer who heard the conversation coming over the 
loudspeaker. The tape recording was indistinct and, as might be 
expected, contained a lot of extraneous noise so in order to 
provide an intelligible account of the conversation, the tape was 
played over several times to a stenographer who made a shorthand 
record of what she heard and then prepared a transcript, which 
Lord Justice-General Clyde later described as "really more in the 
nature of a reconstruction by her of what the conversation, in 
her view, must have been. " 
At the trial the tape w, ws played without objection, but objection 
was taken to the evidence of the police officer who had heard the 
conversation on the basis that the tape was the primary evidence 
and his evidence was therefore incompetent. Objection was also 
taken to the evidence of the stenographer and her transcript 
which she proposed to read out. The objection to the police 
officer was decisively rejected by the trial, judge and his 
decision was upheld on appeal; lie also allowed the evidence of 
the stenographer and her transcript although with much more 
hesitation. 
On appeal to the High Court, the Lord Juotice-General oxprosoly 
reserved his decision on the competency of the girl'o evidence, 
although he accepted that there were practical reasons for 
admitting it, not least the fact that the tape would otherwise 
have had to be played over several times in the court. Lord 
Carmont simply concurred which presumably means that he shared 
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Lord Clyde's reservation. The third judge, Lord Sorn, was much 
more positive: 
"I would like first to consider whether the course 
adopted by the prosecution of getting someone to 
decipher the recording and present the result to 
the jury was a reasonable course and one that was 
fair to the accused. I think it was both 
reasonable and fair. What would have been the 
alternative? It would presumably have been to 
play the recording to the jury over and over 
again, until all the members of the jury were 
satisfied that they had extracted all that they 
were capable of extracting from it. This would 
have caused an interruption of indefinite duration 
in the proceedings... . It seems to me much 
better that the Jury should be presented with a 
reliable version of the conversation - though, of 
course, they should be made to understand that the 
recording itself was the true evidence. Then, so 
long as the recording and the transcription are 
made productions in the case, as they were here, 
this is quite fair to the accused. His advisers 
can see beforehand the version which the 
prosecution is to put forward and I have no doubt 
that the defence would be given facilities to 
check that version against the recording. " 
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One issue which had exercised the court was the question of the 
stenographer's qualifications to act as an expert witness. She 
had admitted that she had never done anything of this nature 
before and indeed it appeared that there was no person available 
who had done anything similar. Lord Sorn adopted the novel view 
that in the circumstances the stenographer had become in effect 
an ad hoc expert: 
"Miss McIntyre was certainly not an expert in the 
sense of bringing some pre-existing qualification 
to her task, because she frankly admitted that she 
had never done anything of this kind before. She 
could write shorthand but she had no experience of 
listening to and deciphering recordings. But is 
it true to say that she was doing something, or 
expressing an opinion about something, which the 
jury could equally well have done, or formed an 
opinion about themselves? Given the same 
opportunity as Miss McIntyre it may be true to say 
that the Jury would have been as well placed as 
she - but they did not have the same opportunity. 
They did not play the recording over and over 
again and make a special study of it ... . Miss 
McIntyre had had an opportunity which was denied 
to them. She did thus bring a special experience 
to her evidence and it might be said that in the 
course of carrying out her task, she had acquired 
a certain expertise in the thing she was doing. 
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... IT)here is no rigid rule that only witnesses 
possesing some technical qualification can be 
allowed to expound their understanding of any 
particular item of evidence. Expositions of this 
kind are often given, subject to the control of 
the presiding Judge as to whether the person 
giving the exposition (without possessing some 
expert qualification) is equipped to do so, and as 
to whether it is fair to the accused that the 
exposition should be given" 
However the High Court made it clear that, in the future, 
evidence on the interpretation of tape-recordings should if 
passible be given by persons who had expert qualifications. 
The most important decision of the period in England was Rv 
Masud Ali, vAs f ussninC 95] E 'R where the 
English Court of Criminal Appeal considered Hoves and I, nvery and 
took the point that there was no difference in principle between 
a tape-recording and a photograph. Although their Lordships 
declined to lay down an exhaustive set of rules, they did hold 
that a tape-recording was admissible provided its accuracy could 
be proved, the voices properly identified and the evidence was 
otherwise relevant and admissible. 
Notes 
I, Irving and McKenzie Police ! ntarrcgation,, The Effects of the police and 
Cr! slna! Evidence 4: t 19SJ p118 
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5, Recording as Testimony to the Truth 119543 Cris LR 96 
6, (1957-58) 4 JSPTL (NS) 217 at p226 
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(ii) The Encl1sh Proposals 
The first official consideration of the tape-recording of police 
interviews in England and Wales was by a Working Party under the 
chairmanship of the then Inspector of Constabulary in 1965. ' 
This body considered that the taping of interviews in police 
stations "would result in less crime being detected, and fewer 
criminals being convicted, without having any countervailing 
advantages. " Senior police officers were to cling, limpet-like, 
to this view for twenty years until the Issue was eventually 
forced by the recommendations of the RCCP. 
Seven years later, the CLRC split on the issue. Given their 
recommendations on the restriction of the right to silence, the 
accuracy of the record was clearly a crucial matter. The 
majority recommended that experiments into the use of tape- 
recording by the police should be carried out to see whether 
technical difficulties could be overcome and whether recorders 
made a sufficiently valuable contribution to the ascertainment of 
the truth without seriously impairing police efficiency. Among 
reasons for this view the majority cited the fear of the police 
that criminals (ic) would refuse to answer questions on tape and 
the fear that the courts might come to regard evidence of an 
interrogation which had not been recorded as "inferior". 
Technical problems and difficulties over editing out inadmissible 
material were also mentioned, 2 
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However a minority of three, including Professor Williams, took 
the view that statutory provision should be made for the 
compulsory use of tape recorders at police stations in the larger 
centres of population, and no steps to restrict the right to 
silence should be taken until this was done. The minority argued 
inter alia that such a provision would deter, if not eliminate, 
"third degree" methods, would help to prevent the fabrication of 
confessions, would reduce the potential for conflict as to what 
actually happened, and would generally assist in reducing the 
scope for error or malpracice by the police. 3 
0 
The response of the government to these proposals was to 
establish a committee to'consider the feasibility of an 
experiment. The Hyde Committee, which reported in 1976, 
identified the arguments for and against tape-recording, which 
were later picked up by the RCCP. In favour of taping were the 
following: 
(1) what transpires during an interrogation is frequently vital 
to a case subsequently brought against the man questioned. It is 
very important that the court should have the beat possible 
account of what took place. A tape-recording is of more 
assistance than any written record which must be prepared after 
an interrogation, because it gives the precise words used - and 
there is the additional advantage that a tape-recording will chow 
the inflections of tone and voice, 
(2) Tape-recording would deter, if not prevent, the use of any 
unfair questioning methods by the police. Conversely it would 
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reduce if not remove the risk of untrue and unfair allegations 
being made against police officers responsible for conducting 
interviews. 
(3) Tape-recording would provide a means of resolving disputes 
about what took place during an interview, and thus reduce the 
time at present spent by the courts in "trials-within-trials". 4 
Against taping were the followings 
(1) Criminal investigations might be hampered if interrogations 
were tape-recorded. In particular the use of a tape-recorder 
might adversely affect the willingness of a suspect to make 
admissions and his willingness to pass information about other 
persons involved in criminal activities. , 
(2) If the use of tape-recorders became standard, evidence of an 
interrogation not tape-recorded might be regarded as inferior and 
of loss weight, even though it might have been quite impract- 
icable to tape-record. 
(3) Contrary to argument 3 above, the use of tape-recorders 
might lead to more "trials-within-trials". For example there 
might be disputes about what the suspect had said (if the 
recording was not clear); or allegations of tampering with the 
recording; or the clever criminal, knowing that his remarks were 
being recorded, might make untrue allegations - perhaps of 
bribery or assault - against the interviewing officer. s 
Although it identified the arguments, the Hyde Committee was 
scrupulous in confining itself to the feasibility of a tape- 
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recording experiment rather that the desireability thereof, and 
their report recommended a limited experiment, which in their 
view had to involve real cases which went to court. They 
suggested that the experiment should exclude interviews in 
connection with summary offences and interviews with juveniles 
unless the case was likely to be heard in an adult court. The 
question of transcribing tapes and reducing them to a form which 
could conveniently be used in court exercised the Committee at 
length and in view of the likely requirement for transcripts, 
they considered that initially the experiment should be limited 
to the taking of statements. '- 
Despite this, and the unequivocal advocacy of Sir Henry Fisher, ' 
who pointed out that the difficulties could be overestimated, 
there seemed to be little enthusiasm for even so limited an 
experiment. 0 Even though one was eventually announced, 'it never 
in fact took place because matters were overtaken by the 
appointment of the RCCP who carried out their own experiment. 
Among other things the RCCP'e research suggested that there was 
less force than generally supposed in the commonly stated 
objections that the presence of a tape recorder would hamper 
investigations and enable false allegations of inducement or 
violence to be fabricated. They also noted the experience and 
views of investigators in the United States that the advantages 
of having admissions on tape greatly outweighed the drawbacks. A 
pertinent, and previously overlooked, point was made in that 
212 
"while the presence of a recorder inhibits some suspects from 
talking this cannot constitute a weighty objection since the 
suspect has a right not to answer questions. " 10 
Research also suggested that the problem of tampering had been 
exaggerated, particularly given the development of the cassette 
recorder, whose tapes, unlike the open-reel type, were not 
susceptible to undetected tampering except with access to 
expensive and sophisticated equipment whose operation would be 
beyond the capability of anyone without technical knowledge. 11 
The RCCP clearly endorsed tape recording, although they suggested 
that until experience had been gained it should be restricted to 
the taking of statements and summaries. 12 However they were of 
the opinion that "the time for further experiments to test feasi- 
bility is past. " In their opinion, tape recording could have 
started immediately on the basis of'administrative guidance from 
the Home Office. 113 
On the other side of the coin, the RCCP rejected the suggestion 
that there should be automatic exclusion of evidence of non-tape 
recorded summaries or statements, although an officer who had not 
taped in circumstances where that might have been expected should 
be required to explain why. 14 
Although the RCCP had expreceed the view that the time for 
experiments as to feasibility was past, field trials were clearly 
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going to be necessary. The trials eventually carried out were on 
a much wider scale than the RCCP had envisaged and took in the 
whole interview in the police station. The field trials were an 
unqualified success and showed that most of the fears expressed 
by the police were unfounded and also that the concerns expressed 
by the Hyde Committee and the RCCP about the cost of transcribing 
tapes had been unduly pessimistic. 15 
The historic antipathy of the higher ranks of the police to tape- 
recording Once prompted Glanville Wi1liame to remark that 
"One cannot help wondering whether the real 
objection ... is their fear of the consequences of 
public inspection of what happens in the 
interviewing of suspcts. " 1*1 
If this was an accurate assessment, the actual experience of 
tape-recording has shown how wrong the police were. The Second 
Interim Report in particular shows that the results of taping 
were almost wholly beneficial and the outlook is optimistic. ". 
In marked contrast to the hoary chestnut about taping having an 
adverse effect on the availability of information and 
intelligence, taped interviews led to an improvement in the total 
information gleaned from Interviews In connection with serious 
cases and there was no evidence that suspects were more 
restrained in mentioning third parties on tape. overall, once 
they were actually given the opportunity, officers appeared to 
welcome the change to taped interviewing and to perceive it as 
214 
assisting rather than hindering their work through the provision 
of an objective record of the interview. 
The police themselves have now come to embrace tape-recording, if 
not exactly with enthusiasm, then certainly with something more 
than the grudging acceptance of the inevitable. Police paranoia 
about "electronic surveillance" has also been swept aside. 
Professor John Baldwin, who had been one of the RCCP's 
researchers, and whose work, he considered, had been hampered by 
police hostility has recently written: 
"It is now obvious to all concerned that, where 
disputes arise as to the veracity of an interview 
record, or allegations are made against the 
officer conducting the interview, the courts are 
in a weak position to determine which party is 
telling the truth. The enthusiastic acceptance on 
the part of the police of the need for tape 
recording to resolve difficulties of this kind 
represents in itself a dramatic conversion and one 
that would scarcely have been predicted a decade 
ago. ... How was it that police officers, after 20 
years of resistance to the idea of tape recording, 
culminating in a determined effort to thwart even 
the experiments of a Royal Commission, could be 
persuaded to use the machines on a routine basis 
with scarcely a murmur of dissent? The answer to 
this question lies in the dawning realisation 
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that, if suspects are interviewed with fairness 
and propriety, then police officers have very 
little to fear from having the interview recorded. 
It may indeed be the case that they will emerge as 
the main beneficiaries of the exercise. " 10 
The modern police view is probably well represented by the 
following comment from a Detective Inspector: 
"They've been trying tape recorders out and we're 
getting so many guilty pleas from them, it's 
unbelievable. Solicitors who begged and begged 
for tape recorders because we were "verballing" 
everybody now realise that that's the worst thing 
they could have asked for, because blokes do cough 
jobs. It's like boasting. You got murderers and 
sex people, they can't stop talking about it once 
they start. I think once we get tape-recorded 
interviews nationally, it will be much better, If 
you put the right questions to somebody, they will 
talk. 11 15, 
At the court stage the evidence was generally tentative, but 
there were signs that a higher proportion of defendants were 
pleading guilty, 20 there were sign that trials were slightly 
shorter and there were fewer trials-within-trials. 
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(iii) The PACE Schem 
Section 60 of PACE laid on the Home Secretary a duty to issue a 
Code of Practice for the tape-recording of interviews with 
suspects and this was approved by Parliament in July 1988, coming 
into force on the 29th of that month and forming Code E. Tape- 
recording is being brought in gradually from area to area under 
the supervision of a National Steering Committee, with the 
government's stated intention being for it to become standard 
police practice throughout England and Wales by 1991. 
Code E requires that all interviews with persons suspected of 
offences triable on indictment (or either way) must be tape- 
recorded, although interviews with terrorist suspects are 
excluded. Despite the exclusion, there is a limited experiment 
in London and Merseyside to tape-record summaries of interviews 
with terrorists. ' Tape-recording also does not apply to 
interviews with someone who comes to the police station as a 
volunteer until such time as he becomes a suspect. However 
taping is supposed to commence after the person has been 
cautioned. 
The custody officer may authorise the interviewing officer not to 
record if the equipment is not working, or no suitable room is 
available and there are reasonable grounds for thinking that the 
interview should not be delayed. Non-recording may also be 
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authorised if it is clear from the outset that no prosecution 
will result. 
The whole of the interview is to be recorded including the taking 
and reading back of any statement. Recording is to be done 
openly, with a master tape being unwrapped, placed in the tape- 
recorder and sealed after use all in the suspect's presence. 2 
(A second tape will be used as the working copy, and if the 
machine in use does not have a second deck, the working copy is 
to be made in the suspect's presence. ) The suspect is also to be 
told that the interview is to be recorded. The interviewing 
officer will, on tape, state his name, rank and that of any other 
officer present, the date and time of the interview, and then 
caution the suspect. If the suspect objects to being recorded, 
his objections should themselves be recorded before the machine 
is switched off. A written record of the rest of the interview 
should be made, but if the officer thinks that he can reasonably 
continue to tape despite the suspect's objections, he may do so, 
although a Note to the Code reminds him that this decision may 
attract adverse comment in court, a 
If a break is taken, that fact should be recorded on tape, 
together with the time. If the suspect leaves the room; the tape 
has to be removed from the machine and sealed, but if he remains 
in the room, the machine can simply. be switched off. Once the 
interview resumes, the time requires to be etated'again. 
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At the end of the interview the time requires to be recorded and 
the master tape sealed. The suspect has to be asked to sign the 
label and must be given a notice explaining the use to which the 
tape will be put and arrangements for access to it. 
If the suspect wishes to make a written statement this should be 
taken while the tape is running. 
If criminal proceedings follow, the interviewing officer should 
make and sign a written record of the interview and he may listen 
to the tape to refresh his memory. The written record need not 
be a full contemporaneous note, but should be a balanced account 
of the interview including any points made for the suspect and 
any key parts should be in direct speech' The primary purpose of, 
the written record is to enable the prosecutor to make an 
informed decision about the case, and indeed prosecutors expect 
to rely on the written record, so keeping to a minimum the number 
of occasions on which the Crown Prosecution Service have to 
listen to a tape or read a whole transcript, If the defence 
accept the written record, it will also be used for the conduct 
of the case in court. 
The field trials had established that the demand for transcripts 
was not nearly as great as had previously been supposed, tran- 
scripts being requested by the prosecution in only some six to 
eight per cent of cases and only a handful of them being longer 
than ten pages. 4 If the police transcribe a tape they will 
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provide the transcript to the C. P. S. who will in turn provide a 
copy to the defence. If the defence wish to transcribe a tape 
the police should provide them with a copy of the tape and they 
will then make their own arrangements to have it transcribed. In 
order to save time and money each side is supposed to provide to 
the other a copy of any transcript they have had made: , It is in 
the spirit of the tape recording arrangements that the content of 
the record of the taped interview should be agreed between the 
prosecution and the defence before the case comes to court. " Is 
However if agreement cannot be reached the issue will be resolved 
by playing the tape at the trial. r, 
Somewhat surprisingly, and in contrast to the Scottish scheme, 
the tape is retained by the police until committal for trial, and 
during this period it falls to be treated as any other exhibit. 
Any editing of a tape, to exclude inadmissible or "sensitive" 
material should be done under the supervision of the C. P. S. 
The Court of Appeal have laid down guidelines for the uco of the 
tape in court ° which provide inter alia for the interviewing 
officer or any other officer who was present to produce and prove 
the tape, including any challenge to its accuracy. There is no 
need to play the tape if the transcript is agreed. If the tape 
is to be played it is a matter for the judge whether the Jury 
should have a transcript while the tape is being played. However 
the Court of Appeal noted that in their experience "a 'transcript 
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is usually of very considerable value to the Jury to follow the 
evidence and to take to the jury room when they retire. " 
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(iv) The Scottish Proposals 
Although the English position has been considered first, 
primarily because of the greater availability of material, 
Scotland actually led the way in the introduction of tape- 
recording of police interviews, 
The issue was first discussed by the Thomson Committee ' who 
recommended that the interrogation of suspects in police stations 
should be recorded on tape "in order to provide a safeguard for 
parsons being interrogated in the privacy of a police station and 
also to protect the police against unjustified allegations. " The 
Committee also recommended that voluntary statements should be 
tape-recorded, Evan the strongest English-advocates of taping 
had acknowledged that there would require to be exceptions to 
deal with mechanical failures and other unusual events, but 
Thomson took by far the most extreme position on admissibility of 
any of the bodies who made recommendations on taping: 
"We. realise that all or part of a police interr- 
ogation may not be recorded through failure of a 
tape-recorder. The question arises whether or not 
an account of any unrecorded interrogation given 
by a police officer from memory and notes made at 
the time of immediately afterwards, should be 
admissible in evidence. We consider that it 
should not be admissihlo, as we foal strongly that 
particularly accurato rocording of interrogation 
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in a police station is essential as a safeguard to 
all the persons concerned. The same consider- 
ations do not apply to a voluntary statement 
which, although recorded on tape, will also be 
recorded in a written document authenticated by 
the accused. Such a statement should be 
admissible in evidence, even though the tape- 
recorder has failed. " 2 
The Thomson Committee did not concern themselves particularly 
with feasibility, although they did carry out a small practical 
experiment which proved technically satisfactory, and they noted 
that both the availability of more sophisticated equipment and 
better training for police officers would improve matters even 
further. Tampering with tapes was considered unlikely, but to 
reduce the possibility the tape was to be coaled and placed in 
the custody of the Procurator Fiscal as aoon as possible after 
the interrogation. 3 
A Working Party was established in 1978 under the chairmanship of 
Mr G. P. H. Aitken to supervise the setting up and operation of a 
research study into the tape-recording of police interviews with: 
suspects. The study itself began in May 1980 with the 
establishment of experimental schemes in Dundee and Falkirki 
later the experiment was extended to-Aberdeen and Glasgow, 
Monitoring was undertaken between the date of inception of the 
experiment and 31 December 1983. Tape recording was initially 
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restricted to CID investigations in cases which were thought by 
the police to justify prosecution in the Sheriff or High Court 
and where the suspect was aged 16 or over. 4 
An interim research report was produced covering the first 
twenty-four months of the experiment 0 and as the first U. K. 
study of tape recording of police interrogations it naturally 
attracted some interest, This early research indicated that only 
a minimal number of suspects refused to be taped and oven fewer 
attempted to fake maltreatment or assault by the police. However 
as far as the behaviour of the police was concerned, the figures 
showed that there had been a dramatic effect on both the length 
and the content of interviews. There was a dramatic rime, 
particularly in Falkirk, of suspects who made statements before 
arriving at the police station and there were delays between the 
suspect arriving at the police station and the tape-recorder 
being activated. 
That tape-recording, particularly in Dundee, got off to a shaky 
start was due in no small measure to the decision by Lord Jauncey 
in F, M. Advocate v McFadden. unreported AT; Cum 1980 to which 
reference has already been made. 0 In this case a whole interview 
was hold inadmissible on the grounds of cross-examination, even 
though his Lordship found parts of it to be entirely fair to the 
accused. It was to be come three years before the issue was 
settled and McFadden overruled, " 
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In an article discussing the interim report two English 
commentators observed: 
"The SHHD Report assumes that suspects increas- 
ingly exercised their right to silence when being 
tape-recorded. It is more likely that the police 
extracted most of the information they wanted in 
the pre-interrogation interview (non-taped) and 
thus conducted themselves in the formal (taped) 
interview in ouch a way that their questions were 
designed not to elicit answers. . ý. 
It emerges that police acceptance of public 
scrutiny of their activities is low and, more 
importantly, that they have found ways of 
disguising this attitude in the context of tape- 
recording. What has happened is that the police 
have managed to give the appearance of accepting 
taping by recording an acceptable number of 
interviews. fc"ade taught the police the lesson 
that there were real dangers in recording the 
traditional interrogation. What is recorded 
therefore is what is acceptable to the courts and 
what would pass public scrutiny. ... Interviews 
have been taped; interrogations have continued to 
take place in secret. " '0 
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The Working Group finally reported in 1985 and at the same time 
published the full results of the monitoring exercise. 9 The 
research evidence showed that tape-recording had had a 
substantial effect on the way the police both prepared for and 
carried out interviews, By the time the full picture was known, 
the police in Dundee had settled down to be perhaps the most 
scrupulous of the four groups of officers in complying with the 
requirements of the scheme and they were beginning to come to the 
view that once they had adjusted to it it was possible to operate 
tape-recording successfully and with a minimum of inconvenience, 
a view which was also, to a lesser extent, held in Aberdeen. . 
However officers In Falkirk and Glasgow remained suspicious of 
tape-recording and admitted to devices to avoid it, 10 While it 
has to be borne in mind that the bulk of the research was carried 
out before McFadden was overruled, the tenor of the evidence 
gathered showed that the police, while acknowledging the 
potential for reducing attacks on their credibility, were 
generally hostile to tape-recording and the most favourable 
response to its extension was likely to be grudging acceptance. 
Nevertheless the Working Party took the view that the experiment 
had proved the technical feasibility of tape-recording and the 
debate had reached the stage where the introduction of a national 
scheme was inevitable. The ultimate objective was seen as the 
tape-recording of all interviews in police stations, but having 
regard to the practical and financial problems involved, it was 
recommended that the categories of interviewe to be taped should 
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remain as they had been during the experiment. Introduction 
throughout Scotland should be phased on a geographical basic and 
national guidelines should be drawn up, although legislation was 
not considered necessary. 11 
Following a period of consultation, the Secretary of State for 
Scotland announced in a written answer 12 that he was asking 
Chief Constables throughout Scotland to begin the necessary 
preliminary work on buildings, equipment and training with a view 
to a rolling programme of implementation beginning on 1 April 
1988. The Secretary of state also announced that suspects under 
the age of 16 were to be brought within the scope of tape- 
recording. 
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(v) The Scottish Scheme I 
Apart from the inclusion of suspects under 16, the final Scottish 
tape-recording scheme differs little from the experimental one. 
Tape-recording only applies to CID interviews in a police 
station, where the offence is deemed serious enough to warrant 
prosecution in the Sheriff or High Court. 2 Three categories of 
persons are to be tape-recorded,, viz (a) those who have signed 
voluntary attendance forms; (b) those who have been detained 
under Section 2 of the 1980 Act; and (c) those who have been 
arrested. An accused person who is in custody for one offence 
may be interviewed in the course of investigation of others for 
which he is a suspect. 
Tape-recording has had no effect on the rules of admissibility 
and the overriding requirement of fairness in maintained, If 
there in any doubt about whether tape recording is appropriate, 
the requirement of fairness should lead the police to conclude in 
favour of taping. It is, of course, also open to the police to 
tape-record interviews of persons outwith the scheme if they wish 
although this should not use up machine time at the expense of 
other more carious cases. In the writer' experience, certain 
police officers in Strathclyde will sometimes tape-record a 
witness in a major enquiry. if they anticipate the possibility of 
the witness being reluctant at a later stage and this seems good 
practice. 
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Where tape recording is not practicable, for example because no 
tape recorder is available or there has been a mechanical 
failure, statements should be noted in note-books in the usual 
way, along with an explanation of the circumstances, since the 
officer may be required to justify in court his decision not to 
tape-record. If initially no recording can be made but one later 
becomes possible, there is no reason why comments or answers 
previously made cannot be put to the suspect on tape and the 
police are advised that such a practice might be "helpful and/or 
deaireab]e. " 
Fars about tampering are overcome by the provision of sophis- 
ticated twin-deck cassette recorders with each of the two tapes 
carrying two tracks one of which records the interview and the 
other the time signal. 
Tape-recording is to be done overtly. Before commencing the 
interview the seals on the tapes are to be broken in the presence 
of the suspect and one tape placed in each machine. Thereafter 
the interviewing officer is to state the time and date, identify 
himself (including rank and force), state the location where the 
interview is taking place and name any other perconc in the room. 
The suspect will then be asked to identify himself and once he 
has done so he will be cautioned. 
The suspect should be allowed to make as full a reply to the 
caution as he wishes. If he indicates that, rather than 
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answering questions, he wiehee to give an account in his own 
words he should be allowed to do so. 
If a suspect refuses to be recorded, the refusal should, if 
possible, be tape-recorded. If this is not possible, the police 
officers should note the refusal in their notebooks and the 
suspect should be invited to sign the notebooks to confirm his 
unwillingness to be tape-recorded. If the suspect indicates that 
he is willing to answer questions, but not while being recorded, 
the interviewing officer should point out to him that the 
recording is designed to protect the interests of the suspect and 
that any answers given remain subject to caution. However if the 
suspect persists in his refusal, the tape-recorded interview 
should be concluded. 
Similarly, if a suspect in the course of an interview states that 
he is not prepared to continue answering questions on tape, the 
police should try to persuade him to allow the tape-recorder to 
remain switched on, He should be told that he will have an 
opportunity to give any information he wishes un-recorded after 
the tape has been switched off at the end of the Interview,, 
However if the suspect is adamant, the taped interview should be 
concluded immediately. 
The caution and charge and any resulting reply should be tape- 
recorded and thereafter no further questions should be put to the 
suspect. If he wishes to make a voluntary statement, he chould 
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be afforded the opportunity to do so on tape. If he prefers to 
write it out, the tape should be left running while he writes it, 
and thereafter he can either have it read over to him or read it 
out himself. The normal rules for the taking of a voluntary 
statement are to be followed even though the proceedings are 
being tape-recorded. 
If it is decided to interrupt the interview, it should be 
concluded and the tape sealed, unless it is anticipated that the 
break will be short, for example a visit to the lavatory. In the 
latter case, the tape can be left running and an explanation 
given for the break in the interview. There is no equivalent of 
the English requirement for the tape to be removed from the 
machine if the suspect leaves the room. 
Before the recorder is switched off, the interviewing officer 
should again state the time, day and date, details of, those 
individuals present in the room and the location of the 
interview. Thereafter both tapes should be removed from the 
machine, placed in their cases. One of the tapes in to be sealed 
in the sight of the suspect, with a label signed by him and both 
the interviewing officers, and forwarded to the Procurator Fiscal 
as soon as possible. The other tape remains with the police. 
Only the Fiscal or a designated member of his staff is permitted 
to break the seal. If no report is made to the Fiscal, the 
sealed tape is to be kept by the police in a lockfast place 
separate from the police copy. 
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Where judicial examination is anticipated, the police should make 
a note of the relevant questions and answers, and this should 
accompany the report to the Procurator Fiscal. The suspect's 
answers must be reported verbatim although the questions may be 
paraphrased. 
If the recording equipment malfunctions, the interviewing officer 
should try to record on tape the reasons why the interview is 
being terminated and bring it'to an end, as nearly as possible in 
accordance with the normal practice. If another machine is 
available, the interview may resume using it with a new tape. 
Where there is no alternative, the officer may resume the 
interview off tape, but he should be prepared to justify his 
decision in court. 
At the end of the interview the police should ensure that the 
police copy of the tape has voice recording, and if it is found 
to be blank, that should be reported to the Fiscal. The 
intorviewing officers will then have to provide such account of 
the interview as they can from notes and memory. 
Defence solicitors (and unrepresented accused persons) are only 
permitted to listen to the tape in the office of the Procurator 
Fiscal and they are not allowed to receive a copy of the tape 
either on loan or for retention and they are not allowed to make 
a copy. 
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Unlike the position in England, the police in Scotland have no 
responsibility for the transcription of interview tapes, which 
lies with the Procurator Fiscal. If the Fiscal decides to 
transcribe the tape and to use the transcript in evidence, a copy 
may be served on the accused not less than fourteen days before 
the trial and if the accused does not challenge its accuracy, it 
becomes admissible and sufficient evidence of the making of the 
transcript and its accuracy and does not require to be spoken to 
by witnesses. 3 If the accused does challenge the accuracy of the 
transcript, and the transcriber has to be called to give 
evidence, his (or more likely her) evidence is sufficient of the 
making of the transcript and its accuracy. 4 
There has only been one subsequent reported case in which tape 
recording has been an issue in its own right. This was the odd 
and rather worrying cae of oc te 1921 SCCR 
? 3. The circumstances were that Tunnicliffe had been 
apprehended in Colchester and interviewed on tape there. In 
addition to clear admissions of tho crimes with which he was 
indicted, the taped interview contained references to crimes in 
England which were, of course, not before the Scottish jury. 
The prosecution sought to make use of what would appear to have 
been an English transcript which had been edited so as to 
contain only references to the charges on the indictment. The 
defence apparently sought to allege that the entire Colchester 
interview had been unfair and as a preliminary to this objected 
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to the edited transcript, which objection the Sheriff upheld, 
Thereafter the Procurator Fiscal sought to play the whole of the 
tape and despite defence objections the Sheriff allowed this to 
be done leaving the question of prejudice to be dealt with in his 
charge to the jury. Having been convicted, the accused appealed. 
At the appeal, the crown, in the person of the Lord Advocate, 
indicated that it was not proposing to support the conviction and 
the appeal was accordingly allowed, The fact that the interview 
had been conducted in England in accordance with English practice 
was clearly a major complication, and one of the main reasons for 
the Lord Advocate's position, but the High Court made certain 
further observations of more general application which are a 
great deal less than helpful. Although their Lordships accepted 
that "in principle there is nothing objectionable to editing a 
transcript if it is capable of being co edited, " they went on to 
say: 
It is not impossible, we should have thought, for 
a tape to be edited in such a way that all those 
passages which could result in prejudice to the 
accused are excluded when the tape is played in 
precisely the same way as passages are excluded 
from the verbatim written record which is lodged 
as a production. " 
One cannot help but wonder if their Lordchtps thouShtthrough the 
possible implications of thiG statement or if they fully 
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appreciated the possible consequences. The whole purpose of tape 
recording is to provide an accurate and complete record of the 
interview and to suggest that the tape might be tampered with is 
to drive the proverbial coach and pair-through one of the most 
important innovations in the protection of the accused. It is 
one thing to edit a transcript while preserving the tape intact 
but it is entirely another matter to suggest that (presumably) 
the prosecution should tamper with an important piece of evidence 
in order to anticipate a possible decision of the trial court. It 
may be that all that their Lordships were suggesting was that the 
tape should be played through before the trial on a machine with 
a counter and the appropriate numbers before and after the, 
offending passage noted so that the tape could be played up to 
the appropriate point and then run past the inadmissible section, 
but if this was what they intended, why did they not simply say 
so? 
It is to be hoped that . runic 
ffe is a dccioion on its own 
facts, and in particular on the English aspect, and does not set 
a precedent for the generality of Scottish tape recorded inter- 
views. 
Notes 
1, This decription is based on the Memorandum of Guidance issued by the SHHO in 
April 1988 
2, In Glasgow this also includes the Stipendiary Magistrate's Court 
3, Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1987 Sections 60(1) and Cß(2) 
4, ibid Section 60(4) 
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(vi) Video Recording 
Although tape-recording is undoubtedly a great step forwards in 
providing for an accurate record, it is sometimes suggested that 
video recording would be even better since it enables the 
demeanour of the suspect to be observed and it can assist even 
more than the tape in protecting the police from false alleg- 
ations of violence or threats thereof. 
Apart from video recordings made by the police themselves, video 
tapes from security cameras and the like are routinely played in 
British courts, the paucity of reported cases suggesting that few 
problems are encountered, and recordings made by television 
companies have been admitted in Scotland. ' 
As a matter of technology there appears to be no reason why video 
recording of police interviews could not be introduced in 
Scotland tomorrow. The police (certainly in Strathclyde) already 
make use of video cameras for matters such as recording the locuo 
of a crime, The Scottish courts have not so far pronounced on 
such practices, but in one English cace the use of video 
recordings as an alternative to maps and sketches was approved 
although the judge commented that such recordings should be made 
as soon as possible after the event and every effort should be 
made to ensure that the recording accurately represented the 
scene as it was at the material time. 2 An increasing number of 
police traffic patrol cars are being fitted with video camerae 
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for the purpose of recording aberrant driving and the writer was 
recently shown a video of a vehicle pursuit on the Glasgow Inner 
Ring Road which depicted the incident far more graphically than 
any verbal description could ever have done. 
A Canadian experiment into video recording in the police station 
with each officer being issued with his own tapes as a form of 
electronic notebook has yielded encouraging preliminary results 
and in particular has shown that, like tape-recording, video 
recording does not inhibit suspects from making confessions and 
admissions, and very few suspects decline to be inteviewed on 
tape. It also showed, if that were necessary, that there was no 
evidence that costly professional camera crews or other technical 
assistance was necessarly to produce a clear and reliable record 
of the interview, 0 
I 
There is also an English experiment under way, perhaps ironically 
Involving the scandal-hit West Midlands Police, 
In Hong Kong and certain other Jurisdictions there is an eotab- 
lished practice in grave crimes of video recording a confession 
in the form of a re-enactment of the crime. 0 In T tr 
R. 1988] 3 WLR 672. the defendant had been convicted of murder. 
He had made a full confession to the police giving a great deal 
of circumstantial information and taking them to the place where 
he had disposed ofproperty stolen from the victim. Two days 
later the police asked the accused if he would be willing to go 
238 
back to the scene and re-enact the way in which the killing had 
occurred with a policewoman playing the part of the victim. He 
was reminded that he was still under caution and that he did not 
need to comply with the request. He also agreed to the re- 
enactment being video recorded and in fact gave a running 
commentary on his own movements, translations of which were 
available for the non-Chinese speaking members of the jury. When 
the matter came before the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council, Lord Griffiths described the recording as "a visual 
confirmation of the earlier oral confession". 
At the trial the only challenge to the admissibility of the video 
recording appears to have been an the basis of oppression by the 
police. The judge ruled in favour of admitting the evidence and 
when the accused later came to testify, he gave a very different 
version from what was shown in the video recording. He sought to 
explain the latter away by saying that he only did what the 
police had told him to. However there was nothing in the 
recording to suggest that the police were directing matters and 
his explanation was clearly disbelieved. 
Before the Privy Council it was argued that such a reconstruction 
should, as a matter of principle, never be admitted although the 
defence had to concede that a video recording of the confession 
to the police would have been admissible and if in the course of 
a recorded confession the accused had been asked to demonstrate 
how he committed the crimp uning a dummy or poccibly a police 
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officer that too would be admissible. The Privy Council 
cautiously approved the practice: 
The truth is that if an accused has himself 
voluntarily agreed to demonstrate how he committed 
a crime it is very much more difficult for him to 
escape from the visual record of his confession 
than it is to challenge an oral confession with 
the familiar suggestions that he was misunderstood 
or misrecorded or had words put into his mouth. 
Provided an accused is given a proper warning that 
he need not take part in the video recording and 
agrees to do so voluntarily the video film is in 
principle admissible in evidence as a confession 
and will in some cases prove to be most valuable 
evidence of guilt. 
To mcet the suggestion that lack of acting skill 
may result in ceriouc distortion of a fair 
demonstration by the accused the video recording 
should be shown to the accused an soon as 
practicable after it has been completed and he 
should be given the opportunity to make and have 
recorded any comments he wishes about the film. 
If the accused says the film does not chow what he 
meant to demonstrate there will then be a 
contemporary record of his criticizm which the 
Judge and Jury can take into account when 
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assessing the value of the film as evidence of hie 
confession. " 
This practice, interesting as it is, is unlikely to become part 
of Scottish procedure in view of the requirement to caution and 
charge as soon as possible and the inadmissibility of evidence 
obtained by questioning thereafter. However, it, is suggested 
that the police could, with advantage, consider video recording 
the actions of an accused person who voluntarily takes them out 
of the police station for the purpose of showing them houses into 
which he has broken, where he has discarded a weapon, or the 
like. Such evidence is frequently attacked on the basis that the 
police know all along the address of the premises or the place of 
concealment and the locus visit was merely o charade. A video 
recording would go a long way towards proving where the truth 
lies. 
Returning to the police station, the main objection to the video 
taping of police interviews appears to be financial. As part of 
their research for the RCCP, Barnes and Webster carried out a 
small experiment which was techincally problem-free, but too 
limited to permit the drawing of conclusions as to practic- 
ability. They calculated that capital costs for video recording 
would be in the order of three times those for tape-recording, 
and annual costs approximately two and a half timos as high. 0 
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The RCCP accepted that video recording offered advantages over 
even taping, and commented that the advantages "may in due course 
be though great enough to warrant the use of video recordings 
here, and we would not want to discourage the police from using 
video when they felt the circumstances warrant it. " *7 Although 
they did not recommend its introduction "at present" the RCCP 
considered that the possibility should be kept under review and 
subordinate legislation should be drafted in such a way as to 
leave the possibility open. 
Interestingly, Lord justice-Clerk Ross has recently called for 
the Introduction of video recording and his call has also been 
endorsed by the Scottish Police Federation. ° 
Apropos the West Midlands experiment Professor John Baldwin has 
comment eci; 
"One does not need research to demonstrate the 
value of monitoring interviews conducted inside 
police stations with suspects. Yet the fact that 
police forces are prepared to open up to outsiders 
their internal methods and procedures represents 
in itself a significant advance, and it is hoped 
that, as a consequence of this, the research will 
shed light on the general question whether the 
interviewing procedures that are adopted are fair 
and produce an accurate record of interview of use 
to the courts. " '9 
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While the present writer would enthusiastically endorse a 
Scottish experiment along the lines of the West Midlands one, the 
advantages that the video recording of interviews in police 
stations would offer over tape-recording may turn out to be not 
so overwhelming or decisive as to Justify its wholesale 
introduction at this stage. It may become otherwise in the 
future, particularly if there is ever a case where a tape is 
interfered with. Meantime as Mirfleid puts it, "For the present, 
it seems clear that we should, in effect, not expect to run until 
we have learned to walk. " 
Notes 
1, Macphail 13S13,12, For the English law on such matters see Cross pp48-51 
2, RY Thomas [1 ' 63 CrIM LR6v2. 
3, A, Grant Vidsotaping Police Questioning, ' A Canadian E%periaent (19371 Crim 
LR 375 
4, J, Baldwin Polfra 1'R tervIeiis on Taps (19903 New JL 662 
5, See S, Sharpe Electronically Recorded Evidence (London, 1989) pp4-5. The 
practice was first Judicially approved in Hong Kong in 1976 - $v Tam Winn!! 
wai 119761 HKLR 441. and in Australia in 1972 - 
[19M UR 55, 
6, Research Study No 8 Tables 3: 6 and 3: 7; see also RCCP Report papa 4,31 and 
Mirfield pp40-41 
7. Report para 4,31 
8, Glasgow Herald 10 October 1991 
9, op cit note 4 supra 
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8.4 Ihr terroget in Before- MAo-istratns 
From time to time the idea has been advanced that the police 
should interrogate suspects before a magistrate or other suitably 
qualified independent referee. Such a system has operated in 
India for many years whereby the police have wide ranging powers 
to question suspects but the answers given are inadmissible in 
evidence, a ban which also applies to confessions unless made 
before a magistrate in the absence of the police, ' 
The first suggestion that such a scheme should be considered in 
England appears to have arisen in 1928 as the result of the Lees- 
Smith report regarding the interrogation by the Metropolitan 
Police of Miss Irene Savidge. a Miss Savidge, who was a potential 
witness to a charge of perjury against two police officers, was 
taken from work to Scotland Yard and there questioned alone and 
at length by a male chief Inspector in the presence of 'a male 
sergeant. She alleged that in the course of the questioning 
indecent and offensive comments had been made to her, she had 
been terrorised and her statement had been distorted. Mr Leos- 
Smith, concluded inter alia that she "war. asked a number of 
questions that ought not to have been asked, and that certain of 
her replies were forced into a form that misrepresented what she 
wanted to say. " He wont on later to add "What happened to Miss 
Savidgo can easily happen to any man or woman in her position. 
Great perils to private citizenn and to civil liberty have been 
revealed by her experience. " 
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As the result of the evidence which had been heard by his 
inquiry, Mr Lees-Smith suggested a total of fifteen questions as 
to the system followed at Scotland Yard. The first two were: 
1. Are the police the proper authorities to take 
statements in the case of percons who are 
suspected or in custody and of witnesses whose 
personal character or interests are involved? 
2. Statements taken at Scotland Yard or at police 
stations, whether of persons who are suspected or 
in custody or of witnesses, are almost always 
taken privately with no one also present except 
the police and the person making the statement. 
Is there sufficient security that the person 
making the statement is guarded from all improper 
pressure? " 4 
Around this time the Royal Commission on the Police 5 was also 
asking its witnesses whether they could suggest any authority, 
other than the police, to whom the taking of statements from 
persons who are suspected or in custody could properly or more 
advantageously be entrusted. The majority of the witnesses 
favoured the status quo although there was support for the idea 
that in unusual cases, such as a charge against the police, or if 
the victim of the offence was a policeman, it was a better 
alternative that statements should be taken by a magistrate. 
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In more recent years one notable proponent of such a scheme has 
been the organisation Justice. 6 They have advocated that the 
police should be empowered to bring a suspect before a magistrate 
and there conduct a full and searching interrogation, which would 
be recorded on tape and the result of which would be admissible 
in evidence. No other written or oral statement would be 
admitted with the exception of tape-recorded statements made on 
arrest or before arrival at the police station, In the scheme as 
conceived by Justice the suspect would be informed of a duty to 
answer questions and that adverse inferences might be drawn from 
his silence and he would have the right to legal representation. 
The suspect would also have a right at his own request to be 
taken before a magistrate to volunteer an explanation. 
Such a scheme is immediately open to the objection that it 
infringes the right to ailonco but as Mirfiold has pointed out, 
to introduce such a scheme without attenuation of the right to 
silence would probably be thought unacceptable as failing to 
achieve a proper balance between the need to protect the suspect 
and the need to allow the police to question nuspocts 
effectively. 
In England neither the CLRC nor the RCCP favoured such a schema. 
The CLRC considered 7 that such a procedure would he no'more 
likely than the existing one to ensure that the person 
interrogated would tell the truth and they also considered that 
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there would be practical problems in arranging immediate 
availability of magistrates. 
The RCCP also considered the practical difficulties of a scheme 
for interrogation before magistrates and on a practical basis 
alone considered that this approach should not be further 
pursued. 0 Practicalities apart, the RCCP (who, as has already 
been shown, took a very different view of the right to silence 
from the CLRC) considered that the idea was objectionable on 
grounds of principle as well. In their view, to require a 
suspect to speak, even with legal advice and under the protection 
of the court, was inconsistent with the very nature'of the 
accusatorial system, They were clear in their opinion that "the 
burden of proof should not and cannot be altered in this way 
without turning pre-trial and trial procedures into inquisitorial 
procedures. " 9 In addition they identified the important point 
that such a procedure could jeopardise the independence of the 
magistracy, who should "be seen to be independent of the police. " 
The RCCP also considered the possibility of using solicitors as 
independent monitors of interviews and rejected the idea on 
resource grounds and the possible conflict of roless, for the 
solicitor. 'I Likewico the idea of using some tort of specially 
created service to provide the function was rejected on various 
grounds including the difficulty of finding people to do "a 
tedious job to be done in very uncongenial surroundings" and 
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doubts as to how long the, public perception of independence would 
last. 11 
Scotc law with its historic procedure of Judicial examination, 
greater restrictions on questioning, shorter times in police 
custody and independent prosecution system, has not had the came 
need for the introduction of an independent element into police 
questioning. The Thomson Committee only considered the matter in 
relation to formal post-charge statements, and then only briefly: 
"There is much to be said for requiring such 
statements to be made before the sheriff both on 
grounds of history and of reliability, and some of 
us were at one tim. o inclined to support such a 
requirement. However, taking account of the 
practical difficulties involved we recommend that 
such statements made to police officers should 
continue to be admissible in ovidonce ... . 11 17 
It seems highly unlikely that any steps will be taken towards the 
introduction of independent third parties either north or south 
of the Border. Tape-recording i3 clearly hero to stay and video 
recording a possible future development. Provided the police do 
not find ways of circumventing the safeguards there is, simply not 
the same need for the introduction of an independent element when 
the recording of the interrogation is available for playing at 
the trial. An accurate record of the interrogation is now 
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available for a small fraction of the cost of independent 
monitoring by s human being. 
Notes 
I, See generally R, N, Gooderson rho Intorrayation of 'uspocts t19701 48 Can Bar 
Rev 270 at 304 
2. Card 3147 
3, Report p33 
4, ibid p34 
6, Cad 3297 (HMSO, 1929) 
6, Gooderson op tit note I supra at pp344-305; also Mirfield p13 
7, Eleventh Report papa 47 
8, Report parai 4,60-4,62 
9, Report Para 4,59 
10, Report papa 4,99 
11, Report Para 4,100 
12, Report para 7,19 
249 
Chapter 9 Northern Ireland - The Response To An Exceptional 
Situation 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines in general outline how the law relating to 
confessions and the right to silence in Northern Ireland has been 
affected by the response of the British government to the problem 
of terrorism in the Province. 
"Terrorism is the scourge of our time. The 
terrorist uses, or abuses, the privileges of a 
democratic society in order to undermine and 
destroy that society. What does a civilised mart 
do when faced with an uncivilised man? The 
dilemma or paradox for democracy arises. when the 
security of the realm is threatened, the life and 
safety and integrity of innocent people are 
threatened, and it becomes reluctantly necessary 
to suspend or reduce civil liberties by special 
legislation. The rule of law is always a balance 
between competing intorsto. But without law and 
order, freedoms and civil libcrtio become 
meaningless, they cannot even exist. " I 
A detailed consideration of the historical and political 
background to the current, apparently insoluble, problems of 
Northern Ireland is thankfully outwith the ecopt of this work. 
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Suffice it to say that since the late 1960o, and in particular 
since 1969, Northern Ireland has suffered from terrorist violence 
far worse than anything seen anywhere also in Europe. The 
"Ulster Problem" is nothing now, being in effect the latest 
version of the "Irish Question" which has dogged British politics 
for three centuries, but the level of violence and the 
sophistication of the paramilitary forces, particularly the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army, were well beyond previous 
experience even though Ireland, both north and south of the 
border, has a long history of emergency legislation and special 
powers going back as far as 1775. 
The root cause of the situation is an unresolved dispute over the 
legitimacy of the government of Northern Ireland leading to 
"military" activity by the I. R. A. who seek to expel the British 
from the six counties which comprise Ulster and create a united 
Ireland, a prospect which is utterly rejected by the majority 
Protestant population of the Province. The writer accepts that 
this is a gross over-simplification of the position and 
disregards several important factors such as the oppression of 
the Roman Catholic minority in Ulster and the dental of their 
civil rights, but in mitigation he pleads that the purpose of the 
present discussion is to look at the way in which the response to 
terrorism has resulted in a legal situation substantially 
different in principle and effect from the rant of the United 
Kingdom. For this purpose the existence of terrorism is accepted 
as a fact and the writer is content to leave the hintorical and 
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political aspects to those more qualified than he to expound 
them. a 
Notes 
1, A, Samuels The Legal Response to Tenorlee 119841 Public Law 365 
2, There is a useful, if somewhat partisan, summary of the troubles in K, Boyle 
et al law and State (London, 1975) especially chapter 2,3 and 9, Also A, 
Jennings (ed) Justice Under Fire (London, 1989) especially chapter 1. 
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9.2 Lego Background Prior to 1973 
Successive British governments have consistently refused, at 
least overtly, to treat terrorists as anything other than common 
criminals and in particular they have attempted to deal with 
terrorism, whether Irish or otherwise, by the ordinary laws of 
the land supplemented where necessary by special powers. ' Prior 
to 1973 these powers were contained in the Civil Authorities 
(Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922-33, commonly known 
as the "Special Powers Act", and various regul4tionc made under 
it. The Act and its associated regulations conferred wide powers 
of arrest, questioning, search, detention and internment on the 
police and army and gave the (Northern Irish) Minister of Home 
Affairs almost unrestricted powers to make regulations with the 
force of law. 
Of most interest in the present context is Regulation 10 which 
provided: 
"Any officer of the 
the preservation of 
order, may authoris, 
and detention for ,a 
hours of any person 
interrogation. " 
Royal Ulster Constabulary, for 
peace and maintainance of 
a the arrest without warrant 
period of not more than 48 
for the purpose of 
Apart from the Special Powers Act, criminal law and procedure in 
Northern Ireland was broadly similar to the English modal, with 
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few significant differences, although an accused in Northern 
Ireland did not obtain the right to give evidence in his own 
defence until 1930. A system of public prosecution had existed 
since 1801 and little use was made of lay Justices of the Peace 
who had no jurisdiction to try cases. A system of professional 
stipendiary magistrates, generally known as "Resident 
Magistrates" has existed since the early nineteenth century. 2 
While the above-quoted regulation provided a specific power of 
detention for questioning, the Special Powers Act had no effect 
on the admissibility of confessions, The Northern Irish courts 
generally continued to follow the English common law which had 
been the law in Ireland before partition. $ As far as confessions 
were concerned the courts applied the exclusionary rule based on 
the test of voluntariness and the absence of "fear of prejudice 
or hope of advantage exercised or held out by a person in 
authority" as set out in Ibrahim vR". It is noteworthy that 
any commentary on the Northern Irish law of admissiblity up to 
the late 1960s will consist almost exclusively of English 
authority with very little native gloss. 0 
As far as discretionary exclusion was concerned, the Northern 
Irish courts clearly regarded themselves as having a discretion 
to exclude confessions, 0 although the 1912/18 Judges Rules had a 
somewhat odd status, being acted upon without apparently being 
formally adopted 7 and when the 1964 Rules were promulgated the 
Northern Irish judges took the view "that it would be a mistake 
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to adopt the Judges Rules or an amended version of them without 
the fullest consideration and ... suggested that the introduction 
of now Rules should not be a hurried procedure. " 0 Their 
Lordships certainly could not be accused of being in a hurry 
since it was to be 1976 before the 1964 Rules were adoptedt In 
one case in 1973 ' this led to the slightly weird situation of 
the judge considering the English 1964 Rules, which specifically 
permitted questioning of a person in custody, in order to decide 
whether the 1912/18 Rules, which were ambiguous on this point, 
had been infringed. The eventual common sense conclusion was 
that it would be difficult "to hold that something which was not 
considered prejudicial or unjust in England was so in this 
jurisdiction. " 
In the late 1960 and early 1970s'the Northern Irish courts 
continued to pursue a stringent approach to the admicsiblity of 
confession evidence and they refused to'maýe any concession to 
the security situation. This issue, the 
divergence between the 
courts' rigid adherence to the common law and the perceived 
realities of the security situation, really began to coma to a 
head following the establishment by the security forces of spec- 
ialised interrogation contras, notably Castlereagh and Holywood. 
The clearest statement of judicial attitudes to the general 
admissiblity of confessions in a non-terrorist context wau O, 
Corr C19681 Ni. 193. a domestic murder. In the course of police 
inquiries, the appellant was asked to visit the police station 
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where he was interviewed over a period of about six hours at the 
end of which period he was cautioned and made a formal statement. 
(At the trial no challenge was raised to this statement). Corr 
was released at that stage but was asked to visit a different 
police station the following day where he was again interviewed, 
this time over a period of some twelve hours, At the end of this 
second period he made a further statement which was tantamount to 
a confession. At the trial objection was taken to the second 
statement on the basis that it. was not voluntary although there 
was no suggestion that the police had made threats or promises or 
engaged in searching interrogation or oppressive cross 
examination. 
The objection, and ultimately the one of the grounds of appeal, 
was that the police had asked certain questions and made certain 
comments to an accused person who was in custody requiring 
answers "so that he was deprived of the free and voluntary 
agency" of refusing to answer them. As a result, it was argued, 
the statement should either have been hold to have been 
involuntary and hence inadmissible or should have been rejected 
by the trial Judge in exercise of his discretion since there had 
been a breach of Rule 3 of the (1912/18) Judges Rules which was 
generally regarded as forbidding the questioning of a person in 
custody. 1° 
In the event the court hold that the statement was correctly 
admitted, but Lord MacDermott L. C. I. was prepared to advance the 
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grounds of exclusion beyond the old "threat or promise by a 
person in authority" rule: 
"The rule of law described by Lord Sumner cannot 
have been intended to apply to all statements 
which are alleged not to be voluntary, for it 
relates solely to the conduct of persons in 
authority; and it is plain also .,. that he did 
not intend his words to apply necessarily to the 
questioning by a person in authority of a suspect 
in custody. ... As Lord Sumner indicated, the rule 
he stated is one of policy rather than logic, 
being directed ýo the control of those, such as 
the police, who are in a position of power and 
authority. But ... 
it would be verging on the 
irrational to limit it also to instances of 
threats or inducement's inspiring fear or hope so 
as to exclude other forms of conduct by the same 
class which might be no lees capable of eroding 
the will of the suspect concerned. The effect of 
a vigorous cross-examination ... on one who to not 
free to get away from his questioner may, in 
certain circumstances, be to arouse hope of 
release or fear of further detention or other 
prejudicial result in the mind of the suspect, 
according to whether or not he makes answers or 
keeps silent. But it may also act more direclty 
by subjecting the person questioned to a degree of 
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pressure which saps his will and makes him talk. 
We think such pressure may well lie within the 
principle of the rule enunciated by Lord Sumner, 
although not within its express terms, and may 
thus suffice to make statements obtained by it 
inadmissible in point of law. " 
Lord MacDermott repeated and somewhat amplified his comments in 
an address to the Bentham Club in 1968 11 but it was to be 1972 
before the question of the admissiblity of a statement obtained 
from a terrorist suspect in an interrogation contra arose, The 
case concerned was Roman unroporrtted Pelfast City 
Commission May 10 1972.12 In this case McGonigal J. had to 
determine the admissiblity of a statement made by the accused 
while in custody in Holywood detention centre. Hie Lordship 
rejected an allegation of physical ill-treatment but then 
proceeded to exclude the statement on the ground of oppression, 
apparently the first time a statement had been so excluded in 
either England or Northern Ireland. 
The accused had been detained in Holywood for about 28 hours 
where he was interrogated for four separate periods ranging from 
25 to 100 minutes. When not being questioned he was made to sit 
in a cubicle, facing a wall, on a chair which was itself placed 
facing the wall. It was this factor which the Judge-found 
"oppressive" rather than the length of the interrogation. In 
particular the accused was on one occasion left sitting in the 
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chair from mid-afternoon until shortly after midnight when he was 
questioned for an hour before being returned to the cubicle for a 
further nine hours ("with what sleep and food I know not" as his 
Lordship put it) before being questioned yet again, 
McGoniga] J. specifically discounted any question of the courts 
creating special rules of admissiblity for terrorist cases: 
"I am not concerned in this case with the rights 
or wrongs of interrogation of-subversive agents or 
the battle against subversive activities. I am 
concerned with the admissibility of this statement 
and the application of the legal principles con- 
cerned in a criminal case= even if one which has a 
subversive flavour. What may be permissible and 
necessary for the protection of the public in a 
fight against subversion - and I pass no judgmont 
one way or the other on that ... may be oppressive 
within the principles covering the admissibility 
of statements in the criminal courts and it is 
that test which has to be applied here. It may 
seem that there is a conflict between public 
interests but if so it is not for me to resolve. 
I can only apply the law as it is laid down, " 
Shortly after Garg8n another case arising from Holywood detention 
centre came before Lord Lowry L. G. J. in R. v Flynn and Leonard 
unreported, Boulf net fäß' 24 a 97.. " In thic cage 
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two sets of statements had been made, the first immediately after 
interrogation at the centre and the second at a later time. 
His Lordship took the view that 
The detention centre has been set up, as it 
seems, for the special purpose of gathering 
intelligence about subversive and terrorist 
activities, and the object of those conducting it 
it to extract information from the persons who are 
brought there for the purpose of being 
interrogated. -Cautions are not issued. Several 
interrogations may take place and they may take 
place in the course of one day ... the 
interrogation set up was officially organised and 
operated in order to obtain information and in the 
case of these two tdefendantsl effectively did 
conduce towards the obtaining of information from 
persons who would otherwise have boon less willing 
to give it. " 
The first sets of statements were accordingly involuntary and 
inadmissible and in reaching this conclucion his Mordchip also 
draw an interesting distinction between "oppra ive conduct" and 
"oppressive circumstances", the former involving "something wrong 
on the part of those in authority" (as in q r, ) and the latter, 
as in the present case implying "the creation of a set-up which 
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makes it more likely that those who did not wish to speak will 
eventually do so. " 
The second set of statements were also ruled inadmissible because 
the Crown had faied to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the 
influence of the earlier circumstances had been dissipated before 
they were made. 
Like McGonigal J., Lord Lowry made it clear that the courts were 
not prepared to make any concession to the emergency situation: 
"Whatever the history of the test (of admics- 
iblity] ... may be ... it is not open to the court 
to substitute a different test based on some 
alternative conception of fairness or on the 
probability or, it may be in some cases, the near 
certainty, that the admissions are true. To do 
that would be to abandon the rule of law and to 
mould the pattern of criminal justice to suit 
individual circumstances. " 11 
As the result of these and other decisions 55 other cases were 
abandoned by the Director of Public Prosecutions between January 
1972 and April 1973 6n the ground that confessions obtained in 
such circumstances were unlikely to be held admissible. '& 
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9.3 Detention. Internment and Associated Abi ss 
(i) The Legal Basis for Detention and Internm _nt 
Reference has previously been made to the power available to the 
police and army-under the Special Powers Act to arrest and detain 
virtually anybody for up to 48 hours for the purpose of 
interrogation. '- 
In addition to this power, the Northern Ireland government had 
draconian powers under the Special Powers Act to arrest and 
detain without trial (i. e. intern) any person who was suspected 
of acting, having acted or being about to act "in a manner 
prejudicial to the preservation of the peace or maintainance of 
order. " The final responsibility for making an internment order 
lay with the Minister of Home Affairs who was entitled to order 
the continued detention of any person so suspected where it 
appeared to him to be expedient for securing the preservation of 
peace and the maintainance of order. 2 
This power was used from time to time but before the outbreak of 
the troubles in 1969 it had not been used on any appreciable 
scale since 1962. However following the outbreak of carious 
large scale violence there was considerable pressure on the 
Stormont government to use internment and it was brought in, 
apparently against the wishes of the army, in August 1971. There 
was a large-scale round-up of persons who were suspected 
(sometimes on rather dubious intelligence) of subversive 
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activities. The political and military effects seem to have been 
largely counter-productive, aithought these issues are outwith 
the scope of this work, but the most important point is that the 
operations of the security forces, particularly' that on 9th 
August 1971, threw into graphic relief exactly what could happen 
when normal legal controls on arrest, search and interrogation 
were removed. These issues are discussed further below. 
When direct rule was introduced in March 1972, the Westminster 
government initially hoped to phase out internment while seeking 
a political solution, but once the truce with the I. R. A. coll- 
apsed it became apparent that this objective was impractical in 
the short term. Although a substantial number of existing 
detainees were released, it was decided to introduce a now system 
of detention without trial and in particular to replace the 
executive power of the (now abolished) Minister of Home Affairs 
under the Special Powers Act with a system of judicial 
determination. Under the new regime, detention without trial was 
portrayed not as a weapon of government against readily 
identifiable enemies of the state (as it had been by the 
Unionists), but rather as a means of dealing with suspected 
terrorists who could not adequately be dealt with in the ordinary 
courts whether by reason of the intimidation of witnesses or the 
inadmissiblity of evidence, 0' 
This now approach led to the passing of the Detention of 
Terrorists Order 1972, shortly to be incorporated-into the 
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Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973. The details of 
the system introduced by the 1972 Order are not directly relevant 
to this work, and in any event internment ended in 1975, but 
broadly stated the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland or one 
of his ministerial deputies had to make an "interim custody 
order" which authorised the detention for a period of twenty 
eight days of a person "suspected of having been concerned in the 
commission or attempted commission of any act of terrorism or in 
the direction, organisation or training of persons for the 
purpose of terrorism. " 
Thereafter the case was heard by a judicially qualified 
Commissioner who had to hold a formal hearing and had to be 
satisfied not only that the suspect had been "concerned in the 
commission or attempted commission of any act of terrorism or in 
the direction, organisation or training of persons for the 
purpose of terrorism" but also that his detention "was necessary 
for the protection of the public". If he was so satisfied, the 
Commissioner would make a detention order. There were provisione 
for appeal and review of such orders and the Secretary of State 
could order the release at any time of a person subject to either 
an interim custody order or a detention order. 
The procedure introduced by the 1972 Order was much less open to 
criticism than the powers of simple executive action available 
under the Special Powers Act. In effect in each case a charge of 
what amounted to criminal conduct had to be established to tho 
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satisfaction of"a judicial Commissioner at a formal hearing 
though without any restriction on the admissibility of evidence. 
It has been stated ° that the way in which the 1972 system 
operated in practice emphasised the "military security" nature of 
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(ii) "Interrogation Depth" - The-Compton and -Parker e 
is 
The removal of the normal legal controls on the exercise of 
powers of arrest, search and interrogation inherent in the 
process of internment meant that the Army and the police were 
free to organise their security operations virtually as they 
pleased. As Boyle et al put it "the policies and practice of the 
various branches of the police and army were accordingly guided 
and controlled more by their own internal constraints and values 
than by the provisions of the law. " 
The dangers of this situation became terribly apparent following 
the large-scale swoop on suspected terrorists on 9th August 1971. 
Boyle at al comment that prior to the introduction of internment 
there had been "no more than the occasional allegation of 
improper conduct" made against the R. U. C., but following this 
operation "there was a flood of complaints against the security 
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forces of torture and brutality in the treatment of many of those 
arrested and in particular those taken to a special interrogation 
centre established at Holywood Barracks in Belfast. " The 
complaints reached the stage where the British government 
appointed a Committee of Inquiry headed by Sir Edmund Compton to 
investigate them. 01 
Compton's inquiries established that the initial arrests had been 
made by parties of soldiers early in the morning of 9th August. 
The persons arrested were taken to one of three regional holding 
centres where their identities were confirmed and they were 
interviewed by officers of the R. U. G. special branch after which 
It was decided whether they should be released or further 
detained. A limited number of those selected for detention were 
subjected to "interrogation in depth" and this was where most of 
the complaints arose. The complaints related to ancillary 
matters rather than the actual Interrogation itself, and in 
particular to what became known as the "five techniques" i. e. 
wall-standing, hooding, noise, bread and water diet and sleep 
deprivation. 
Although it never became clear who organized and directed the 
system of interrogation in depth, it was apparent that both the 
army and the R. U. C. were' involved. The Parker Committee, who, ar, 
will be discussed later, also investigated interrogation 
procedures noted; 
"One of the unsatisfactory features ... has boon 
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the fact that no rules or guidelines have been 
laid down to restrict the degree to which these 
techniques can properly be applied, Indeed it 
cannot be assumed that any U. K. minister has ever 
had the full nature of these particular techniques 
brought to his attention, and, consequently, that 
he has ever specifically authorised their use, "4 
The government provided Compton with a note of policy in relation 
to interrogation methods 5 which explained that the techniques 
then in use had been employed in many previous internal security 
operations since the end of the Second World War and had most 
recently been revised following a report on the Aden situation. 
The rules stated that "Subjects are to be treated humanely but 
with strict discipline" and they expressly forbade "violence to 
life and person, in particular mutilation, cruel treatment and 
torture. " Also forbidden were "outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular humiliating and degrading treatment. " However the 
note also contained the government's view that; 
"The precise application of these general rules in 
particular circumstances is inevitably to some 
extent a matter of judgment on the part of those 
immediately responsible for the operations in , 
question. Intelligence it the key to successful 
operations against terrorists; and the key to 
intelligence is information regarding their 
operations their dispositions and their plans. 
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When combatting a terrorist campaign time is of 
the essence; information must be sought while it 
is still fresh so that it may be used as quickly 
as possible to effect the capture of persons, arms 
and explosives and thereby save the lives of 
members of the security forces and of the civil 
population. 
Information can be obtained more rapidly if the 
person being interrogated is subjected to strict 
discipline and isolation, with a restricted diet= 
but violence or humiliating treatment ,., are 
forbidden, ... 11 
Compton established that the security forces had used the "five 
techniques" to disorientate those being questioned and so to 
break down their resistance. Detainees were indeed required on 
occasions to wear black hoods, were exposed to continuous, 
monotonous noise, were deprived of food and sloop and wore 
required to stand against a wall with their hands raised against 
it sometimes for lengthy periods. 
Compton drew a somewhat arcane distinction between on the one 
hand "brutality", which is described as "an inhuman or savage 
form of cruelty, and that cruelty implies a disposition to 
inflict suffering, coupled with indifference to, or pleasure in, 
the victim's pain", and on the other hand "physical ill- 
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treatment". 6 The conclusion was that the detainees had been 
subject to "physical ill-treatment" (but not to "brutality"), 
although in the case of "wall standing" the ill-treatment lay in 
the action taken to enforce the posture rather than the posture 
itself, 7 
Compton's remit was purely factual and his Committee was not 
called on to consider the legality of the techniques and 
following their report a further committee, this time of Privy 
Counsellors, was appointed under Lord Parker to consider whether 
interrogation in depth should be allowed to continue. a 
The Parker Report is a fascinating document principally becausb 
of the powerful dissenting minority report by Lord Gardiner. The 
Committee was unable to reach agreement on the main issue of 
policy before it, It was generally agreed that some of the 
practices described by Compton might well be unlawful, but the 
majority view of the Committee was that the security situation 
demanded tough interrogation techniques and subject to proper 
safeguards for those being interrogated 
"There is no reason to rule out. these techniques 
on moral grounds and ... it is possible to operate 
them in a manner consistent with the highest 
standards of out society. " 9 
Perhaps surprisingly, ' and certainly to the credit of the 
Westminster government, it was Lord Gardiner'c powerful 
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dissenting view which was to prevail. His Lordship argued that 
the use of hooding, wall-standing, deprivation of diet and 
deprivation of sleep were civilly and criminally illegal under 
domestic law and nothing in any existing law (including the 
regulations under the Special Powers Act) extended ordinary 
police powers of interrogation or did anything to validate the 
procedures. "That being so, " concluded his Lordship 
unequivocally, "No Army Directive and no Minister could lawfully 
or validly have authorised the use of the procedures. Only 
Parliament can alter the law. The procedures were and are 
illegal. " "I 
Lord Gardiner was also extremely sceptical of the claim that the 
use of the techniques had led to the obtaining of intelligence 
information which would not have been obtained, or not obtained 
so quickly, by other means. He pointed to experience during the 
Second World War when prisoners were treated with kindness and 
courtesy but nevertheless much intelligence information was 
gathered, often very quickly, by interrogation, the cross- 
referencing of information and the use of microphones and "stool 
pigeons. " 11 
In Lord Gardiners opinion, the real question for the Parker 
Committee was whether they should recommend that Parliament 
"Should enact legislation making lawful in 
emergency conditiono the i11-treatment by the 
police, for the purpose of obtaining information, 
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of suspects who are believed to have such 
information, and, if so, providing for what degree 
of ill-treatment and subject to what limitations 
and safeguards. " '2 
Not surprisingly, his Lordship was not in favour of such a 
recommendation and he put forward several reasons against it 
including lack of moral justification, difficulties in setting 
fixed limits on the amount of noise, wall-standing or whatever 
and the effect on the reputation of Great Britain in the 
international community. Two of his Lordship's reasons deserve 
to be set out in fulls 
"(2) If it is to be made legal to employ methods 
not now legal against a man whom the police 
believe to have, but who-may not have, information 
which the police desire to obtain, I, like many of 
our witnesses, have searched for, but been unable 
to find, either in logic or in morals, any limit 
to the degree of ill-treatment to be legalised. 
The only logical limit ... would appear to be 
whatever degree of ill-treatment proves to be 
necessary to got the information out of him, which 
would include, if necessary, extreme torture, ... 
(4) It appears to me that the recommendations ... 
(of the majority) ... necessarily envisage one of 
two courses. 
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One is that parliament should enact legislation 
enabling a minister in a time of civil emergency 
... to fix the limits of permissible degrees of 
ill-treatment to be employed when interrogating 
suspects and that such limits should then be kept 
secret. 
I should respectfully object to this, first 
because the Minister would have just as much 
difficulty as Parliament would have in fixing the 
limits of ill-treatment and, secondly, because I 
view with abhorrence any proposal that a Minister 
should in effect be empowered to make secret laws; 
it would mean that United Kingdom citizens would 
have no right to know what the law was about 
police powers of interrogation. 
The other course is that a Minister should fix 
such secret limits without the authority of 
Parliament, that is to say illegally, and then, if 
found out, ask Parliament for an Act of Indemnity. 
I should respectfully object even more to this 
because it would in my view be a flagrant breach 
of the whole basis of the Rule of Law and of the 
principles of democratic government. " 13 
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As already stated, the government eventually adopted Lord 
Gardiner's view rather than that of the majority and in 1972 it 
was announced that no further use of the "five techniques" would 
be permitted. 14 This, coupled with new procedures for frequent 
medical examinations of those under interrogation, had the effect 
of bringing about a marked reduction in the direct physical ill- 
treatment of suspects which had undoubtedly occurred in 1971 and 
1972. 
Some three years later Lord Gardiner himself chaired a committee 
which reviewed the working of the Northern Ireland (Emergency 
Provisions) Act 1973 in the context of civil liberties. 's That 
Committee noted: 
"[B]ut violence has in the pact provoked a violent 
response, The adoption of methods of 
interrogation "in depth" which involved forms of 
ill-treatment that are described in the Compton 
Report did not last for long. Following the 
report of the Parker Committee in 1972 these 
methods were declared unlawful and were stopped by 
the British Government; but the resentment caused 
was intense, widespread and persistent, " 
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(iii) The ro e a- The United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom was one of the original signatories to the 
European Convention on Human Rights which was promulgated in 1950 
with a view to protecting the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of everyone within the jurisdiction of any of the 
signatory states. Two organs are provided to enforce the 
convention, the European Commission on Human Rights and the 
European Court of Human Rights which for the remainder of this 
section will be referred to as the "Commission" and the "Court" 
respectively. 
For the purpose of the present discussion, the most important 
Article of the Convention is Article 3 which provides: 
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, " 
Article 15 of the Convention permits member states to derogate 
from certain of the rights and freedoms which it provides if 
there is a public emergency which threatens the life of the 
nation. Among the first derogations from the Conventions was a 
notice from the United Kingdom in respect of Northern Ireland on 
27 June 1957 which was to remain in force until withdrawn in 
1984.1 
The right of derogation is not absolute. Even where notice of 
derogation is given, it is clear that the Commission and the 
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Court consider themselves entitled and empowered to review the 
right of the state to derogate from protected rights in the first 
place and to determine, given that derogation is held to have 
been permissible, whether the state has taken such measures only 
to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation. In addition, Article 15 prohibits derogation from 
certain Articles, including Article 3, under any circumstances. 
The procedure for enforcing the Convention is fairly straight- 
forward. Under Article 24 one state may refer to the Commission 
any alleged breach of the Convention by another state. 2 There 
are formidable procedural hurdles to be overcome, including the 
need to ensure that all domestic remedies have boon exhausted, 
but if it overcomes these hurdles, the referral will be 
considered and investigated by the Commission with a view to 
effecting a friendly settlement. If an amicable solution cannot 
be reached, the Commission will prepare a report in which it will 
establish the facts and express its views whether the facto found 
disclose a breach of the Convention. The report will be sent to 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and to the 
states concerned. Within three months of the Commission adopting 
its report, the Commission itself or either of the states 
concerned may refer the matter to the Court for judgment which is 
final and binding. 3 If there is no referral to the Court, the 
Committee of Ministers may decide, by ,a two-thirds majority, 
whether there has been a violation of the-Convention and what 
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steps the state concerned must take. This decision is also 
binding. 
While these procedures are legally straightforward, and generally 
effective in enforcing the Convention, they are extremely time 
consuming. The litigation with which this section is concerned, 
Ireland v The United Kingdom began with the filing of charges in 
December 1971, the Commission adopted its report in January 1976, 
the case was referred to the Court by the Irish government in 
March 1976 and the Court delivered its judgment in January 1978, 
the process thus having taken six years and one month. 4 
The Irish application related to a number of matters, but the 
issue of concern to the present discussion is the allegation that 
detainees in Northern Ireland were subject to torture or inhuman 
or degrading treatment contrary to Article 3. The Commission's 
report is vast, even the summarised version running to over 200 
pages of English text, more than half of which concern this 
allegation. 11 
The Irish allegation related not only to the use of the "five 
techniques" but also to other forms of ill-treatment at various 
army and police centres, principally physical violence, special 
exercises and other forms of distressing treatment. The British 
government admitted the use of the "five techniques" but the 
other forms of ill-treatment were the subject of factual dispute. 
One issue which loomed large in the Commission's report, although 
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it is peripheral to the present discussion, was the question of 
whether there was an "administativ© practice" of inhuman 
treatment by the British government. Since the use of the "five 
techniques" was admitted, there was clearly such a practice in 
respect of them, but in relation to the other forms of ill- 
treatment it was necessary for the Commission to decide whether 
such a practice existed. This obviously caused some difficulty 
but the eventual conclusion was that such a practice did exist in 
respect of the other forms of ill-treatment. - 
The Irish government submitted written evidence of 228 cases of 
alleged ill-treatment, 16 of which were ultimately examined in 
detail by the Commission as "illustrative" cases and specific 
findings were reached only in respect of these cases. The 
Commission heard 119 witnesses, of whom no fewer than 100 related 
to the Article 3 issue. In general it uphold the major 
allegations made by the Irish government and it concluded, inter 
alia, that: 
(a) the combined use in 1971 of the "five 
techniques" as an aid to the interrogation of 
fourteen persons amounted to a practice of inhuman 
treatment and torture to breach of Article 3; 
(b) ten other persons had suffered inhuman 
treatment contrary to Article 3 and there had been 
in 1971 at Palace Barracks, Holywood, near Belfast 
a practice in connection with the interrogation of 
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prisoners which was inhuman treatment in breach of 
Article 3. 
The Commission started from a notion of "inhuman treatment" which 
included "at least such treatment as deliberately causes severe 
suffering, mental or physical, which, in the particular situation 
is unjustifiable. " Torture was defined as "inhuman treatment 
which has a purpose such as the obtaining of information or 
confessions or the infliction of punishment" while degrading 
treatment was treatment which was "grossly humiliating or drives 
an individual to act against his will or conscience. " Non- 
physical torture was "the infliction of mental suffering by 
creating a state of anguish and stress by means other than bodily 
assault. " 
The Commission expressly rejected the view of the majority of the 
Parker Committee that there might be circumstances which would 
justify conduct which violated Article 3.7 The Commission 
stated ex officio that it 
"finds it necessary to state clearly that it did 
not have in mind the possibility that there could 
be a justification for any treatment in breach of 
Article 3 ... The prohibition under Article 3 of 
the Convention is an absolute one and ... there 
can never be under the Convention or under 
international laws a Justification for acts in 
breach of that provision, " El 
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The case eventually reached the Court in 1976 but judgment was 
not issued until 18 January 1978,9 Before the Court, the British 
government did not contest the Commission's opinion on the two 
finding in relation to Article 3 and also gave an unqualified 
undertaking that the "five techniques" would not in any 
circumstances be reintroduced as an aid to interrogation. 
Although the Court took note of the undertaking, and the breaches 
of Article 3 were not contested, nonetheless it held that a 
ruling should be given. 
The Court noted firstly that the "five techniques" were applied 
in combination and with premeditation and for hours at a stretch, 
and caused, if not actual bodily injury, at least intense 
physical and mental suffering and led to acute psychiatric 
disturbances during interrogation. Secondly the Court noted 
that the techniques were such as to arouse in the victims 
feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of debasing and 
humiliating them and possibly breaking their physical or moral 
resistance. 
In relation to the general issues the Court hold: 
Cl) by sixteen votes to one that recourse to the "five 
techniques" amounted to a practice of inhuman and degrading 
treatment; 
(ii) by thirteen votes to four that the use of the techniques did 
not constitute a practice of torture since they did not occasion 
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suffering of the particular intensity and cruelty implied by the 
word torture. 
As to Palace Barracks, the Court considered that the evidence 
before it disclosed that, in the autumn of 1971, quite a large 
number of persons held in custody there had been subjected by 
members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary to violence (for example 
kicking and beating) which led to intense suffering and to 
physical injury that on occasion was substantial. The Court 
held: 
Q) unanimously, that there had existed at Palace Barracks in the 
autumn-of 1971 a practice of inhuman treatment; 
(ii) by fourteen votes to three that the said practice was not 
one of torture since the severity of the suffering capable of 
being caused by the acts complained of. did not attain the 
particular level inherent in the notion of torture; 
(iii) unanimously, that it was not established that the practice 
continued beyond the autumn of 1971. 
The Court described the treatment of detainees at Ballykinlor 
military camp in August 1971, which included the compulsory 
performance of painful exercises, as a discreditable and 
reprehensible practice; however, it hold, by fifteen votes to 
two, that this practice did not infringe Article 3. 
The Court also considered that the information before it 
suggested that there must have been individual cacec of violation 
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of article 3 in various other places in northern Ireland, It 
concluded, however, by fifteen votes to two that no practice in 
breach of Article 3 was established as regards such places. 
Finally, the Court held unanimously that it could not direct, as 
the Irish government had requested, the United Kingdom to 
institute criminal or disciplinary proceedings against those who 
had committed, condoned or tolerated the breaches of Article 3 
found by the Court. 
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9.4 The Di ok eo and e her Ireland e 
Provisions) Acts 1973 and 1.978 
Despite the previously described changes in procedure, internment 
was considered to be undesireable in principle and the government 
was still anxious to use it as little as possible. There was a 
definite danger that internment could replace the normal legal 
process entirely as the means of dealing with terrorist suspects. 
A Commission was accordingly set up in 1972 under Lord Diplock to 
consider "What arrangements for the administration of justice in 
Northern Ireland could be made in order to deal more effectively 
with, terrorist organisations by bringing to book, otherwise than 
by internment by the Executive, individuals involved in terrorist 
activities, particularly those who plan and direct, but do not 
necessarily take part in, terrorist acts; and to make 
recommendations. " ' 
To an extent the Diplock Commission's work was overtaken by 
events when the Detention of Terroristo Order 1972 was passed, 
but nevertheless they carried on and produced their report in the 
remarkably short period of two months. Their speed has been 
criticised as "undue haste" 2 and although they took evidence 
from various persons concerned with the administration of justice 
in Northern Ireland, there in no doubt that the Diplock 
Commission's report was rightly criticised in parliament and 
elsewhere as lacking factual evidence to juetify the radical 
changes which were proposed. When taxed with this point in the 
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House of Lards, Lord Diplock's response showed, for a Judge, a 
somewhat curt approach to the question of proofs 
"When I see a fire starting, and indeed we saw a 
fire starting then, I send for the fire brigade, 
not a statistician, " 2ok 
This is not, of course, to say either that such evidence did not 
exist or that the changes to which the Diplock Report led were 
not necessary or appropriate. To a considerable extent the 
Gardiner Committee which reported in 1975 justified Diplock's 
views ex post facto and the Baker Report of 1984 contained a 
chilling description of two specific incidents involving 
intimidation of juries. In one case a juror described as "large 
and powerful" was in such a state aftqr a night of telephone 
threats that he was reduced to begging in tears to be excused. 
The trial Judge was forced to excuoe the whole jury, In another 
case, involving a Loyalist, the intimidation was more subtle and 
involved the intermittent beating of a Lambeg drum at coma 
distance from the court but sufficiently loudly to'bo heard by 
the Jury. 21 
The Diplock Commission laid much stresc on the danger of intim- 
idation, principally of potential witnesses, but alto of jurors, 
and took the view that until the fear of intimidation could be 
removed and the safety of witnesses and their familiec 
guaranteed, the use of some extra-judicial process for the 
detention of terrorists could not be dispensed with. 4 However 
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they made various far-reaching recommendations -for changes in the 
criminal process to enable at least come of the cases presently 
being dealt with by internment to come before the ordinary 
courts. The Commission were at pains to point out that their 
proposals were only intended to take effect only for a limited 
class of crimes and only so long as the emergency situation 
lasted. Their proposals were not intended to affect the general 
criminal law of Northern Ireland. 
The Diplock Commission began by identifying a number of crimes 
commonly committed by members of terrorist organisations, which 
they called the "Scheduled Offences". r- When a scheduled offence 
was tried on indictment, the trial should be before a judge 
sitting alone without a jury. When they turned specifically to 
the issue of confessions, 7 the Commission reviewed the existing 
law and implicitly criticised the decision in R vFlynn and 
Leonard': 
"Although not strictly rules of law but rules of 
general guidance from which the Judge who tries a 
case has a discretion to depart, [the Judges' 
Rules] appear to have been applied in Northern 
Ireland with considerable rigidity as if they were 
a statutory requirement from which no departure is 
permissible. In a recent decision the court ,,. 
has ruled that, the more creation by the 
authorities of any 'set up which makes it more 
likely that those who did not wish to speak will 
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eventually do so', renders involuntary and 
therefore inadmissible in a court of law any 
confession subsequently made even though the 
actual statement sought to be relied upon was made 
in writing after the accused had been expressly 
cautioned and notwithstanding that its contents 
are such that no man who was not guilty could have 
had knowledge of the facts that it discloses. " 
Professor Greer has pointed out that this criticism is 
misconceived and confuses two separate issues - the question of 
mandatory exclusion of an involuntary statement and the question 
of exclusionary discretion where there has'been a breach of the 
Judges Rules. The latter issue was not before the court in 
either O$ or Elynr end LeonsEd. 
In another implicit criticism of the courts the Diplock 
Commission went on 10 
The whole technique of skilled interrogation is 
to build up an atmosphere in which the initial 
desire to remain silent Is replaced by an urge to 
confide in the questioner. This does not involve 
cruel or degrading treatment. Such treatment in 
regarded by those responsible for gathering 
intelligence as counter-productive at any rate in 
Northern Ireland, in that it hinders the creation 
of the rapport between the person questioned and 
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his questioner ahich makes him feel the need to 
unburden himself. But as the rules as to 
admissiblity of confession have been interpreted 
in Northern Ireland the more fact that the 
technique of questioning As dosignod to produce a 
psychological atmosphere favourable, to the 
creation of this rapport is sufficient to rule out 
as evidence ... anything which the accused has 
said thereafter. " 
At this time the European Commission had barely begun its 
consideration in Ireland v United Kingdom and the speed with 
which the Diplock Commission produced its report precluded any 
detailed consideration of the implications of what they were 
saying, but coming as they did about a year after the Compton 
Report had confirmed the ability and willingnecs of the security 
forces to mistreat prisoners at least occasionally, these 
comments were more than a little disingenuous. The best that the 
Diplock Commission could come up with was the limp observation 
that they "would not condone" the practices described by Compton 
or Parker. The conclusion, however, was inevitable 'It 
"We consider that the detailed technical , rules and 
practice as to the admiaaihility of inculpatory 
statements by the accused as they are currently 
applied in Northern Ireland are hampering the 
course of justice in the case of terrorist crimes 
and compelling the authoritioc responsible for 
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public order and safety to resort to detention in 
a significant number of cases which could 
otherwise be dealt with both effectively and 
fairly by trial in a court of law, " 
In place of the "current technical rules, practices and judicial 
discretions" as to the admissibility of confessions the Diplock 
Commission proposed a "simple legislative provision" based on the 
terms of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
which, it will be remembered, forbids torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. 
They did so for two reasons: 
"It is a simple concept which we do not think the 
Judiciary in Northern Ireland would find it 
difficult to apply in practice. It would not 
render inadmissible statements obtained as a 
result of building up a psychological atmosphere 
in which the natural desire of the person being 
questioned to remain silent is replaced by an urge 
to confide in the queotioner, or statements 
preceded by promises of favours or indications of 
the consequences which might follow if the person 
questioned persisted in refusing to answer. " 
The test of "torture or irrhuman or degrading treatment" was, 
along with the concept of "Scheduled Offences" and the abolition 
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of juries for their trial, enacted into legislation by the 
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973, This Act also 
repealed the Special Powers Act which had long been demanded by 
the minority community and civil liberties groups. The 1973 Act 
and certain other emergency legislation was consolidated into the 
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978. Section 6 of 
the 1973 Act, which later became Section 8 of the 1978 Act, 
provided: 
6{1) In any criminal proceedings for a scheduled 
offence, or two or more offences which are or 
include scheduled offences, a statement made by 
the accused may be given in evidence by the 
prosecution in so far as 
(a) it is relevant to any matter in tccue in the 
proceedings, and 
(b) it is not excluded by the court in pursuance 
of subsection (2) below. 
(2) If in any such proceedings where the 
prosecution proposes to give in evidence a 
statement made by the accused, prima facie 
evidence is adduced that-the accused was subjected 
to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment in 
order to induce him to make the statement, the 
court shall, unless the prosecution catiefies-it 
that the statement was not so obtained 
(a) exclude the statement, or 
(b) if the statement has been received in 
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evidence either - 
(1) continue the trial disregarding the 
statement; or 
(ii) direct that the trial shall be restarted 
before a differently constituted court (before 
which the statement in question shall be 
inadmissible). 
(3) This section does not apply to a summary 
trial. 12 
Section 7 of the 1973 Act (Section 9 of the 1978 Act) included a 
provision which effectively, if not absolutely, shifted the onus 
of proof in relation to possession of a "proscribed article, " 
essentially explosives, firearms and ammunition. Where the 
prosecution proved that the accused and the article concerned 
were both present in any premises, or the article was in premises 
of which the accused was the occupier or which he "habitually 
used otherwise that as a member of the public, " the court might 
accept that as sufficient evidence of the accused's possession of 
the article "unless it is further proved that he did not at that 
time know of its presence in the premises in question, or if he 
did know, that he had no control over it, " 
Part II of the Act provided wide-ranging powers of arrest on 
suspicion 13 and search and Section 16 (Section 18 of the 1978 
Act) explicitly limited the right to silence: 
16(1) Any member of Her Majesty's forces on duty 
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or any constable may stop and question any person 
for the purpose of ascertaining that person's 
identity and movements and what he knows con- 
cerning any recent explosion or any other trecent) 
incident endangering life or concerning any person 
killed or injured in any such explosion or 
incident. 
(2) Any person who fails to stop when required 
to do so under this section or who refuses to 
answer or fails to answer to the best of his 
knowledge and ability, any question addressed to 
him under this section, shall be liable on summary 
conviction to ... a fine ... . 
1,4 
This section has been the subject of a surprising lack of 
reported judicial comment although the view has been expressed 
that it is doubtful whether it conforms to Article 5 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 'r- It has also been pointed 
out that it is not necessarily limited to matters of terrorism 
since an "incident endangering life" could refer to a car 
accident. 16 There would not appear to be any requirement of 
suspicion, let alone reasonable suspicion, before the power can 
be exercised. There is no definition of "recent" and between 
1973 and 1987 it was only explosions which had to be "recent", 
the qualification being added in respect of other incidents by 
the Northern Ireland (Emergency Proviciont) Act 1987. There Ic 
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no time limit on the period during which the person stopped may 
be questioned, nor is there any indication as to the amount of 
detail which the person is required to give. 
In 1975 the Gardiner Committee reviewed the operation of the 1973 
Act and apart from recommending a few comparatively minor changes 
they generally took the view that it was working well. By the 
time of the Gardiner Report the courts had begun to interpret 
Section 6 and, as will be discussed later, they had taken the 
view that, contrary to the recommendation of the Diplock Report, 
Section 6 had not deprived them of their discretion to exclude 
confessions in the interests of justice. Gardiner recommended 
that there should be an express statutory provision preserving 
judicial discretion, " but, while no steps were taken to curtail 
the courts' use of discretionary exclusion, it was to be 1987 
before a provision explicitly preserving it was enacted. 
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9.5 e Police_&busegi --Amnesty rnt2rriational and the 
Bennett Report 
(i) Interrogation Centres Amnesty International Misplon 
The difficulties in following the normal procedures of policing 
and detection in Northern Ireland in the mid and late 1970s were 
acute. Apart from the previously discussed problems of 
intimidation of potential witnesses, the examination of a locus 
and the collection of forensic evidence 'were frequently 
impossible. This might be due to the total destruction of the 
potential evidence, but it could equally be due to booby-trapping 
and other risks to the lives of security personnel auch as 
hostile crowds. At other times a number of terrorist outrages 
were arranged to swamp the resources of the security cervices. ' 
Following the ending of internment in 1975 the R. U, C. came under 
intense political pressure to apprehend and secure convictions of 
suspected terrorists. A decision was made to construct two 
special interrogation centres, one at Gough in Armagh and one at 
Castlereagh in Belfast. Both were opened in 1977 and their 
opening coincided with a major increase in the number of 
complaints relating to police interrogation. 
From their earliest inception a majority of those prosecuted for 
scheduled offences before the Diplock Courts have been convicted 
wholly or mainly on the basis of confessions made during the 
course of police interrogation. For example between January and 
June 1978 568 persons were prosecuted for scheduled offences of 
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whom 411 (72%) pled guilty. 3 Of the remainder 121 were 
convicted after trial and 36 were acquitted. The Director of 
Public Prosecutions informed the Bennett Committee that in 75-8O% 
of these cases the prosecution case depended wholly or mainly on 
the confession of the accused. 4 There was little firm 
information for earlier years but it was suggested that the 
proportion had increased from about 65% in 1976 and 75% in 1977. k; 
Those figures only related to those who were, firstly, charged by 
the police and, secondly, against whom the Director of Public 
Prosecution considered that there was sufficient admissible 
evidence to justify prosecution. Many more people were 
interrogated than were charged by the police and according to the 
Bennett Committee, between September 1977 and August 1978 only 
37% of those interrogated at Castlereagh and 24% of those 
interrogated at Gough and a further contra at Strand Road 
Londonderry were actually charged with any offence. As Boyle at 
al put it, it follows either that very large numbers of innocent 
people were being subjected to prolonged interrogation or that 
prolonged interrogation failed in a substantial number of cases 
to produce a confession from those who had something to confess., " 
Despite the pious sentiments expressed by the Diplock Committee, 
complaints of police brutality during interrogation continued to 
be made and as already noted increased eubstantially after the 
opening of the interrogation centres. Shortly put, it was 
beginning to look as if the R. U. G. was ill-treating suspects in 
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order to extract confessions from them, confessions which were 
then leading to almost inevitable conviction before the Diplock 
Courts. In addition it was apparent that even when a suspect 
made a confession at an early stage, interrogation was 
continuing, often for the full three day detention period and 
detectives were using these further interrogation sessions as a 
means of eliciting information about general terrorist 
organisation and activities. 7 
By April 1977 police doctors, who regularly examined prisoners at 
the stage when they were being charged at police stations, became 
sufficiently concerned at the bruising, contusions, abrasions and 
other injuries (mental as well as physical> which they were 
seeing that they wrote to the Police Authority bringing the 
matter formally to their notice. The police, not surprisingly, 
denied the allegations and in turn alleged that many of the 
injuries were self-inflicted for the specific purpose of 
discrediting them. There were further exchanges between the 
doctors and the authorities with particular concern being 
expressed about the condition of prisoners who had passed through 
Castlereagh police station but no official action was taken. As 
the Bennett Committee put it, "when denials of ill-treatment of 
prisoners were made by the police, some of the medical officers 
who had examined prisoners, and found injuries', had reason to 
fear for their reputation, " 8 Ultimately the chief medical 
officer at Gough police station, Dr Irwin, was sufficiently 
concerned by the injuries and the lack of action by the 
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authorities that he "went public, " as a result of which he was 
later forced to resign. 
The issue attracted the attention of the media and various 
television and press reports added to the disquiet. In November 
1977 a group of some thirty solicitors who regularly handled 
cases before the Diplock courts decided to form a group for the 
purpose of collating evidence of alleged brutality, They wrote 
to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland stating their view 
that: 
"... ill treatment of suspects by police officers, 
with the object of obtaining confessions, is now 
common practice, and that this most often, but not 
always, takes place at Castlereagh R. U. C. station 
and other police stations throughout Northern 
Ireland. " 10 
A mission from Amnesty International visited Northern Ireland 
between 28 November and 6 December 1977. They considered 
evidence relating to 78 persons who alleged maltreatment by 
R. U. C. personnel, principally at Castireagh, and invariably by 
plain clothes detectives. Most of the 78 had been arrested under 
the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 although 
some had been subject to the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Act 1976. Generally Amnesty International found the 
allegation against the police to be established and they 
concluded that "maltreatment of suspected terrorists by the 
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R. U. C. has taken place with sufficient frequency to warrant the 
establishing of a public inquiry to investigate it. " 
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(ii) The Bennett committee 
The idea of a public inquiry did not find favour with the Britich 
government but it was clear that the Amnesty International report 
could not be ignored. A Committee of Inquiry was therefore 
established under Mr Justice Bennett Inter alia "to examine 
police procedures and practice in Northern Ireland relating to 
the interrogation of persons suspected of scheduled offences. " 
It was, however, made clear to the Bennett Committee that they 
were not to inquire into individual allegations of maltreatment. 
The Bennett Committee produced an excellent report which included 
a comprehensive review of the law and which was undoubtedly the 
most impressive of the reports relating to Northern Ireland 
reviewed in this work. The Sennett Committee was scrupulously 
fair in its assessment of the difficulties under which the R. U. C. 
were operating and the reasons for the reliance on admissions. ' 
They were also careful to remind their readers that police 
questioning is a normal part of procedure in other parts of the 
United Kingdom and that admissions and confessions constituted a 
significant element in a high proportion of cases in England and 
Wales. - 
Howover, despite the exclusion of individual allegations of 
maltreatment they took careful note of a considerable body of 
medical evidence before commenting that whatever the explanation, 
there were "injuries which were not coif-inflicted and were 
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sustained during the period of detention at a police office. "3 
Despite the measured language the Committee's view was 
unequivocal: 
"What we have found reinforces the concern shown 
by the doctors and the Police Authority, and 
demonstrates the need for an improvement in the 
supervision and control of interrogation. More- 
over we cannot blind ourselves to the possibility 
that if, as we have found on the basis of medical 
evidence, ill-treatment causing injury could 
occur, so could ill-treatment which leaves no 
marks. ... What is aimed at is a system in which a 
prisoner who walks into a police office unhurt and 
unmarked shall be unhurt and unmarked when he 
leaves that office. " 4 
The Committee noted that there was no code of conduct, for police 
officers engaged in the interviewing of prisoners and there was a 
considerable need for such a code which, in their view should be 
enforceable as a matter of police discipline. They referred to a 
case where a prisoner (who in the event was not the subject of 
criminal proceedings) had been repeatedly interviewed, apparently 
on the decision of a junior officer, during a period of come 21 
hours after which has was only allowed 216 hours sloop, He had 
become so disturbed that he had slashed his wrist and butted his 
head against a radiator causing injury to his forehead. 
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The Committee were aware of the difficulty which could"be posed 
by hard and fast rules but in a masterpiece of understatement 
observed that they: 
"[Could) not contemplate with approval a situation 
in which the zeal, and the apparently uncontrolled 
discretion, of an individual officer can lead a 
prisoner to contemplate self-destruction or to 
undertake self-mutilation. There must surely be 
doubts about the truth of any statements made in 
circumstances such as these. " 11 
Although they stopped short of attempting to set out a 
comprehensive code of conduct, the Bennett Committee made a 
lengthy series of recommendations and suggestions for matters to 
be dealt with in such code. The recommendations included the 
prohibition of various forms. of degrading treatment such as 
ordering a prisoner to strip, adopt an unnatural posture or carry 
out unnecessary physically exhausting action as well as the use 
of obscenities, insults, and threats of various types including 
physical force, abandonment in a hostile area and sexual 
misbehaviour. 
In relation to the timing and duration of interview-,, Bennett 
recommended that no single interview should go on longer than the 
period between normal meal times and prisoners should be allowed 
a break for meals; except in the case of urgent operational 
reasons an interview should not commence after midnight: not more 
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than two officers should interview one prisoner at one time and 
not more than three teams of two officers should be concerned 
with interviewing one prisoner. 7 
The Bennett Committee also considered in some detail the various 
options and possibilities for independent supervision. In their 
evidence to the Committee, the Police Authority for Northern 
Ireland had raised the possibility of civilian supervisors whose 
main duty would be to ensure that the police followed the rules 
laid down in relation to interviewing suspects. Like the RCCP, 
the Bennett Committee rejected this idea on various grounds, 
although not without hesitation. The grounds for rejection 
included the difficulty of finding suitable people to do the job, 
the difficulty in establishing the relationship between the 
civilian supervisors and the police and the fact that "a body of 
officials working day by day in cooperation, as the public would 
see them, with the police, would quickly come to be tarred with 
the same brush in the minds of critical members of the 
community. " 8 Related proposals to extend the functions of the 
Boards of Visitors of H. M. Prisons in Northern Ireland and the 
role of medical officers were also rejected, 
The Bennett Committee also considered the question of tape 
recording and although there were unable to advance the arguments 
appreciably beyond, the debate in the rest of Britain, they 
pointed out some of the particular problems which tape recording 
would present in Northern Ireland. Although there was not a 
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problem with interviews on the way to the police station, since 
such interviews simply did not happen, interviews at police 
stations were likely to be much longer than anything seen 
elsewhere, particularly since the suspect might be detained for a 
period of several days. This was considered likely to lead to 
problems with the bulk of the records and the Immensity of the 
task of producing and editing transcripts. 
The Committee also pointed out that the main purpose of tape 
recording was to provide a reliable record, whereas the main 
issue before them was the need to prevent prisoners being ill- 
treated. This threw into prominence the arguments about who 
should be allowed to switch the machine on and off and what 
protection could be found against the faking of incidents by 
suspects. The fact that in Northern Ireland so much reliance was 
being placed on confessions increased the need for a reliable 
record, but on the other hand it also increased the need to 
ensure that the presence of the tape-recorder did not render the 
interrogation process ineffective; 
"We have felt bound, however, to give special 
prominence to the peculiar features of police 
interrogation in Northern Ireland ... and in 
particular the fact that persons known to have 
given information to the police are likely ... to 
suffer victimisation by the paramilitary organ- 
Isationo as a result. This applies both to 
information about the suspect's own part in crime 
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and, even more, to information about others' 
involvement in terrorist activity, In view of 
this, we believe that the fact that a permanent 
and reproducible record was being made, which the 
suspect could not later disown, would increase his 
reluctance to speak to a greater degree than else- 
where. ... Once a copy of the tape passed out of 
the hands of the police, it would be impossible to 
be sure into whose hands it might fall, In 
Northern Ireland, a risk to lives and security 
would ensue, bearing in mind that interrogation 
there is intended, and likely, to reveal 
intelligence about the activities of terrorist 
organisations. " 
For these reasons the Bennett Committee considered that Northern 
Ireland was not the beet place to begin a system of tape 
recording. However they were strongly in favour of an experiment 
with tape recording elsewhere, and recommended that the matter be 
reconsidered in Northern Ireland once the experimental results 
were known. 10 
The Committee also rejected video rocording, concluding that it 
would not offer any substantial advantages by comparison with the 
unrccorded visual observation of interviowc. 11 
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In the view of the Bennett Committee, there was no real 
alternative to the police themselves taking the necessary steps 
to ensure that maltreatment did not occur. Various steps in this 
direction had already been taken by the time of the Bennett 
Report, but there was room for further improvement, 12 Bennett 
came to the same conclusion as Amnesty International, namely that 
the uniformed branch of the R. U. C. was not implicated in the 
allegations of brutality, and from this starting point made 
several recommendations generally directed towards giving 
uniformed officers responsibility for ensuring the welfare of 
suspects. 
Inter alia Bennett recommended that it should be made "entirely 
plain" to the uniformed inspectors that their responsibility for 
the welfare of prisonere extended to the interview room, and that 
if necessary they should enter the interview room and stop the 
interview if a breach of the law or force instructions was taking 
place or if it seemed reasonably likely that events in the 
interview room were leading to such a breach. Bennett also 
recommended the installation of spyholes in the doors of all 
police interview rooms in the Province and the installation of 
closed circuit television facilities in all interview rooms used 
for the interrogation of terrorist suspects and other persons 
arrested for scheduled offences. Any interference with the 
effective operation of the closed circuit television apparatus 
was recommended to be a disciplinary offence. Monitoring screens 
were to be provided for the senior uniformed officer and should 
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also be availbie to the senior detective officer in charge of 
intervlew3.10 
Further recommendations were made to strengthen the role of the 
medical officers, and in particular it was recommended that 
medical officers should see all terrorist suspects and persons 
suspected of scheduled offences during each period of 24 hours 
and should offer them the opportunity of medical examination. 1 
As far as access to legal advice was concerned, the Bennett 
Committee found that solicitors were invariably refused access to 
terrorist suspects,, ,a position which they considered unjust- 
ifiable. They recommended that prisoners should have an 
unconditional right of access to a solicitor after 48 hours and 
every 48 hours thereafter, although solicitors should not be 
permitted to be present at interviews. 18 Although moot of the 
Bennett recommendations were accepted, this one was only 
partially Implemented with the government Insisting that the 
police should have the right to be present at any interview 
between a suspect and his solicitor, a condition which most 
solicitors found unacceptable. 'f- 
One of the reasons why most of the Bennett Committee's 
recommendations were accepted was that they could be implemented 
by administrative means and did not require legislation and 
following the Bennett Report, the number of complaints concerning 
physical abuse of suspects dropped dramatically, 17 although 
307 
doubts have recently been expressed about the continuing 
effectiveness of the Bennett "regime". 10 It has also been 
suggested that since the Bennett recommendations made the 
extraction of confessions much more difficult, the policy of 
securing convictions on confessions alone lost its viability and 
thus led to the evolution of the "supergrass" system, which was, 
in turn, to become discredited. 1-1 
Notes 
1, Bennett Report Chapter 2 
2, ibid paras 38-40 
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9, ibid paras 192-194 
10, ibid paras 195-200 
11, ibid pare 201 
12, ibid paras 210-211 
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14, ibid pare 249 
15, ibid paras 122-123 and 277-288 
16, K. Boyle et al ian ! ears an liP Nvrthera lrel nd p51, the position has now 
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9.6 Judicta? Decissions 1973-1984 
Q) "Torture or Inhuman or. DDegrading Treatment 
It will be apparent from the foregoing discussion that during the 
1970s interrogation by the security forces was as much, if not 
more, directed towards obtaining intelligence and information 
about terrorist activities as it was towards obtaining 
confessions for use in court. It has also been pointed out that 
many more people were questioned than were prosecuted. It is 
probably fair to say that the Diplock Courts were never called 
upon to consider the worst excesses of the security forces. 
Nevertheless the enactment of Section 6 of the Northern Ireland 
(Emergency Powers) Act 1973 clearly made a major difference to 
the law on admissiblity. 
Notwithstanding the absence of a jury, issues of admissibility of 
confessions in the Diplock Courts fall to be determined on the 
voir dire and if the statement is excluded the Judge will often 
stand down under section 6(2)(1i) (later section 8(2)(11)). If 
the statement is not excluded, the practice seems to be that the 
evidence need not be reheard but must be expressly reconsidered 
at the trial stage. ' 
The first judicial comment on the now legislation camo in the 
unreported case of Rv Cony in 1973, The Lord Chief Justice 
entertained no doubt that many statements which would previously 
have been excluded as being involuntary were now to be 
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admissible: 
"Section 6 of course has materially altered the 
law as to the admissibility of statements by 
singling out torture and inhuman and degrading 
treatment. This is clear from the fact that such 
things have always made for the exclusion of an 
accused's statement since they deprive it of its 
voluntary character. Accordingly Section 6(2) 
would merely be a statement of the obvious if it 
did not in conjunction with Section 6(t) render 
admissible much that previously must have been 
excluded. There is no need now'to satisfy the 
Judge that a statement is voluntary in the 
sometimes technical sense which that word has 
acquired in relation to criminal trials, " 2 
i 
The first reported decision on the test of "torture on inhuman or 
degrading treatment" was R-v eHet, heringtori d0r .1 
S. 4, where Lord Lowry LCJ was the trial judge in a typical 
terrorist case relating to the murder of two police officers with 
the only evidence against the accused being their confocsions. 
The accused, who all gave ovidenca, had alleged that they had 
been maltreated in police custody. In addition medical evidence 
was led of certain injuries which had been found on them during 
their time in custody and which were, up to a point. consistent 
with their allegations. The injuricc were not particularly 
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severe and certainly did not indicate the use of torture or 
inhuman treatment. However, Lord Lowry considered that degrading 
treatment "while it must overlap considerably with torture and 
inhuman treatment, must also cover conduct which does not 
necessarily fall within the first and second types of behaviour 
mentioned in the section. " His Lordship accordingly found that 
if the treatment necessary to cause what the doctors had seen 
had been meted out to persons being interrogated in custody, it 
was degrading treatment. His Lordship also took the view that 
once prima facia evidence of torture or inhuman or degrading 
treament had been adduced, it was for the prosecution to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that that the accused's statement had not 
been obtained by it. His lordship set out four reasons for his 
view: 
1. The context of section 6 is that of a criminal 
trial and the prosecution's standard of proof of 
issuse in such a trial (even when they must first 
be raised by the defence) is proof beyond 
reasonable doubt; 
2. The use of the word "satisfied" in section 
2(4) (sic) must imply proof beyond reasonable 
doubt; 
3, At common law where, with a view to the 
admission or rejection of statement evidences the 
Issue for the trial judge in one of voluntariness, 
the proof must be beyond reasonable doubt; 
4. A statute, particularly where it abridgee the 
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rights of an accused, must in case of ambiguity be 
construed co as to alter the law as little a 
possible consistently with the language used. 
Lord Lowry accordingly held that the prosecution had not die- 
charged the onus and the statements were inadmissible. One of 
the accused, Hetherington, had made a separate written statement 
admitting membership of the Z. R. A. but Lord Lowry applied t 
Flynn and Leonard '-1 and took the view that it "would be 
unrealistic to find that such influence as may have existed Cthe 
previous day] had been dissipated effectively by the time this 
statement was made. " 
Two years later the issue first came before the Court of Criminal 
Appeal, presided over by Lord Lowry, in Rv : [h mason 119771-NI _ 
74 
and the opportunity was taken to clarify some of the procedural 
issues. 
The accused was charged with the murders of four soldiers who had 
been blown up by a remotely-detonated bomb. -Ho had been arrested 
within hours of the explosion and was interviewed five times by 
the police in the space of one day. At the fourth interview he 
intimated that he would make a written statement, but before 
doing so he gave a verbal statement and drew certain diagrams of 
the bomb. 
312 
At the trial the accused alleged that he had been subjected to 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment in that he had been 
made to stand with his arms and legs out-stretched, was 
frequently kicked in the ribs and testicles, was subjected to 
verbal abuse, was made to do press-ups and other exercises. He 
also alleged that he was punched in the abdomen, slapped across 
the face and twice had a plastic bag put over his head, He 
collapsed during the fifth interview, but medical evidence was 
adduced by the Crown to the effect that this was due to a 
hysterical reaction, the doctors also giving evidence that they 
had seen no evidence of physical maltreatment. A certain amount 
of contrary medical evidence was adduced by the defence, but 
having heard all the evidence the trial judge ruled in favour of 
admitting the statments. 
On appeal it was held that he was fully entitled to do so and the 
Court of Appeal's judgment adds nothingf to Lord Lowry's expo- 
sition of the law regarding admisniblity in Hethorington, 
However the Court took the opportunity of issuing a "reminder" of 
the position relating to a voir dire governed by Section 6(2) of 
the 1973 Act. Under the statute, once prima facie evidence of 
the making of the statement was adduced by the Crown, the accused 
had to raise a prima facie case of torture or inhuman or 
degrading conduct before admissibility became a triable issue. 
The correct course was for the defence to make its case under 
Section 6(2) and only if a triable issue was raised did it become 
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the duty of the Crown to rebut the defence case and prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that it was wrang. 
Lord Lowry also commented on the duty of the judge when giving 
judgment in a trial in a Diplock court. Such a judge has no jury 
to charge and will therefore not err if he does not state every 
legal proposition and review every fact and argument on either 
side. His task is to reach conclusions and give reasons to 
support his view and, preferably, to notice any difficult or 
unusual points of law in order that if there is an appeal, it may 
be seen how his view of the law informed his approach to the 
facts. 
There have been no further reported cases bearing directly on the 
issue of "torture or inhuman or degrading treatment" and the 
issue seems to have effectively been settled by Lord Lowry's 
decision in Hetherington. 
In any event the improvement in police practices which followed 
the Bennett report would clearly go a long way towards reducing 
the scope for the defence to rely on police maltreatment, As 
will be diccussed later, the courts themselves made it clear that 
even where the conduct complained of fell short of torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment, a statement might still be 
excluded as a matter of judicial diocrotion, 
314 
In Rv O'Halloran 1 19791 NI 45 and other unreported cases, 4 the 
courts themselves ruled out physical violence entirely. In 
O'Halloran the Lord Chief Justice saids 
"This court finds it difficult in practice to 
envisage any form of physical violence which is 
relevant to the interrogation of a suspect in 
custody and which, if it had occurred, could at 
the same time leave a court satisfied beyond 
reasonable doubt in relation to the issue for 
decision under Section 6 (now Section 8). " 
Notes 
I, Hogan and Walker Political Violence in Ireland pli0 et seq, Also 0, S, Greer 
the Adslssibility of confession; Under th, a Northern Ireland (EEargancy 
Provisions) Act F978 19801 31 NILQ 205 at 234-235 
2, This extract is given in the judgment of Hutton 3, in Rv Dtl1ort1]984] NI 
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as a response to criticism of mick., See Hogan and Walker op cit note I 
supra p114 
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(ii) Judicial Discretion 
The first reported case in which the courts had to address the 
question of the effect of Section 6 of the 1973 Act on the 
Court's discretion to exclude evidence ' and the decision which 
effectively set the trend for subsequent cases was Rv McCormick 
and Others [19771 NI 105. a decision of Lord Justice McGonigal 
sitting at first instance. The learned judge's long and erudite 
judgment shows that he had no doubt that Section 6 did not 
deprive him of a discretion to reject otherwise admissible 
evidence. In what was in effect the preamble to his judgment his 
Lordship observed: 
"Section 6(1) stresses the limited nature of the 
objections which can be taken by providing that 
unless excluded by Section 6(2) the relevant 
statement may be admitted in evidence. Thin is, 
of course, subject to the overall discretion of 
the trial judge to exclude any evidence on the 
ground that its prejudicial effect outweighs ito 
probative value. " 
Before the question of discretionary exclusion could price, it 
was necessary to determine whether the statement in fact passed 
the test laid down in Section 6(2). In determining this issue, 
his Lordship noted that the terma of Section 6(2) were derived 
from Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and for 
guidance he turned not to existing English or Trish authorities 
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but to the judgment of the European Commission in Trel5nd y 
United Kingdom and their earlier decision in what was generally 
known as the Greek Case. 
The main points of the Commission's report in rreland v ted 
King ors and in particular their definitions of "torture", 
"inhuman treatment" and "degrading treatment" have already been 
mentioned ' but it should also be pointed out that in the Gee 
Casa the Commission had distinguished between acts prohibited 
under Article 3 and "a certain roughness of treatment" which "may 
take the form of slaps or blows of the hand on the head or face". 
In the view of the Commission such roughness was "tolerated by 
most detainees and even taken for granted. " 
Applying the Commiseion'r definitions, which he noted appeared to 
"accept a degree of physical violence which could never be 
tolerated ... under the common law test, " Lord Justice McGonigal 
came to the view that., 
"A statement which is trade is admissiblc under the 
Section, however induced, unless induced by 
conduct falling within the descriptive terms 
"torture or inhuman or degrading treatment" in the 
sense used in the section and it is only excluded 
by the section even in those three cases if the 
acts complained of were acts done in order to 
induce the statement. " -" 
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His Lordship then addressed in more depth the question of 
judicial discretion: 
"That does not mean, however, that these courts 
will tolerate or permit physical maltreatment of a 
lesser degree deliberately carried out for the 
purpose of or which has the effect of inducing a 
person interviewed to make a statement. Not only 
would such conduct amount to an assault and in 
itself be an offence under the ordinary criminal 
law but it would be repugnant to all principles of 
justice to allow such conduct to be used as a 
moans towards an end, however desirable that end 
might be made to appear. ... 
It is at this stage, however, when a statement has 
passed the test of admissiblity under section 6 
that the trial Judge's discretionary powers have 
to be considered, and it is the proper exercise of 
these powers which provide an extra-statutory 
control over the means by which statements are 
induced and obtained. " 
After a review of earlier authorities, his Lordship then stated: 
"It is clear from the authorities ... that the 
judicial discretion to exclude evidenco is widely 
based and includes cases where statements have 
been obtained by maltreatment. It does not, of 
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course, mean that every incidence (sic) of mal- 
treatment will lead as of course to exclusion. 
Each case must be considered on its merits and the 
discretion .., Is still the discretion of the 
individual trial Judge, In considering its 
exercise in any case the trial judge must take 
into account not only the conduct complained of 
but its effect on the person subjected to it and 
all other relevant circumstances. " 
However, the judge should also have regard to the standard of 
maltreatment necessary to exclude a statement under section 6 and 
should take care not to defeat the will of parliament: 
"If he exercises his discretion without regard to 
the section he will in all probability exclude 
statements obtained in circumstances not 
considered by Parliament to warrant exclusion. .., 
The effect of the exercise of the discretion if 
unfettered by the existence of section 6 might be, 
therefore, to negative the effect of section 6 and 
under the guise of the discretionary power have 
the effect of reinstating the old common law test 
in so far as it depended on the proof of physical 
or mental maltreatment. In my opinion the 
judicial discretion should not be exercised co as 
to defeat the will of parliament as expressed in 
the section. While I do not suggest its exercise 
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should be excluded in a case of maltreatment 
falling short of section 6 conduct, it should only 
be exercised in such cases where failure to 
exercise it might create injustice by admitting a 
statement which though admissible under the 
section and relevant on its face was in itself ... 
suspect by reason of the method by which it was 
obtained. ... This would require consideration not 
only of the conduct itself but also, and since the 
effect of any conduct varies according to the 
individual receiving it, possibly equally 
important its effect on the individual and 
whether, to use the words of the Commission Report 
... the maltreatment was such as to drive the 
individual to act against his will or conscience. " 
In McCormick Lord Justice McGonigal had made it clear that once 
the point of admissiblity was taken, the onus was on the 
prosecution to satisfy the judge that the statement was taken in 
a manner and in circumstances which justify its admission in 
evidence, whether decided by section 6 or against an exercise of 
judicial discretion. A year or so later in Rv, 2týcý [ 197 lý NI 
tl4 his Lordship, again sitting at first Instance, had to deal 
with the question of judicial discretion in the situation where 
the accused refused to recognise the court and refused to take 
any part in the proceedings. As the result of the accused's 
attitude to the court, the point of admissiblity was not "taken" 
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in the normal sense and his Lordship effectively raised it ex 
proprlo mote If there was, the learned judge considered, 
something in the evidence which raised a doubt in his mind as to 
its admissiblity, he had to consider that even though the accused 
for reasons of his own had elected to take no part in the case, 
In Milne the accused had been interviewed for 39 hours out of 72 
and during this period he had eaten (by his own choice) nothing 
more than a Twix bar. In the course of the Crown evidence it 
came out that at one paint, towards the end of the interviewing 
process and shortly before he made an incriminating statement, 
the accused had claimed to be "all mixed up" and "not thinking 
straight" and a short time later told his interrogators that he 
was still "confused". The statement was clearly admissible on 
the basis of section 6 but Lord McGonigal decided to exercise his 
discretion to exclude it: 
"It does not ... follow that length of time or 
persistent questioning is in itself such as to 
mean a statement is not voluntary, but if there is 
evidence to suggest that it 1. c not or may not he 
it is for the Crown to satisfy the court that it 
is. If the crown fails to satisfy the court. that 
the statement is voluntary, then although the case 
may not come under section 6(2) the court must, in 
my opinion} consider whether it should be excluded 
as a proper exercise of the court's discretion. 
... The application of the discretion ... depends 
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solely on the court ... looking at the facts and 
circumstances of a particular case and deciding 
whether as a fact it is satisfied that the state- 
meet was a voluntary statement. That Is, that it 
was not made by a person driven by the conditions 
or circumstances under which it was made to act 
against hi will or conscience. " 
By the time of the next reported decision, 'R v 4cGrmth [19.801 NT 
9, a Judgment of the Court of Appeal, the Northern Ireland 
(Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 had been passed, and Section 6 of 
the 1973 Act had become Section 8 of the 1978 one. The point in 
McGrath was one of some novelty, and, it is submitted, little 
hope of success. The accused had been arrested three times in 
connection with the same offence, in June 1976, March 1977 and 
finally in November 1977 when he made an oral admission and a 
written confession, One oddity, not followed up in the brief 
report, is that after he was arrested in March 1977 the accused 
was bailed in May 1977 and the charge was "dropped" in October, 
the month before his third and final arrest, 
The basic point in is r th was that the repeated arrests amounted 
to mental torture, or at least Inhuman treatment. Defence 
counsel argued that the conduct had to be Judged from the 
standpoint of the effect on the victim, independently of the 
intention of the person responsible. The trial judge, Lord 
Justice Gibson, had taken the view thatt 
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"In order to constitute treatment within the act 
there must be either physical or mental ill- 
treatment and that that must be-of a very grave 
nature. ,.. All physical or mental illtreatment in 
not torture or inhuman or degrading, and. I have 
also come to the conclusion that the 1.11treatmont 
which would fall within the section must be done 
with the intention of causing either physical or 
mental suffering and that that physical or mental 
suffering must be of a very high degree and it 
must have been done also as the section indicates 
with the purpose of inducing a statement, So 
those are the physical acts, there must be grave 
physical ilitreatment and secondly the intention 
of causing a high degree of suffering and the 
motive must be to produce a statement. I am quite 
satisfied that it is not enough to intend merely 
to do an act which, in the result, without any 
foresight by the police officer, does produce 
suffering, that to my mind in not anything, within 
the section, that is to say in order to bring a 
case within the section one must do morn than be 
satisfied that the suffering resulted from 
conduct; it must be shown that at least there is a 
prima facie case that suffering was intended or at 
least foreseen when the conduct was adopted. " 
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The appeal court approved the trial judge's interpretation of 
section 8(2) and commented that on the findings in fact there was 
nothing which could have prevented him from being satisfied 
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had not been subjected 
to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. They added that: 
"Section 8(2) is aimed at discouraging the 
deliberate infliction of suffering rather than 
contemplating the incidental effect on a suspect 
who becomes the victim of conduct which is not 
deliberately bad conduct. The words 'subjected to' 
in section 8(2) appear to us to lend further 
support to this opinion since they appear to look 
to a situation where the victim is deliberately 
made the subject of the outlawed conduct. " 
Rv Culbert 019821 Mt 90 does not particularly advance the law, 
but its importance lies in the opinion of the Court of Appeal 
that the guidelines for police interviewing which had been laid 
down after the Bennett report did not relate to the inter- 
pretation of section 8(2) and did not set a standard by which to 
decide whether a person had been subjected to inhuman or 
degrading treatment. 
The final case in this category, v Dub 0[ M41 NI ? q2. is not 
particularly remarkable but Includes a first instance judgment by 
Hutton J. running to some 20 pages in which the law is compre- 
hensively and carefully considered In a manner which would put 
324 
many a Scottish judge to shame, Hutton J's Judgment in Dil. o is 
a synthesis of the existing law and the application of that law 
to the facts of the case and, despite its impressive command, in 
fact adds little of real consequence of its own. In essence the 
judgment comes down to this. If there has not been torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment, statements by a terrorist suspect 
made after a period of searching questioning in custody will be 
admissible notwithstanding that at the outset the suspect did not 
wish to confess and the questioning caused him to speak when 
otherwise he would have remenined silent. 
One particular point of intereEt, (if only because it is stated 
in a single sentence of 120 words! ), is the learned judge's 
explicit disavowal of what Mirftold terms the "disciplinary 
principle" 4 in relation to the exclusion of statements to the 
police 
"Further, in a case such as thth where the court 
decide that the statements are admissible and 
where the court further decides in relation to the 
circumstances of that particular case and the 
course of questioning, including the length and 
times of the interviews as it affects the 
particular accused, that there is no ground for 
exercising the court's discretion to exclude the 
statements, I consider that the court should not 
exercise its discretion to exclude the etatementc, 
and thereby, In effect, bring about the acquittal 
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of the accused on certain counts for the sole 
reason that it wishes to ensure that in other 
cases the police will not follow a certain course 
in conducting the interviews of other suspects. " 
Notes 
1, The issue had previously arisen in two unreported first instance cases LY 
Corey, 1973, (referred to supra) and RY Irwin. 1977, both of which are 
referred to in RY McCormick an&, Q tt., 
2, mark and Others y Greece Collection of Decisions of the European 
Commission on Human Rights, Vol 25 p80 
3, Emphasis added 
4. Mirfieid p70 et seq. See Rv Sarni 1979) 2 All ER 12221 [1310) AC 402 
326 
(iii) The Relationshijý.. bctj2een the Emergency wars Legislation 
and Non-Scheduled Offences 
When the Diplock Commission first conceived the concept of the 
"Scheduled Offences" they did so on the basic that the offences 
were "commonly committed" by terrorists. However like any other 
country Northern Ireland has its share of, cay, murders or 
manslaughters which owe nothing to terrorism, Since the whole 
thrust of the Emergency Powers legislation was directed towards 
combatting terrorism, it is clearly inappropriate that a domestic 
murder or some equally obviously non-terrorist crime should be 
tried before a Diplock Court and subject to the special rules of 
evidence presently under discussion. The. Northern Ireland 
(Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 accordingly provided ` that the 
Attorney General could certify that certain offences should not 
be treated as scheduled and when this was done the offences fell 
to be dealt with as ordinary crimes and subject to the ordinary 
rules of procedure although Section 8 continues to apply in 
relation to the admissiblity of statements even when the 
scheduled offence is "certified out". 2 
Inevitably the scheduled and non-scheduled offences will overlap 
and there will be anomalies. Complaints, have also boon voiced 
that the Attorney General fails to "certify out" appropriate 
cases so that the prosecution can take advantage of the absence 
of a jury and lower standards of admissibility in the Diplock 
courts. 
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Only one reported case has touched on this area, and then only 
indirectly, this being Rv McBrten and Harman 119§41 Ni 280 a 
non-Diplock trial for murder. Harman had been arrested for the 
murder of her husband. The murder would appear to have been 
claimed by the I. R. A. and presumably for this reason Mrs Harman's 
arrest was carried out under Section 12 of the Prevention of 
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976. Following her arrest 
the accused was taken to Castlereagh where she was held for three 
days and questioned five times making two written statements and 
a number of verbal admissions. Objection was taken to the 
admission of this evidence at her trial and since the crime was 
non-scheduled the matter fell to be determined by the common law. 
Various arguments were put forward in support of the defonce' 
argument that the statements had been obtained by oppression. In 
particular it was argued that for a person suspected of a non- 
scheduled offence to be brought to Castlereagh at all was 
oppressive, in the same way as the circumstances of interrogation 
at Holywood were held to be oppressive in Ry Flynn and Jeonard. 4 
Having reviewed the leading English authorities, Carswell J. had 
little difficulty in rejecting this argument along with the 
others put forward in support of the claim of oppression. 
Having found that the statements-wore admiscibio an, a matter of 
law, Carcwoll J. then had to decide whether to exercise his 
discretion to exclude them as having been unfairly obtained. The 
defence argued that Mrs Harman's arrest under section 12 was 
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invalid and unlawful as was her consequent detention. If she had 
been arrested at common law she would have been brought before a 
Magistrates' Court as coon as practicable after 24 hours had 
elapsed from the time of her arrest. If this had happened she 
would not have been in a position to make certain of the later 
statements. It was also alleged that the police had been in 
breach of the Judges Rules by failing to charge the accused when 
they had sufficient evidence to do so. All these arguments were 
rejected by the learned judge whose conclusions included the 
following. ti) The statements, both verbal and written were 
voluntarily made and part of a "continuing process of 
revelation". (ii) The police were acting in good faith In 
arresting Mrs Harman under the 1976 Act. They might have been 
right or wrong in their decision to do so but his Lordship was 
satisfied that the police did not act with the deliberate 
intention of putting the accused as a disadvantage, or with the 
object to wear down or break her will. 
r 
Mcßrien and H? rman is hardly a landmark in the law of confessions 
but It is of importance as one of the few recent Northern Ireland 
decisions concerning the common law tests of voluntariness and 
the absence of oppression and the exercise of judicial discretion 
in a common law catting, Carswell Pa decision is entirely in 
accordance with contemporary English case law. 
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9.7 The Baker Rg+ the northern n(, nr (ync 
Provisions) Act 1987_ 
The Westminster government continued to be keen to normalise the 
legal position in Northern Ireland as far as possible and in 
April 1983 Sir George Baker was appointed to review the operation 
of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 with the 
following terms of reference; 
"Accepting that the temporary emergency powers are 
necessary to combat terrorist violence, and taking 
into account Lord Jellicoe's review of the working 
of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Act 1976 as- it affects Northern 
Ireland, to examine the operation of the Northern, 
Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 in order 
to dertermine whether its provisions strike the 
right balance between the need, on the one hand to 
maintain as fully as possible the liberties of the 
individual and on the other to provide the 
security forces and the courts with adequate 
powere to enable them to protect the public from 
current and foreseeable incidence. (sic) of 
terrorist crime; and to report. " 
The Baker review wau published in 1984.1 
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Broadly stated, Baker took the view that circumstances in 
Northern Ireland left little room for manoeuvre and that it would 
be irresponsible to abandon the emergency powers entirely. His 
report was long and comprehensive, and dealt with all aspects of 
the legislation, although the view has been stated that its value 
is diminished by inconsistent interpretation of the terms of 
reference. 2 
Baker came down in favour of the retention of single-judge 
Diplock courts for the trial of scheduled offences but considered 
that there should be many more scheduled offences which might be 
"certified out" and hence tried before non-Diplock courts. 3 
From time to time the allegation had been made that the Diplock 
judges were becoming "case hardened". Baker defined this to mean 
that the judge "has heard it all before; therefore he does not 
believe the accused; therefore he is or becomes prosecution 
minded". '`' While the possibility of this happening was 
acknowledged, the judges themselves recognised the danger and 
Baker rejected the allegation of "case hardening". 
When he turned to the question of evidence, and for present 
purposes the aspect of greatest interest is evidence in relation 
to statements by the accused, Baker explicitly endorsed the need 
to gain evidence through interrogation and he reviewed, with 
general approval, the way in which the Northern Irish courts had 
operated Section 8 (and its predecessor Section 6). He rejected 
the criticism that the combined effect of Rv McCormick and &v 
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Milne I had been to erode the minimum standard of Article 3 and 
Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and stated his own view that "no physical violence of any 
degree would now be tolerated and I cannot believe that violence 
could occur, unless the accused was the aggressor. " He also 
strongly favoured the tape recording of, interviews. 7 
As Lord Gardiner had done some years previously, Sir George Baker 
argued that the discretion under which the Northern Irish Judges 
had rejected confessions not specifically excluded under the 
statute should itself be placed on a statutory footing. Baker 
noted "Here as elsewhere it is very much a question of how the 
Act looks. The difference between what is said in the section 
and what really happens in court is said, and I have some 
sympathy with this view, to produce vagueness and complexity 
which confuses ordinary folk, More importantly it-gives 
opportunity for exploitation, exaggeration and half truths for 
propaganda purposes, " *3 Baker also observed thatt 
In recent years few confessions have been 
excluded. It is impossible to say in every case 
whether they were rejected in the exercise of the 
judges' discretion but certainly 40%-45% were, 
Should anyone seek to use this as an argument to 
support a suggestion that judges are case-hardened 
I emphasise that allegations of physical ill- 
treatment have virtually ceased since the 
implementation of Bennett's recommendations in 
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1979. Counsel tell me that fights with 
allegations of confessions obtained by violence 
are a thing of the past. " I 
Baker recommended that Section 8 should be redrafted to exclude 
violence and to include the judges' discretion, 
The legislative answer to the Baker Report was the Northern 
Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1987 which made various 
amendments to the 1978 Act based on Baker's recommendations. 10 
The general thrust of the 1987 Act was, as might be expected, 
towards "normalising" the procedures used against terrorism. The 
1987 Act provided a new Section 8 of the 1978 Act in the 
following terms: 
80) In any criminal proceedings for a scheduled 
offence, or for two or more offences at least one 
of which is a scheduled offence, a statement made 
by the Accused may be given in evidence by the 
prosecution in so far as- 
(a) it is relevant to any matter in issue in the 
proceedings, and 
(b) it is not excluded by the court in pursuance 
of subsection (2) below or in the exercise of its 
discretion referred to in subsection (3) below 
(and has not been rendered inadmissible by virtue 
of such a direction as is mentioned in subsection 
(2)(M) below). 
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(2) Where in any such proceedings- 
(a) the prosecution proposes to give, or (as the 
case may be) has given in evidence a statement 
made by the accused, and 
(b) prima facie evidence is adduced that the 
accused was subject to torture, to inhuman or 
degrading treatment, or to any violence or threat 
of violence (whether or not amounting to torture) 
in order to induce him to make the statement, 
then, unless the prosecution satisfies the court 
that the statement was not obtained by so 
subjecting the accused in the manner indicated by 
that evidence, the court shall do one of the 
following things, namely- 
ti) in the case of a statement proposed to be 
given in evidence, exclude the statement; 
(ii) in the case of a statement already received 
in evidence, continue the trial disregarding the 
statement; or 
(iii) in either case, direct that the trial shall 
be restarted before a differently constituted 
court (before which the statement in question 
shall be inadmissible). 
(3) It is hereby declared that, in the case of 
any statement made by the accused and not obtained 
by so subjecting him as mentioned in subsection 
(2)(b) above, the court in any such proceedings as 
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are mentioned in subsection (1) above has a 
discretion to do one of the things mentioned in 
subsection (2)(i) to (iii) above if it appears to 
the court that it is appropriate to do so in order 
to avoid unfairness to the accused or otherwise in 
the interests of justice. 
(4) This section does not apply to a summary 
trial. 
Although the new Section 8 appears to broaden the range of 
conduct which makes confessions inadmissible by adding 
specifically "violence or threat of violence" as a ground for 
exclusion, the difference is more apparent than real, Clearly 
the new provision would strike at the "certain roughness of 
treatment" which the European Commission regarded as acceptable 
in the Greek Case and which Lord rust ice McGonigal was prepared 
to accept in Rv McCormick and Others, but the Courts themselves 
had already prohibited violence in RY Q'ýIallTrani. '' it has also 
been pointed out that the new Section 8 leaves some important 
issues unresolved, notably whether and to what extent it 
precludes psychological or mental pressure on the accused. 12. 
Another unresolved issue is the effect of threats of violence 
against third parties (such as members of the accused's family). 
With all due deference to Lord Gardiner and Sir George Baker, the 
present writer, being a Scot and used to the broad application of 
judicial discretion in many contexts, finds it difficult to 
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understand what purpose is served by placing this-discretion on a 
statutory basis. The Northern Irish courts had quickly held 
themselves to retain their discretion to exclude statements and 
had exercised that discretion in a wise and careful way, treading 
the delicate line between allowing the common law rules to re- 
establish themselves by the back door and allowing an unaccep- 
table degree of latitude to the security forces, 
It has been argued that the statutory discretion now available to 
the Judges in'Northorn Ireland is wider that that enjoyed by the 
English judges under PACE, since in the former case the court may 
exclude the statement "if it appears to the court that it is 
appropriate to do so in order to avoid unfairness to the accused 
or otherwise in the interests of Justice, " while under PACE the 
test is that the evidence "would have such an adverse effect on 
the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit 
it. " 13 The present writer is unable to see any material, 
practical difference between these two provisions. He would 
submit that if judicial discretion exists at all, it cannot be 
fettered and exists precisely in order to deal with issues which 
by their nature do not admit of statutory regulation or otherwise 
fall outside the provisions of the existing law. As one eminent 
Scottish judge put it: 
"The purpose of the £common law] discretion is 
that it should be sufficiently wide and flexible 
to be capable of being exercised in a variety of 
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circumstances that may occur from time to time but 
which cannot be foreseen. " 14 
To attempt to put such a discretion on a statutory footing, other 
than perhaps simply to confirm its existence, seems a pointless 
exercise, particularly since the appellate process exists to deal 
with any unwise or inappropriate use of judicial discretion. 
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9.8 The Northern a (Emergency a) Legislation 
Overview and Conclusions 
At the time of drafting this chapter, July 1991, yet another 
attempt to resolve the problems of Northern Ireland has come to 
naught with the failure of the so-called "Brooke Initiative". 
The Loyalist paramilitary organisations have called off a 
ceasefire which they had called during the talks and I. R. A. bombs 
have recently been planted in Preston and London, The situation 
is both familiar and depressing, as is the realisation of the 
extent to which political violence and its consequences has 
become a part of normal life for many of the population in 
Northern Ireland. It is difficult for an outsider to understand 
what lies behind the troubles and it is even more difficult to 
imagine where a solution is likely to be found. It is clear that 
legislation to deal with terrorist violence is-going to be 
required for the foreseeable future, 
It has been pointed out, rightly, that there is an inherent . 
illogicality in trying, on the one hand, to deal with terrorists 
as common criminals and, on the other hand, providing special 
powers and rules for use in terrorist cacao and the Northern 
Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1987 is a further step towards 
the assimilation of terrorism legislation and "ordinary" criminal 
procedure. How much further this process of "normalisation" can 
go is unclear. 
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Although subject to considerble criticism, much of it politically 
motivated, the Diplock Courts appear to have operated in a 
reasonably successful manner and when compared with the alter- 
native of internment are much the lesser of two evils. Such 
courts appear to comply with the minimum standard laid down in 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and they are 
regarded as sufficiently fair to warrant extradition by courts in 
the United States and-the Irish Republic. Even Dermot Walsh has 
to admit, albeit grudgingly, that there would be significant 
problems in returning to trial by jury. 
The absence of a jury is not significant in many cases because 
the defendant pleads guilty. Moreover in a trial before a jury 
the admissibility of a disputed confession normally falls to be 
determined by the judge before the matter reaches the Jury. 
Although allegations of "case hardening" have been made against 
the Diplock courts, no such allegations have ever been proved. 
The special rules on admissiblity of confessions appear to have, 
in the words of Hogan and Walker, "attained their objective of 
feeding sufficient evidence into the court system without 
reliance on witnesses" and this has been achieved without either 
official resort to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the 
European Convention or abrogation of the minimum standards of 
legal process under the Convention. 2 There has, however, been a 
cost. While one can dismiss the description of Section 8 as "one 
of the most miechievious and humanly degrading (provisions] ever 
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to appear in the criminal legislation of any country" 3 as both 
extravagant and inaccurate, if not downright foolish, there can 
be no doubt that the reputation and standing of the security 
forces, courts and state were damaged particularly during the 
1970c. 
However, if one lesson is to be learned from the experience of 
Northern Ireland it is the danger of the complacent assumption 
that savage brutality by the forces of law and order in the 
interests of obtaining evidence and intelligence "couldn't happen 
here". It could and it did. While the situation in Northern 
Ireland is complicated by historical and cultural factors absent 
elswhere in Britain, the experiences of the early 1970s show 
beyond peradventure the need for the supervision, whether by 
electronic means or otherwise, of what takes place in police 
stations. It appears that the law in Northern Ireland has now, 
after a very shaky start, reached a reasonable, and above all 
practical, compromise between the need to take dangerous 
terrorists out of circulation and the need to protect civil 
liberties. As far as the present writer is aware, the critics of 
the Emergency Powers legislation have never been able to suggest 
any real alternative to the test of "torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment" which does not involve a real risk of a 
return to the situation in the early 1970s when it was clear that 
the common law test of voluntariness was found wanting. 
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9.9 Rocent Developments 
(i> The Criminal EdeQted Order 
Apart from the brief description of the legal position prior to 
1973, the whole of this chapter has been devoted to matters 
directly concerned with the emergency situation in Northern 
Ireland. The general criminal law of the Province was little 
affected by the emergency provisions, and indeed remained 
virtually untouched throughout the entire period. However recent 
developments have brought about major changes in the general law, 
which in the case of the Criminal Evidence Order may owe more to 
expediency than anything else and it is now proposed to turn away 
from terrorism per se and consider these changes. 
As previously discussed, Section 16 of the 1973 Act (later 
Section 18 of the 1978 Act) brought about a fairly modest 
restriction in the right to silence by requiring a person to 
answer questions concerning his identity and movements and what 
he knows about any recent explosion or other recent incident 
endangering life or concerning any person killed or injured in 
any such explosion or incident. Apart from this, the emergency 
legislation had virtually no effect on the right to silence which 
was broadly similar to the pro-PACE English position. It would 
appear that the Northern Irish judges tended to refrain from 
making adverse comments to juries about the failure to testify 
and also from drawing adverse inferences in cases where they cat 
as a tribunal of fact. I 
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It is therefore somewhat surprising that the most drastic cur- 
tailment of the right to silence in the United Kingdom was 
brought about not specifically in the context of terrorism, but 
rather in the context of the reform of the general Northern Irish 
law of criminal evidence and procedure. The Criminal Evidence 
(Northern Ireland) Order 1988, : which pre-dated the report of 
the (English) Working Group on the Right of Silence, effectively 
abolished the right to silence in all criminal proceedings in 
Northern Ireland. The suggestion has been made ' that the 
operative factor in the decision to move on the right to silence 
in Northern Ireland was the upsurge in terrorist violence in the 
summer of 1988. 
In any event, whatever the reason for it, ' this major change in 
the law was brought about not, as one might have expected, by 
lengthy and detailed consideration and parliamentary debate but 
by an Order in Council introduced in parliament as a "reserved 
matter" under Schedule 3 of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 
1971 4 The Order, which was not preceded by a proposal, 
progressed from draft to law in the startling period of three and 
a half weeks. One effect of this procedure was that the Order 
had to deal with the general criminal law since legislation 
relating specifically to terrorism would have required a Bill in 
Parliament. 
The government claimed that the propossle in the Order were 
brought forward only after the most careful thought. Their 
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position was explained by the Secretary of State in the following 
terms: 
"For some time the government has been reviewing 
the law on criminal evidence in Northern Ireland 
in the light of the grave challenge from 
continuing terrorist violence and from other 
serious crime, particularly racketeering. They 
have had before them a formidable body of 
persuasive evidence for change, including the 
acknowledged difficulties faced by the police in 
bringing to justice hardened, professional 
criminals, often assited by able legal advisers, 
who are thoroughly trained in resisting police 
14 
questioning, and in the case of terrorists, who 
even publish in their news sheets detailed 
instructions on techniques for resisting 
questioning under the heading 'Whatever you say, 
say nothing'. ... These practices are now widely 
recognised and imitated throughout the criminal 
elements in Northern Ireland. " 5 
Later in the debate Mr King added: 
"... I was asked whether I have any figures, The 
R, U. C. informs me that of all those detained for 
questioning in connection with serious crimes, 
including terrorist offences in Northern Ireland, 
just under half refuse to answer any substantive 
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questions while in police custody. Many of those 
people will not answer any questions. It is clear 
that in too many cases justice is being 
thwarted. "'- 
The legislative procedure adopted, as well as the terms of the 
Order, received a sharp response from the Standing Advisory 
Commission on Human Rights, a body established by law to advise 
the Secretary of State on matters relating to human rights in 
Northern Ireland. 7 The Commission were disturbed that they had 
not been consulted and had only learned of the publication of the 
Draft Order through the media. They were concerned that the 
Draft Order had been laid before the Home Office Working Group 
(on which the Northern Ireland Office was represented) had 
reported. They were particularly concerned at the fact that the 
matter had not been dealt with by Bill. After calling on the 
government to publish the figures claimed to justify their 
position, the Commission observed: 
"If the purpose of the inference provicione is 
principally to-deal with terrorist finances and 
the 'wall of silence' encountered in interrogating 
persons suspected of terrorist offences, then, as 
'provisions for dealing with terrorism or sub- 
version' are 'excepted' matters for the purpose of 
the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, it 
would in our view be, appropriate for Government to 
proceed by Bill. We note here that the Prevention 
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of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Bill was laid 
before Parliament in November 1988. The Bill 
contained provisions concerned with terrorist 
funds and withholding information which might be 
of material assistance in preventing acts of 
terrorism and apprehending terrorist offenders. 
Arguably, the Bill could have been a vehicle for 
introducing inference provisions. This would not 
have precluded use of the Order procedure for 
amending the general criminal law of Northern 
Ireland, which is a 'reserved' matter under the 
1973 Act, should this have been thought desirable 
following full consultation in light of the 
conclusions of the working party. In all the 
circumstances, the doubt remains that the Order 
procedure without a Proposal was used to as to 
minimise the opportunity for public debate. " 0 
The Commission discussed at some length the reports of the CLRC 
and the RCCP and noted the difference of views. Their own 
conclusion was stark: 
"These differing views of the CLRC and a majority 
or the RCCP underscore our point that the decision 
to lay the Draft Order before Parliament before 
the working group had reported to the Home 
Secretary was a mistake, In our opinion this 
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decision will not have helped maintain confidence 
in Northern Ireland's administration. " 9 
Broadly stated, the Order permits the drawing of adverse 
inferences from silence in four basic situations: where the 
accused on being questioned or charged fails to mention any fact 
relied on in his defence; where the accused fails without good 
reason to give evidence at his trial; where the accused fails to 
account for any object, substance or mark on his person, clothing 
or footwear or otherwise in his. possession or in the place where 
he is arrested; and where the accused fails to account for his 
presence at a , place at or about the time an offence was 
committed. In all cases as well as drawing an adverse inference 
the court may treat the accused's failure or refusal as, or as 
capable of amounting to, corroboration of any evidence given 
against him in relation to which his failure or refusal in 
material. 
Article 3 of the Order allows the court when deciding inter alle 
whether there is a case to answer or whether the accused is 
guilty of the offence charged to have regard to evidence that the 
accused 
"(a) at any time before he was charged with the 
offence, on being questioned by a constable trying 
to discover whether and by whom the offence had 
been committed, failed to mention any fact relied 
on in his defence in those proceedings; or 
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(b) on being charged with the offence or 
officially informed that he might be prosecuted 
for it, failed to mention any such fact, 
being a fact which in the circumstances existing 
at the time the accused could reasonably have been 
expected to mention when so questioned, charged or 
informed as the case may be... " 
A new form of police caution has been introduced: 
"You do not have to say anything unless you wish 
to do so but I must warn you that if you fail to 
mention any fact which you rely on in your defence 
in court, your failure to take this opportunity to 
mention it may be treated in court as supporting 
any relevant evidence against you: If you do wish 
to nay anything, what you say may be given in 
evidence. '° 
Article 4 permits the drawing of inferences from a failure by the 
accused to give evidence at the trial, Under Article 4(2) the 
court must warn accused persons of the effect of a refusal to 
testify and the following terms have been approved by the Supreme 
Court judges: 
"The court, as it is required to do by law, is 
about to call on you to give evidence in your own 
defence. I am also required by law to tell you 
that if you refuse to come into the witness box to 
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be sworn or if, having been sworn, you refuse, 
without good reason, to answer any question, then 
the court (or the jury) in deciding whether you 
are guilty or not guilty may take into account 
against you to the extent that it considers proper 
your refusal to give evidence or to answer any 
questions and of relevant] your refusal may also 
be regarded by the court (or the jury) as 
corroboration of the evidence given against you, 
I now call upon you to come to the witness box to 
be sworn and to give evidence in your defence. " 11 
i 
Article 4(5) specifically provides that the article does not 
render the accused compellable to give evidence on his own 
behalf, but it scarcely needs to be said that there will be 
considerable pressure on the accused to testify. While 
inferences may not be drawn if the accused fails to testify "for 
good cause" Article 4(6) provides that any refusal shall be taken 
to be without good cause unless the accused is entitled to refuse 
to answer by virtue of any statutory provision or on the ground 
of privilege or unless the court in the exercise of its general 
discretion excuses him from ancwering. 
It would also appear that the prosecution may now comment on the 
failure of the accused to testify since Article 400) repeals the 
prohibition on prosecutorial comment formerly contained in 
349 
Section 1(b) of the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Act 
1923.1' 
Under Article 5 an adverse inference may be drawn if the accused 
fails to account for the presence on his person, clothing or 
footwear "or otherwise in his possession" or in any place in 
which he is at the time of his arrest "any object, substance or 
mark or ... any mark on any such object". There are certain 
provisos before inferences may be drawn. A constable must 
"reasonably believe" that the presence of the object, substance 
or mark may be attributable to the accused's participation in the 
commission of an offence, the constable must inform the accused 
of his belief and he must request the accused to account for the 
presence of the object, substance or mark. 
Article 6 makes a similar provision, and applies the same 
provisos, where the accused fails to account for his presence, 
having been found by a constable at or about the time the offence 
for which he was arrested is alleged to have been committed and 
the constable "reasonably believes" that the accused's presence 
at that place and at that time may be attributable to his 
participation in the commission of the offence, 
Articles 3 and 4 clearly owe their origin to the Eleventh Report 
of the CLRC I-' but Articles 5 and 6 are apparently based on 
Sections 18 and 19 of the Criminal rustico Act 1984 of the Irish 
Republic. It would appear that in the Republic these powore have 
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not been used and it is also noteworthy that they were enacted 
there for a limited period of four years and would cease to 
operate at the conclusion of that period unless there was a 
resolution of each House of the Irish Parliament that they should 
continue in operation. 14 
It would appear that the Standing Advisory Committee on Human 
Rights was not the only body to be unhappy with the Criminal 
Evidence Order. A certain amount of information has "leaked" 
which suggests that the Northern Irish judges were a great deal 
less than enamoured of it. 16 
In court judicial reaction to the 1988 Order has been cautious 
and it has been common for judges to comment that they are not 
prepared to use Article 4 to bolster up a weak case and this has 
occurred in some cases involving possession of firearms and 
explosives where the defendant has remained silent both before 
and at the trial. The view has been taken by certain Judges that 
before an adverse inference can be drawn the weight of the 
prosecution evidence should be "Just ... on the brink of the 
necessary standard of proof. " 16 
On the other hand, in one case where the accused had made a 
qualified admission to the police but refused to give evidence 
the judge took the view that the refusal to give evidence and to 
give substance to the exculpatory part of his admission entitled 
the court to discount that part of the admission. 17 
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In certain other cases, including the infamous murder of the two 
army corporals, the courts appear to have used inferences in a 
manner closer to that presumably intended by Parliment. 10 
The present situation with regard to the drawing of inferences 
from silence is unclear although it is apparent that the order 
has not had the dramatic effect which the government had hoped. 
The Order has only been in force for some two years and as yet 
there has been no opportunity for guidance from the Court of 
Appeal. J. A. Jackson suggests that the courts have to decide 
whether, on the. one hand, the Order "licences drawing whatever 
inferences are logically tenable from silence". In this case, 
while caution could still be advocated there would be no need for 
restrictions such as the "on the brink" standard. On the other 
hand, Jackson suggests, the view might be taken that since the 
Order did not specifically abolish the right to silence, the 
right should still be taken into account as a legal principle and 
that whatever the logic of the situation it should not be legally 
proper to draw inferences unless the prosecution evidence is on 
the brink of the necessary standard. 
Jackson also suggests that the Order is neither fair nor effec- 
tive in achieving the end of encouraging those suspected of 
terrorist activity to answer questions when there was not enough 
evidence to convict them. It is not fair because the cautions 
that are to be. given induce criminal suspects to respond to 
questioning at a stage when a reliable record may not be able to 
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be produced of what they have said and when there may be no 
evidence against them. It is not effective becauce the percons 
to whom it was intended to apply are the very people who will 
wait to see how judicial attitudes develop and in the absence of 
any guidance on what matters may be taken into account in 
determining what inferences "appear proper" it is still open to 
the triers of fact to take account of the right to silence. 
The present writer respectfully agrees with Mr Jackson's view and 
would add that as well as being ill-conceived and obscure the 
Order smacks of pandering to police lobbying without any real 
thought being given to the consequences. Further Judicial 
decisions, and in particular decisions of the Court of Appeal, 
must be awaited before firm conclusions can be drawn, but in the 
meantime, as Jackson neatly puts it: 
"The right of silence has been regarded as a 
sacred cow, but the lesson for those who view 
abolition or curtailment of the right as a panacea 
for the conviction of offenders is that they may 
be just as guilty of putting their faith in a 
sacred cow, " 19 
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(ii) Thg Police and Criminal P ýNgrthern Ireland) Order 
1959 
The above Order has introduced into Northern Ireland virtually 
the same regime as was introduced in England and Wales by PACE 
and its associated Codes are in very similar terms to the revised 
English versions. Since PACE has already been discussed earlier 
in this work, Ia few brief supplementary comments will suffice. 
The provisions in the Order relating to the treatment of persons 
in custody are practically the came as under PACE although the 
definition of a "solicitor" is restricted to a person qualified 
to practice under the Solicitors Act 1974 or the Solicitors 
(Northern Ireland) Order 1976 and there is no provision for the 
establishment of duty solicitor schemes. 2 
Persons detained under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Act 1989 are excluded from the PACE regime. However 
such persons are subject to the safeguards under the Northern 
Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1987 which provides rights of 
intimation and access to legal advice broadly similar to those 
provided under the Order. 
In relation to confession evidence, Articles 74 and 76 of the 
Order are the equivalents of Sections 76 and 78 of PACE 
respectively. However neither of these Articles applies in 
relation to scheduled offences. Article 74 has no effect "in 
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relation to criminal proceedings to which Section 8 of the 
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 applies" and 
Article 76 does not affect the admissiblity of a statement under 
Section 8 of the 1978 Act. 
The net result is that the Northern Ireland courts will have to 
continue to apply different tests of admiooiblity depending on 
whether they are dealing with scheduled or non-scheduled offences 
although in practical-terms the differences are slight, a 
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Chapter 10 Inquisitorial and Adversarial Systemar. A Comparative 
View, 
10.1 Introduction. 
The procedure followed in the criminal courts of the western 
countries is conventionally divided into two types, inquisitorial 
and adversarial. This division, although convenient, is never 
absolute (and is probablyoverrated anyway) since every legal 
system displays some characteristics of both types of procedure. 
Indeed one respected French commentator, A. Esmein, claims 
"mixed" procedure, in which he includes the procedure of his own 
country, as a third distinct system. ' More recently the 
suggestion has been made that the appropriate terms are 
"adversary" to denote the Anglo-American model and "non- 
adversary" to denote the continental European one. 3However in 
this work the traditional nomenclature is retained and the modern 
systems are referred to as inquisitorial or adversarial and it is 
accepted that they will be only predominantly of the one type or 
the other. 
The essential difference between the two systems is, as Lord 
Devlin has pointed out, apparent from their names - adversarial 
procedure is a trial of strength, inquisitorial is an inquiry: 
"The question in the first is: are the shoulders 
of the party on whom in laid the burden of proof 
,., strong enough to carry and discharge it? In 
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the second the question is: what is the truth of 
the matter? " 3 
The traditional view is that under inquisitorial procedure the 
inquiry is a continual process. There is, at least in the case 
of serious crimes, supervision of the investigative process by'a 
judicial official who is responsible for the preparation of a 
dossier embodying the results of his inquiries, including the 
questioning of the accused and the witnesses, which is then used 
as the basis of the case at the trial stage. The trial itself is 
seen an the culmination of the investigation and it follows that 
the judge will be "in the driving seat" to a much greater extent 
than his adversarial counterpart, assuming responsibility for the 
4 
calling and questioning of the witnesses in a way which is 
entirely alien in adversarial procedure. 
The French system is, despite Eemein'c view, often regarded as 
the classic model of modern inquisitorial procedure, and indeed 
the French Code d'Instructon Criminelle of 1808 was the prototype 
for the rest of the continent. 
Under adversarial procedure, the trial is the centrepiece and 
everthing that goes before it is a preparation for the 
battlefield. The preparation and presentation of evidence lies 
with the parties and the judge acts as a neutral referee in a 
contest. He has little or no concern with the evidence-gathering 
process and will generally know nothing about the case other than 
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the evidence which the parties lead before him, his right to call 
or examine witnesses on his own initiative being very limited. 
Modern English procedure is almost wholly adversarial, while 
Scottish procedure is adversarial at the trial stage but displays 
definite features of inquisitorial methods, particularly judicial 
examination and the practice of the Procurator Fiscal, the public 
prosecutor, conducting a confidential investigation in serious 
cases culminating in the submission of a "precognition" to Crown 
Office before a case is Indicted. 
The earlier discussion of the proposals for the interrogation of 
suspects before a neutral third party I leads naturally to a 
consideration of the inquisitorial system of procedure. Even 
though there may be no foreseeable prospects of the wholesale 
introduction of continental methods into British courts, the 
growing importance of the European dimension, as well as the 
outcry which followed the Guildford and Birmingham scandals, 
means that such method should not be ignored. Indeed, on the 
contrary, they should be examined to see what lessons can be 
learned. The writer would, however, recall the cautionary note 
sounded earlier in this work -a system which works well in one 
country will not necessarily work equally wall when exported. 
Outside continental Europe, the French cyctem is the best known, 
and the beet documented in English. The German cyctem, although 
stemming from a common root with the French has atypical features 
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of its own which render it less suitable for comparative 
discussion, particularly the abolition in 1975 of the Unterr- 
suchungsrichter, the office equivalent to the French , 
fuge 
d'instruction, the-latter being one of the most characteristic 
and widely discussed elements in modern inquisitorial procedure. 
Germany law also has the so-called Legalitbtsprinzip or 
"principle of legality" whereby the German public prosecutor "is 
obligated, unless otherwise provided by law, to take action 
against any activities which may be prosecuted ... to the extent 
that sufficient factual particulars may be obtained. " 6 
Accordingly in this chapter the model is largely the French 
system. 
In preparing an analytical model for the purpose of comparing 
four highly disparate systems of procedure, B. S. Ingraham makes 
the pertinent point that despite their diversity all the systems 
of procedure share the same essential skeletal structure 
comprising intake, screening, charging the accused and 
safeguarding his . rights, adjudicating, sanctioning, and appeal. 
Nonetheless there are important practical and philosophical , 
differences and differences of emphasis between the two types of 
procedure, not least in the position of the accused and the 
manner in which the court may treat him. Inquisitorial systems 
emphasice abstract truth and substantive justice, believing that 
justice is impossible without the truth. Adversarial systems on 
the other hand stress the autonomy and dignity of the litigant 
(even if he is morally in the wrong) and insist on a fair fight 
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under procedural rules that are so devised that there is a fair 
distribution of wins and losses regardless of merit, r- 
However it has been argued that the theory is becoming incrcas- 
ingly separated from the reality, that there is in fact very 
little difference between modern inquisitorial and adversarial 
systems and in particular that the notion of judicial supervision 
of the investigative process is a myth. Although this point of 
view had previously been advanced 7 its clearest and most 
unequivocal statement was by Goldstein and Marcus in 1978. ' 
Their views received a sharp response from Langbein and Weinreb, 
9 and a detailed refutation from Volkmann-Schluck. ° Goldstein 
and Marcus can rightly be criticised for at least apparently 
assuming "that the French procurcur and German Staatsanwalt are 
simply district attornies who speak a foreign language; that the 
French police fudiciaire and the German Polizei are just the 
homicide squad of an American city dressed in different uniforms; 
that the fuge d'instruction, the Richter and the American trial 
judge are, beneath the robe, one and the same. " In particular 
they seem to miss the vital point that the continental prosecutor 
will be a person of judicial status who, as a state official, 
will be expected to be neutral and bound to ascertain not only 
incriminating but also exonerating circumstances. 
Nevertheless, Goldstein and Marcus's essential thesis, that in 
France and other continental countries ordinary criminal matters 
are routinely investigated only by the police and that 
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prosecutorial decisions usually rely entirely on evidence 
gathered by the police, has not been convincingly refuted. 
Indeed, Scottish practice would appear to offer support to their 
thesis since, despite the theoretical supervision of the police 
by the Procurator Fiscal, the vast majority of summary complaints 
are initiated on the basis simply of a police report with no 
further inquiry. 11 
The views of Goldstein and Marcus are also to an extant supported 
by two English writers, Lidstone and Early, who, in an article 
written before the passing of PACE, attributed the erosion of the 
distinction between adversarial and inquisitorial methods to the 
activities of the police: 
"In fact it is arguable that the patterns of 
policing are the same in either system and it is 
police practices which shape or change the chaps 
of the system producing a different system in 
practice whether in theory it be accusatiorial or 
inquisitorial, It follows that both systems are 
converging, following a similar pattern of police 
illegalities being condoned by and absorbed into 
the system despite running counter to central 
elements within those systems. In both systems 
the single most important pressure producing 
change is the need to interrogate suspects and the 
increasing recognition of this need by the judi- 
ciary and/or the legislature which facilitates 
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interrogation by the police by granting greater 
powers of detention or arrest for questioning and 
allos the police to exert a measure of autonomy 
from judicial supervision. " 12 
The authors argued that various developments in France in the 
early 1980s, together with the power of detention under Section 2 
of the 1980 Act in Scotland and the general erosion of suspects 
rights in England before PACE 
may cause us to consider whether the label 
'accusatiorial' or 'inquisitorial' has any meaning 
at the pro-trial stage and to ask whether the 
right to silence, although in theory defined 
differently in those systems, does not also in 
practice converge so as to mean as little to the 
accused whatever his nationality and however one 
describes the system into which he is drawn. " 
It is a simple and inescapable fact that whatever provisions are 
made in Codes or statutes, the initial investigation of criminal 
matters, (if not the entire inquiry) will, in all procedural 
systems of which the writer is aware, be carried out by the 
police. 
This aspect will be considered further later but before doing oo, 
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Adversarial procedure is known to have developed earlier than 
inquisitorial, and it certainly existed in a fairly sophisticated 
form in Republican Rome, involving popular accusation and oral,, 
public proceedings before courts consisting of a presiding 
praetor and between 32 and 75 Jurymen who rendered the decision 
when the speeches of the parties had been completed and all the 
evidence was in. The exact details of the procedures followed 
are not entirely clear, and there was never a general system of 
criminal procedure since each law contained special provisions 
relative to the formal accusation, the proof and the prosecution 
of the particular crime concerned. However it appears that there 
was considerable concern for the defence of the accused, and 
there was nothing calculated to bring about a confession. Ecmoin 
suggests that even where the accused confessed in open court 
there still had to be a trial before judgment could be entered 
against him. Although under certain conditions a slave might be 
tortured, a freeman could not. 
Although Roman procedure always remained prodominantly 
adversarial, even to the time of Justinian, inquisitorial 
elements began to develop under the emperors. As Ecmein puts it, 
inquisitorial procedure "agrees with a centralising and despotic 
power. " The judge had to take a more active part in the 
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discovery of the truth, the accused was now subjected to torture 
and the examination by the magistrate was now directed more 
towards the procuring of a confession. 
With the decline in liberty and the emergence of imperial 
despotism, Roman adversarial procedure began to decay and 
eventually matters degenerated to the point where the system of 
popular prosecution became little more than legalised blackmail. 
Such strong measures had to be taken against professional 
accusers that all private complaints, were effectively discouraged 
and official involvement in the discovery of crime increased 
greatly. 
Up to the thirteenth century, procedurp, throughout Europe, 
including England, remained primarily adversarial in nature. 
However, from the latter part of that century, inquisitorial 
procedure as a system in its own right began to spread through 
the Continent. The system can be said to have begun in Canon 
criminal procedure in 1215 when Innocent III persuaded the 
Lateran council to make modifications in Church procedure, which' 
until then had been modelled on early Roman adversarial methods. 
After 1215 it became the duty of the Judge to make a secret 
investigation of the facts in every case in which he received a 
complaint that an offence had been committed and also in every 
case in which there were rumours that an individual subject to 
the ecclesiastical courts had committed a crime. The accused 
could be examined in secret and on oath and he did have a limited 
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opportunity to defend himself since the names and depositions of 
the witnesses (who would also be examined on oath) were 
communicated to him. If the judge's investigation indicated that 
the accused was guilty, he could be punished. 
Inquisitorial procedure was first introduced into lay courts in 
Northern Italy and from there it spread to France, Germany and 
other European courts, England alone avoiding its advance. By 
the sixteenth century, adversarial procedure was, for practical 
purposes, extinct in Continental Europe. 
Esmein identifies the two predominant features of inquisitorial 
procedure at this time as (a) the secret inquiry to discover the 
culprit and (b) the employment of torture to obtain hin 
confession. As noted above, the use of torture to extract 
confessions had begun in the Roman Empire. It underwent a 
revival at the end of the twelfth century when it began to 
replace ordeals as a method of proof. By the end of the 
fourteenth century torture for this purpose had become-general 
practice and virtually a fundamental institution of inquisitorial 
criminal procedure 
There were also a number of other typical features. Detection 
and prosecution were both performed by the state. The character 
of the judge had shifted from that of an arbiter"chonsn by the 
parties to a representative of the ruler with an exclusive right 
to administer justice. The Judge was not limited to deciding on 
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evidence laid before him by the parties . He proceeded with the 
inquiry of his own accord and following certain rules. In other 
words, within the limits set by the law, it was the function of 
the Judge to search for evidence and the inquiry was not a 
confrontation between two parties. To quote Ecmein again, "The 
open duel between accuser and accused is replaced by the 
insidious attack of the judge. " 
Inquisitorial procedure also produced the idea of the right of 
appeal to a higher judge and led to the system of legal proofs, 
both seen as counterbalancing the powers of the judge. In the 
case of legal proofs, the fudge could not convict unless he had 
before him certain kinds and quantities of evidence, but on the 
other hand, if he did have such evidence before him he was 
required to convict, irrespective of his personal opinion. 
In France inquisitorial procedure was enacted into law by 
ordonnances in 1498 and 1539 and definitively codified by the 
Ordonnance Criminalle of 1670, Although this latter statute is 
one of the greatest watersheds in European criminal procedure, it 
legitimised the continuation of practices of quite horrifying 
barbarity. A trial court which was in doubt about its verdict 
could order the "preparatory" torture of an accused. "In the 
perplexity in which judges find themselves, when they coo very 
strong presumptions against the accused, and when all the means 
of proof are exhausted, they are driven to the resource of the 
preparatory torture. " The Ordonnance did restrict this power 
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somewhat, Title XIX, Article i provided that the corpus delictt 
must have been established and there must have been "considerable 
proof". If the accused did confess under torture he had to be 
interrogated again, without torture, to see if he stuck to the 
confession. There were also provisions permitting appeal and 
preventing the repetition of torture. On the other hand the 
system of torture "under reservation of proofs" was allowed to 
continue. Under this system, in effect, an accused who had 
successfully resisted torture without confessing, and thus could 
not be convicted of the offence with which he was charged, could 
again be tortured to justify the infliction of a lesser penalty. 2 
However, the 1670 Ordonnance is the ultimate statement of pure 
Inquisitorial procedure and it governed French practice down to 
the Revolution, some of its elements still being relevant today. 
The core of the procedure under the Ordonnance was the pre- 
liminary phase, the instruction. Its object was de preparer, 
rechercher, ordonner et composer tout co qul auf necessaire pour 
parvenir a la condamnation ou a 1'absolution do 1'accusd. The 
whole purpose of the instruction was to obtain sufficient 
evidence in order to satisfy the system of legal proofs, by 
which, as previously noted, the trial court was required to 
convict, irrespective of personal opinion, if presented with a 
sufficient quantum of proof. 0 
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Offences were usually brought to the attention of the lieutenant 
criminal, as the examining magistrate was then known, either by 
private individuals or by the procureur du rof. Once the 
lieutenant was satisfied that a crime had taken place, he would 
begin a secret investigation to discover the person responsible. 
Witnesses were heard secretly and separately and whatever they 
said would be taken down in writing. During the instruction the 
intersts of the prosecution were represented by the procurour du 
roi who had access to the case papers at any time and who was 
consulted in all important decisions. 
Once the identity of the likely culprit was established, he would 
be brought before the lieutenant criminel for interrogation. 
This would usually be the first he heard of the accusation 
against him. The interrogation would be under oath and was one 
of the most important parts of the entire instruction. The 
lieutenant was directed to give special attention to it "in order 
to obtain the truth through the fog with which the guilty 
individual seeks to surround it. " Moreover, in most cases, the 
heavier sentences could not be pronounced unless the accused had 
confessed. The interrogation took place in secret, with only the 
magistrate, his clerk and the accu3ed being present. The accused 
was prohibited from consulting counsel at this stage and, in the 
case of capital crimes, at any other stage of the proceedings. 
The interrogation could be repeated as often as the lieutenant 
though necessary. The result of the interrogations was reduced 
to writing. 
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Once the accused had been interrogated, the witneosec were again 
brought before the magistrate for recollement when their prior 
depositions would be read to therm and they would be asked if they 
persisted in their testimony or had anything to add or change. 
After recoIlement, the accused would be confronted with the 
witnesses and the lieutenant would read the depositions to the 
accused in the witnesses' hearing. This was the accusod's only 
chance to object to the witnesses or their depositions, although 
witnesses were unlikely to change their evidence after 
recollement since they would then be liable to proceedings for 
perjury, 
Once the preliminary procedure was finished, the case was said to 
be instruct and in theory it passed from the hands of the 
lieutenant criminal to the procureur du roc for any final motion 
he might make, and then to the reporting judge whose duty it was 
to analyse the proceedings and exhibit the results to the trial 
court. In practice, however, cases were frequently reported by 
the lieutenant himself which, of course, meant that the accused 
was left entirely at the mercy of the magistrate who had 
conducted the entire investigation and without the benefit of any 
impartial evaluation of the results of the instruction. 
Under the system of legal proofs there was, as Ploocowo puts it, 
no life in the trial procedure. Apart from a final interrogation 
of the accused by the presiding judge, the trial court neither 
saw witnesses nor heard evidence. All it was required to 
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determine was whether the evidence gathered during the 
instruction satisfied the legal requirements of a complete proof. 
If it did the judges were required to convict the accused. If 
the requirements for a complete proof were not satisfied, but the 
evidence was nonetheless substantial, the accused might, as 
already noted, with some very limited safeguards, be subjected to 
"preparatory" torture with a view to extorting a confession. 
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(ii) Criticisms end Reform of the 1670 Procedure 
Although the 1670 Ordonnancc had, as Esmein points out, the vital 
but incidental benefit of furnishing a solid foundation for 
criminal law, laying a basis for learned commentaricc and making 
a scientific study of criminal procedure a possibility, it is 
hardly surprising that the procedure outlined in the previous 
section produced appalling miscarriages of Justice and began to 
attract criticism and adverse comment from philosophers, clerics 
and sometimes from judges themselves. Indeed, criticism of the 
brutality of the procedure had been voiced shortly after the 
promulgation of the Ordonnance. 
Initially, criticism tended to be directed towards the use of 
torture rather than the inquisitorial system per to, By the 
eighteenth century, however, the whole system wat under attack 
from the philosophers of the age of enlightenment, notably 
? 4ontesquieu, Aeccaria and Voltairs. The secrecy of nccu atione, 
the abuse of pre-trial detention, the use of torture and other 
weaknesses in the ayetem were all condemned. 
The reformers sought models for a new and better cyotem and two 
particular systems attracted attention, that of republican Rome 
and that of England. For the philosophero the main attraction of 
the latter system war, the uuce of the jury which determined the 
guilt or innocence of the accused on the basis of the evidence 
led before. The public nature of the trial and the idea of 
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committal proceedings by a grand jury before a person could be 
brought to trial were also attractive features. 
By the late eighteenth century the spirit of reform was abroad 
and change was inevitable. Preparatory torture was abolished in 
1780 and preliminary torture went in 1788. In 1789 the 
Constitutional Assembly, in anticipation of further reforms, 
passed a provisional law which inter alia required laymen of good 
repute to assist the investigating magistrate in his preliminary 
operations prior to the interrogation of the accused and 
permitted the accused the assistance of counsel who was present 
at the interrogation of the witnesses and had access to all the 
documents in the case. 
In 1791 English procedure was imported virtually wholecale into 
France but it was an early example of the unwisdom of attempting 
simply to import into one country a system which, while operating 
successfully in its country of origin, was not necessarily suited 
to conditions elsewhere. Out went the lieutenant criminel and 
the procureur du rat, the office of justice of the peace was 
introduced as was the grand jury and the idea of public jury 
trial. 
Post-revolutionary France was in a state of chaos with disorder 
and widespread criminality and the now eyotem was unable to 
provide the necessary repression of crime or social protection 
and was short-lived. Laws of 1795 and 1801, particularly the 
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latter, showed a distinct tendancy towards the old methods, 
resurrecting the lieutenant criminelle and his secret 
examinations as well as the public prosecutor. 
Notas 
I, See generally Esmein Part II Title II Chapter II 
(iii) The Code d' soi 1808 
In 1808 there was promulgated the Code d'Jnstruction Crimine. Ile 
combining elements of the earlier procedure under the 1670 
Ordonnance and the English procedure introduced in 1791. The 
Code survived virtually intact in France for a hundred and fifty 
years and was the dominant influence throughout Europe in the 
nineteenth century. 
It had become evident that confessions obtained by the threat or 
use of force were not freely made and tended to be lacking in 
trustworthiness, and the reforms now incorporated in the Code had 
their roots in the dacire to avoid any'danger of a return to the 
brutalities of the old procedure, especially interrogation under 
torture, for the purpose of extracting a confession, 
The Code also provided that the accused could no longer be 
required to take the oath and to answer questions, and since 
there were no longer any effective legal means of forcing an 
accused to answer questions, the Code effectively gave the 
privilege against self-incrimination. I 
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Esmein, who, as already noted, considered the 1808 French system 
to be "mixed" rather than inquisitorial, lists its main 
characteristic features: 
1. Accusations must now be made by a special functionary, a 
public prosecutor acting In the name of the state; judges can no 
longer take cognisance themselves of criminal denunciations by 
secret informers, 
2. The judgment is rendered by magistrtates and/or lay jurors. 
3. The proceeding is divided into two stages: the first, the 
preliminary investigation, is entrusted to an investigating 
magistrate (the fuge d'instruction) and results in an official 
evidentiary record (dossier) which becomes the basis of the 
prosecutor's accusation; the second, the public trial, in which 
the evidence is presented orally or in documentary form and the 
defendant is given the opportunity to confront his accusers and 
to submit evidence of innocence as well as evidence of 
Justification. 
4. The system of legal proofs is abolished and replaced with a 
system of free evaluation of-the evidence by the triers of fact, 
subject to the standard of their being "thoroughly convinced by 
it" before finding guilt, However, the judge or jury is no 
longer required to state the evidentiary basic of his or their 
judgment. 
Since 1808 the. aim of French procedure hie been to lay before the 
court all the facto concerning both the offence and the porcan 
alleged to have committed it so that it may judge the accused. 
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There are three main steps to achieving this aim: 
1. the making of detailed pre-trial inquiries 
2. by examining the personality of the accused and 
3. by placing the onus of eliciting the evidence at the trial on 
the judge rather than on the parties to the case. 
Great emphasis is laid on the pro-trial inquiries which allow an 
investigation into anything which may have a bearing on the case. 
Prosecution is essentially public in nature although the partie 
civile has certain rights to instigate proceedings which are not 
enjoyed by the victim of a crime in Britain. As in Scotland the 
vast majority of cases in France are first reported by the police 
to the public prosecutor who enjoys a broad discretionary power 
not to prosecute no matter how serious the offence, a. 
There were a number of gradual reforms of procedure from 1897 
onwards mainly directed towards strengthening the accused's 
rights, notably the law of 1897 giving the right to legal 
representation during the instruction, and in 1958 the Code de 
Procddure Pdnale was promulgated to replace the 1808 Code. It 
made various alterations of detail, but as far as investigative 
and trial procedure are concerned, they are still recognisably 
based on the 1808 model. 4 
At the time when the 1958 Code was being considered, the queotton 
was raised whether the traditional system should be abandoned. 
The reasoning behind this suggestion was that although the 
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instruction was nominally under the charge of the Juge 
d'Instruction most of the practical work of the investigation was 
done by specialised officers of the police judiciare who disliked 
any too close supervision of their work by the Juge and often 
obtained from him a delegation of powers amounting virtually to a 
blank cheque. It was suggested that this situation might be 
regularised by increasing the powers of the police and limiting 
the role of the jugs to the judgment of incidents in the course 
of the instrucion. However, this idea was rejected as tending 
too much towards the adoption of adversarial methods and, on the 
contrary, the 1958 Code increased the control of the jugs over 
the police. 6 
More recently the fuge d'instrurtion has again been under attack, 
and in 1985 a law was passed under which hic functions would have 
been performed by a collegiate body of three judges, in order to 
avoid the inconsistencies, errors and abucos occasionally 
attributable to individual magistrates. However this law, which 
would, at the very least, have been highly costly to implement 
was repealed some two years later without having been brought 
into effect. ' 
Modern French criminal procedure is complex and a detailed 
exposition is outwith the scope of this work. However it to 
noteworthy that depending on the type of procedure followed the 
accused is liable to be questioned by the police, by the 
prosecutor (procurour), by the fuge d'thstruction and by the 
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president of the trial court. Although he cannot be compelled to 
answer questions, is never placed on oath and has no liability to 
prosecution for perjury, the accused only enjoys the privilege 
against self-incrimination and not the wider right to silence as 
it is has been defined and discussed earlier in this work, since 
adverse comment may be made and adverse inferences drawn. 
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10.3 Modern French Procedure Under the 1958 Code 
(i) Preliminary vex; atio ýt bt Polign 
(a) General Principles 
It should be noted that in France there are two separate bodies 
of police, the police judicalre and the police administrative. 
The police judiciare are subject to the control of the Procureur 
do is Republique, although if the , 
fuge d'instruction is in charge 
of the inquiry, the police judiciare are answerable to him. 
Within the police fudiciare there to a further division into 
agents and officiers, the latter having much greater powers. 
Unless otherwise specified, this chapter refers to powers 
exercised by officiera of the police judieiaire In parsing it 
is noteworthy that for certain purposes officiera of the police 
audiciaire appear to-include such improbable candidates as local 
mayors and forestry officials. I 
Article 14 of the 1958 Code requires the police fudici. ira to 
"investigate breaches of the penal law,, collect evidence and seek 
out the perpetrators, even if a Judicial investigation has not 
been opened" and Article 75 requires them to "undertake 
preliminary investigations either on the instructions of the 
procureur or on their own authority. " 
In order to avoid falling into the came trap ac Gaidetein and 
Marcus, it should also be remembered that the French procureur is 
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part of the magistrature with the status and authority which that 
entails. 2 
To an outside observer, one of the most striking features of 
French criminal methods is the paucity of formal rules of 
evidence, and particularly the absence of anything equivalent to 
the exclusionary rules in regard to involuntary or unfairly 
obtained confessions which operate in England and Scotland. All 
evidence which is reasonably probative, whatever it may be, is 
admissible in criminal proceedings because for the French there 
is one supreme proof which overshadows all others and alone 
decides the issue - the intime conviction or profound personal 
conviction of the judges and jurors. 
This principle is set out in Article 353 of the Code which- 
requires the president of the trial court to rend the following 
instruction, which must also be posted prominently in the 
retiring room of the courts 
"The law does not ask an accounting from judges of 
the grounds by which they become convinced; it 
does not prescribe for them rules on which they 
must make the fullness and sufficiency of a proof' 
particularly depend; it requires of them that they 
ask themselves, in silence and reflection to seek 
out, in the sincerity of their conscience, what 
impression the evidence reported against the 
accused and the ground of his defence have made-on 
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their reason. The law asks them only the mingla 
question, which encompasses the full measure of 
their duties. 'Are you thoroughly convinced? "' 
There Is in French law no "legal" evidence as opposed to evidence 
which would be forbidden and if the court admits all types of 
evidence it is because each item of proof has value insofar as it 
produces this personal conviction-3 In other words if a French 
court admits evidence which_a Scottish court would regard as 
having been obtained unfairly, it does so on the basis that its 
probative value is diminished by the manner in which it was- 
obtained. Although the French do not operate what one would 
regard as an exclusionary rule, they do have an important rule 
that evidence must be lawfully secured and any evidence secured 
in breach of the law must be excluded from the judicial hearing 
under pain of nullity. 
Although in France everyone is under a legal requirement to 
identify himself to the police, France recognises the privilege 
against self-incrimination in the sense that, apart from matters 
of identity, a French accused is entitled to remain silent in the 
face of questioning by the police, the pracureur and the fuge 
d'instruction. However only at the stage of examination by the 
jugs d'instruction need the accused be informed that ho is free 
not to make a statement. Thera would not appear to be anything 
in French methods equivalent to the police caution in Britain. 
Instead of the indirect control of an exclusionary rule, French 
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law, at least in theory, relies on judicial supervision as a 
means of controlling the police. Historical attachment to the 
idea of judicial examination of the accused would appear to 
militate against police attempts to secure e confession of guilt. 
However, as will be explained, this may well be an illusion. 
The general French view appears to be that the procedure of 
instruction criminelle, the "patient preliminary examination of 
the evidence, which is sifted and studied, heard and reheard, 
until as far as possible all inconsistencies have been eliminated 
and until those which have not been eliminated have been thrown 
into sharp relief" 6 must be conducted, not by the police, but by 
a person of judicial status. Sheehan comments that French courts 
are suspicious of confessions made to the police particularly if 
retracted during the Instruction or the trial and auch will only 
be regarded as part of the evidence against the accused, the 
trial court having, ' in accordance with the principle of the 
intime conviction, complete discretion as to what it makes of the 
confession. 6 
At the time when the Code of 1808 was framed it would never have 
occurred to anyone to allow the preliminary investigation of a 
crime to be carried out entirely by the police who, at that time 
lacked the independence, impartiality, knowledge of the law, and 
sometimes even the intelligence necessary for the conduct of the 
procedure. As in Britain the quality of the police in Franca has 
improved enormously since the early nineteenth century, but the 
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Freench still take the view that in criminal matters, where the 
liberty of the subject is at issue, the process of investigation 
should not be left to the police who are prima facie unlikely to 
be impartial, but to a judge whose independence and impartiality 
are beyond question. The purely investigative functions of the 
juge d'in: truction could be taken over by the police, but the 
police are generally thought to be too anxious to secure 
convictions and the procedure of instruction, involving as it 
does an independent judicial officer, is seen as shielding 
innocent persons from over-zealous police interrogation, 7 As 
previously noted, the possibility of departing from the 
traditional system and limiting Judicial control of the police 
was considered and rejected at the time when the 1958 Code was 
under consideration. 
Nevertheless the fact remains that when a breach of the criminal 
law occurs, it will normally be reported in the first inotanco to 
the police. The police may, in the course of normal preliminary 
inquiries,, detain in custody persons who, they believe, can help 
them with their inquiries. There would not appear to be any 
requirement for "reasonable suspicion" or a similar test. This 
period of detention, or garde d vue may last for up to twenty 
four hours although it may be extended on the written authority 
of the-procureur to a total of forty eight hours, " Police 
brutality and coerced confessions are as strongly prohibited in 
France as in any other country, and there are detailed 
requirements for the keeping of careful records of all that 
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happens during the garde h vue. These records form a document 
known as a proces-verbal which will in turn become part of the 
dossier. In addition the accused may request a medical 
examination which must be granted if the detention is extended 
beyond twenty four hours. 00, 
However good the protection of the accused may be, it does not 
alter the fundamental point that, as one writer delicately puts 
it, "There is no doubt that the possibility of detention has some 
intimidating effect on a person who Is faced with a request by 
the police to give information. " 
The French police are required to inform the procureur "without 
delay" of offences brought to their notice. Where the matter is 
a crime, the procureur is obliged to request an investigation by 
the . fuge d'instruction and where the matter is a ddlit he has a 
discretion to do so. 10 This issue is clouded by the possibility 
that the procureur may, with the consent of the accused 'correct- 
ionalice" serious crimes, ie reclaoeify crimes as deiitc. This 
is likely to happen because the procureur believes that the 
powers of punishment available in the Cour d'assises is 
disproportionately severe in relation to the seriousness of the 
offence and that the facts of the case do not Justify the 
elaborate and costly trial procedures of that court. One effect 
of corroctionalisation, whether intentional or not, will be to 
free the police from the constraints of control by the jugs 
d'instruction. In 1980, for example, only 0.4% of all cases 
385 
reported to French prosecutors were referred to jugas 
d'instruction. 1' This figure alone suggests that Goldstein and 
Marcus may have been justified in describing pro-trial Judicial 
supervision in France as a "myth". 12 Even allowing for their 
misinterpretation of the role of the procureur, they argue, 
convincingly, it is submitted, that whether it is a magistrate or 
prosecutor who conducts the formal investigation, most 
investigative work will have been carried out by the police 
before any other official enters the picture, because the police 
learn about the crime first, are better trained than prosecutors 
or Judges to use the technology of factfinding, and often wich to 
avoid the formal procedures of the instruction. This latter 
point is thought to be of particular importance in France since 
it is only when the accused is brought before the jugo 
d'instruction that he has any right to legal advice and the right 
to be told of his right of silence. 
Even when the jugo has begun an investigation, there may not be 
much supervision of the police. In most cases the jugo will 
issue a commission rogatairs in favour of a named police officer, 
authorising him to carry out most of the routine tasks of 
criminal investigation. Professor Vouin comments "Thus it 
frequently happens that an examining magistrate, soloed of a 
crime committed the day before, delegates the examination - and 
hears no more of the crime for several monthet This is clearly 
dangerous for the accused. " 13 Under the commission rogatoiro the 
police have powers to cite witnesses, -to put them on oath and to 
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require them to testify, a power which is normally otherwise 
unavailable, although even under a commission rogatoire the 
police may not question a person who has been formally charged-14 
If in the course of their inquiries the police discover that the 
evidence is pointing with force and consistency, dos indices 
graves at concordants de culpabllit, towards the guilt of a 
particular person, they are bound not to question him, or to 
desist from questioning him further. Thereafter he may only be 
interrogated by the fuge d'instruction in person. However, the 
sole arbiters of when the crucial point arrives appear to be the 
police themselves, 16 
In fact the interrogation of a person as a witness under oath, 
despite evidence which creates a strong suspicion against him, is 
only wrong if its purpose oA result is to evade the rights of 
the defence. Moreover it has been hold that since the fuge 
d'tnstrucion and any official acting by virtue of a com. 'ission 
rogetaire from him is under a duty to discover whether the person 
being interrogated actually participated in the crime being 
investigated, continuing the interrogation of that person as a 
witness under oath after he confesses, without formally charging 
him is not regarded as being for the purpose with the result 
of eluding the rights of the defence. IS 
Even if the police do acknowledge the situation, Anton note 
that in practice they will merely advise the cucpact of his right 
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to be brought before the jage and will ask him whether he 
consents to waive his right, which is not infrequently done. 
Anton observes that while it is possible to argue that this is 
within the letter of the (1958) Code, it is hardly within its 
spirit and it can only be justified on the basis of the urgency 
of police investigations. 11 
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(b) LFnquete Flagrante -a Special Case 
In cases which are classified as a crime or ddlit and where the 
offence has been discovered either as it was being committed'or 
having "recently" been committed, there is a procedure known as 
L'Enqudte Flagrante which affords wide powers to the police 
judiciare and the procureur to investigate the offence as one of 
urgency and in certain circumstances without the intervention of 
the fuge d'lnstruction. I 
The procedure known as garde A vue has already been mentioned, 
but under i'enquete flagrant the powers available to the police 
are somewhat greater than in routine preliminary Inquiries and in 
certain limited circumstances the possibility of detention for 
ninety six hours exists. : 
A person detained under this procedure is not considered an 
accused and may be questioned by the police judiciairo although 
he does not appear to be under a legally enforcable obligation to 
answer questions not related to the issue of his identity. 4 He 
is not entitled to legal advice or representation during his 
detention. In order to prevent abuses the police judiciairo are 
required to state in their report the=duration of the 
interrogations and the length of the intervals between them, 
However there has been a long series of decisions to the effect 
that procedural irregularities in the garde A vue, while possibly 
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giving rise to criminal or disciplinary sanctions, do not render 
inadmissible statements obtained as a result. 4 
This system would, like "correctionalisation", appear to be open 
to the objection that it invites the procureur to delay the 
involvement of the fuge in order to allow the police a free run 
at the suspect. However Sheehan, whose views on the point are 
more sanguine than certain other commentators, suggests that this 
criticism is without foundation 
'"... bearing in mind the frequent refusal of 
accused persons to answer the police while giving 
full explanations to the , 
fuge d'instruction, the 
reserve placed by the courts on confession, made 
to the police, and the general attitude of the 
magistrats of the Ministern public. Furthermore, 
unless substantial incriminating evidence already 
existed against a suspect it would be pointless 
for the police to arrest him in the hope of 
gaining a confession, since failure to do so would 
only result in the accused's release at the end of 
the period of detention. " rp 
Lidstone and Early take a very different view, and quota an 
article by a senior French judge who was critical of the role of 
the procureur in deciding to extend the period of garde A vuo. 
The judge, M. Arpaillange, argued that in many instances 
prolongation to forty eight hours is automatic, allowing 
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extensive police contact in an environment created for no other 
purpose than to subjugate the will to that of the interrogator. 
Under I'enqudte flagrante the suspect is liable to questioning 
by the procureur and prolonged police involvement with him whilo 
in custody will diminish the importance of the examination. 6 
A suspect who has been detained under garde a vue will be brought 
before the procuraur who has the right, which is usually 
exercised, to question him. During the questioning the accused 
may not be legally represented. At the time Sheehan carried out 
his research, he noted that the attitude of the procureur 
generally was that the purpose of the examination was to ensure 
that there was a reasonable case to answer and that proceedings 
were not taken against an innocent person. The Identity of the 
accused will be confirmed and he will be asked a few questions 
about the main facts of the case. The accused has the right, to 
put forward any explanation and if this is accepted by the 
procureur he may drop proceedings against the accused and 
liberate him there and then. The examination is not intended to 
extract a confession or obtain further evidence against the 
accused and the procureur will generally not enter into any form 
of cross examination. If the accused makes a statement or 
answers any questions, the procureur will dictate this in 
narrative form to a clerk or typist and the resulting statement 
will be signed by the suspect and the procureur Thereafter the 
procureur will decide how to dispose of the case. 
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(ii) Questioning by the Tute d'Instructton 
As already noted, in all cases classified as crimes (ie the most 
serious matters) the procureur is obliged to request an 
investigation by the fuge d`instruction and in cases classed as 
ddlits he has a discretion to do so. 
If it takes place, the investigation will be secret in the sense 
that only the accused, the procureur and any partie civile will 
be informed of the progress and content of the inquiry. The 
secrecy is intended to protect the interests of the accused by 
preventing harmful publicity. All steps taken by the fuge and 
any statements by the accused or witnesses will be recorded in a 
dossier to which the procureur and the accused's legal represent- 
ative have a right of access. 
The function of the fuge d1inatruction is to collect, examine and 
investigate all the evidence relating to the case and thereafter 
to decide whether the case should be remitted for trial and* if 
soy to which court, The ju e is only concerned with sufficiency 
of evidence and is not required to decide on issues of 
credibility. His decisions must be motivated in law and thus 
issues of credibility or his personal view of the guilt or 
innocence of the accused are irrelevant. His powers are clearly 
inquisitorial and it is his duty to ascertain the facts rather 
than leaving the matter in the hands of the parties. 
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The Juge d'instruction has the right to interrogate the accused, 
something which the French consider a normal part of the 
investigation. Apart from being conducive to the ascertainment 
of the truth, the questioning allows the accused to put his point 
of view and, since he becomes aware of the case against him it 
assists him to organise his defence. It ensures that the dossier 
is balanced and does not merely represent the prosecution's case. 
Examination by the Juge d'instruction will take place in his 
office and will be less formal than a trial. Nevertheless, 
French law recognises that precautions are necessary to ensure 
that the interrogation is conducted in conditions which safeguard 
the rights of the accused at all times and that there is no 
attempt to extract a confession by any moans or at any cost. 
The accused will not normally be interrogated on his first 
appearance, although the Code does permit this "if urgency 
results either from the condition of a witness in danger of death 
or from apparent preparation for disappearance. " It is also 
permitted in the investigation of a flagrant delict when the fuge 
d'instruction is present at the scene. The report of the 
interrogation should mention the reason for the urgency. 
More commonly, however, at the time when the accused first 
appears before him the fuge will establish his identity, acquaint 
him expressly with each of the acts that are imputed to him and 
advise him that he is free not to make a statement. The minute 
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of the interrogation must include a record of the accused having 
been advised that he need not mako a statement. 
If the accused does wish to make a statement, the fuge will 
receive it, and at this stage questioning will normally be 
limited to clearing up ambiguities in the st, atoment, although the 
accused may also be asked if he admits the accuracy of any prior 
statements made to the police. Professor Anton notes that, "It 
is highly probable that the suspect, now formally an accused 
person, will wish to make a statement, for French criminals in" 
the vast majority of cases exhibit a quite spontaneous desire to 
confess all. " 
The clerk of court will take down, at the Juge'o dictation a 
minute of the proceedings. At the end of this dictation the jugo 
d'instruction must advise an unrepresented accused of his right 
to legal representation and this advice and the nccusod'a reply 
are incorporated into the minute of the proceedings which will be 
signed by the accused and the clerk. Counsel may be designated 
for the accused if he desires, irrespective of his financial 
situation. 
Failure to inform the accused of his right not to make a 
statement or of his right to 1cga1 advice will nullify both the 
instant and any subsequent proceedings. 
395 
The final step at the first appearance will be for the jugs to 
decide whether the accused should be detained in custody 
(detention preventive). The Code declares that this should be 
exceptional, but it appears to be widely used, particularly in 
the case of serious crime, and it is conceded, even by some 
French commentators, that abuses occur. 2 Manfred Pieck 2. " 
describes the juges d'instruction as being "unsparing" in their 
use of this power, particularly if the accused refuses to speak. 
After the first examination, the jute d'instruction may examine 
the accused on as many occasions as he wishes, for example to 
take account of new evidence discovered in the course of 
interviewing the witnesses, although prior to each interrogation 
he must summon counsel for the accused to enable him to be 
present at each interrogation. The accused can only be heard in 
the presence of his legal representative unless he expressly 
waives this right. The dossier must be placed at the disposal of 
counsel at least twenty four hours before each interrogation, but 
in practice the jugs will allow counsel access to the dossier 
whenever he wishes it. It has been pointed out that this means 
that the accused will be in a position to know the precise 
evidence against him before he is first interrogated on the 
facts, and thus an astute criminal can devise a defence 
compatible with the evidence for the prosecution, 3 
The procuraur and any partie civ$la may also be present at 
subsequent interrogations and although the juge has the exclusive 
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right actually to ask the questions, the procureur and the legal 
representative of the partie civile have the right to euggest 
questions for him to put. 
At these subsequent examinations, the fuge d'inatruction will 
question the accused in great depth, in the same way as the 
accused would be cross-examined In a British trial. There is no 
restriction on the nature, content, form or number of the 
questions but the accused always has the right not to answer. 
However the fuge may make "appropriate comments" whenever the 
accused refuses to answer his questions and unfavourable 
inferences will undoubtedly be drawn by the Jupe and all 
subsequent Judges or jurors. It is probably for this reason that 
accused persons rarely refuse to make any reply at all to the 
questions put to them. 4 
The fuge will dictate the accused'e answers in the form of a 
statement either at the end of the examination or in the course 
of it if it is lengthy. At the end of the examination the Jug© 
will read the statement over to the accused who can correct any 
inaccuracies. Thereafter it to signed by the jugo and the 
accused. 
At these subsequent Interrogations, if there are discrepancies 
between the accused's statement and evidence from witnesses, the 
fuge may elect to hold a confrontation. In this procedure he 
will interrogate the accused again, and if he maintains his 
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version, the fuge will introduce the witness and ask him to 
repeat his version in the hearing of the accused and vice-versa. 
He will then ask each to comment on the evidence of the other and 
will cross-examine both parties closely on any points of 
difference. s It is hoped that the accused will thus be induced 
to admit facts which he has hitherto denied, and the process can 
be regarded as a partial substitute for cross examination. A 
confrontation is subject to the same procedural safeguards as any 
other interrogation and the usual minute of the proceedings will 
be prepared for the dossier. 
One step beyond confrontation is reconstruction of the offence 
whereby the juge, his clerk, the procureur and counsel for the. 
parties proceed to the scene of the crime and an attempt is made 
to re-enact what actually happened at the time of the crime. The 
accused and the witnesses are asked to repeat, as far as 
possible, their actual words and movements. In seriouc crimes 
the procureur will always ask for a reconstruction since it is a 
practical way of proving, as nearly conclusively as possible, the 
truth or otherwise of a particular version of the facts. Ac 
Anton puts it, "It is based upon the familiar truth that, while a 
person may tell one or two lies with an appearance of 
verisimilitude, he will find it difficult to tell many 
successfully, and still more difficult to rehearse a whole course 
of conduct which is false., ' "I 
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Sheehan, sanguine as always, comments, 
"While each individual Jugs has his own style, 
many feel that the informality of the proceeding -- 
as opposed to the trial itself - is more conducive 
to the accused speaking freely. In that way an 
innocent person has nothing to lose and has a 
better chance to establish his innocence since the 
fuge will investigate any defence evidence with 
the same resources, thoroughness and impartial 
approach which he brings to bear on the 
prosecution evidence. " 7 
He also observes that any unjustifiable attempt by the accused to 
reserve his defence until the trial while finding out the 
strength of the case against him in advance is liable to be 
looked upon with suspicion. 0 
In complex or important cases the jage will hold a final 
examination of the accused recapitulating the main points of the 
case and the accused's answers thercta. 
Since the purpose of a French criminal trial is to judge the 
accused, "on Auge 1'homme, pas les faits", and also because guilt 
and penalty are determined simultaneously by the trial court, it 
is regarded as fundamental that the triers of the facts should be 
fully informed as to the evidence, or absence of evidence, of 
criminal propensities on the part of the accused. Accordingly 
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the jugo d'instruction will also prepare a section of the dossier 
including exhaustive detail about the accused's life history. 
This "Dossier du Personnalite' will include all possible 
information about the accused whether favourable or unfavourable, 
including his casier judiciaire or criminal record, and will be 
available to the trial court. 
Once the instruction is complete and the fuge has coma to 
provisional conclusions, the dossier is sent to the procureur for 
his views. Representations may also be made to the fuge by the 
accused's counsel and counsel for any partie civile. Thereafter 
the fuge will pronounce an interlocutory order formally closing 
the instruction. 
If the fuge considers that a case has been established against 
the accused he will refer the case to the appropriate court. If 
the case is appropriate to the highest court, the Cour d'assices, 
the doasior must be studied by the Chambre d'accucation, or 
indicting chamber which considers matters anew, examines the 
regularity of the procedure and comes to a definite decision as 
to what proceedings should follow, Parties and counsel will be 
summoned to an oral hearing by the Procureur C ndral, 
After the Chambre d'accusation has considered the matter, its 
decision will be communicated to the parties. It may order 
further steps to be taken to elucidate the facto and it may refer 
the dossier back to the fuge d'instruct. ton; it may also alter or 
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vary in any way the fuge's findings, but if it finds that the 
facts appear to disclose a crime, it will order the accused to be 
arraigned before the Cour d'essiEes. 
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(iii) The Trial 
This section relates only to conventional French trials, the 
simplified procedure available in the Tribunal de Police is not 
further considered. ' It is at the trial stage that French 
procedure is at its least inquisitorial and most adversarial, and 
consequently of least interest in the present discussion. There 
are several points of similarity with British procedure, partic- 
ularly the public nature of the proceedings, the presumption of 
innocence and the burden of proof on the prosecution. Never- 
theless the procedure followod at the trial differs in several 
important respects from that followed in Scotland or England. 
In the first instance it should be noted that the French system 
does not recognise a plea of guilty by the accused and accord- 
ingly all proceedings take the form of a trial. The court will 
only give its decision after an examination of the evidence 
although this will obviously be fairly cursory if the accused 
does not intond to challenge it and the proceedings will be 
shorter. 2 There are also provisions for trial in the ebcence of 
the accused which are much wider than those available in 
Scotland, although yet again the court will consider the evidence 
carefully before reaching a verdict. 
In cases which have been remitted for trial in the 'Cour d'asslscs 
the accused will have a preliminary private interview in chambcrc 
with the president of the court. This interview will usually be 
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confined to the establishment of the accused's identity and 
procedural matters such as legal representation. The facts will 
not normally be explored, although there is nothing to prevent 
the president from hearing the accused on the fundamentals of the 
case. The inevitable record of the proceedings will be made and 
signed by the clerk of court, the president and the accused, 4 
The president has a , rarely exercised power to adjourn the trial 
and order a supplementary investigation if he considers that the 
case is not ready for trial. Professor Vouln explains that, 
"Thus the examination (instruction) is continued even after the 
Judgment for committal, right up to the opening of the hearing in 
the Court of Assize. ... French law will not countenance the 
opening of the trial at assize and its pursuance to a final 
judgment except at the end of a completed examination which 
guarantees the validity of the judgment which will cnyue, "s 
At the trial the proceedings will normally commence with the 
president of the court examining the accused, having first 
studied the dosier, or the police report if thorn has been no 
Instruction, This examination was not provided for In the 1808 
Code, Under that statute the proceedings were to begin with the 
prosecutor presenting his case and the president was only to put 
possible questions to the accused after each witness had given, 
evidence. However the custom was quickly establichod that it was 
the presiding Judge who opened the proceedings by making the 
accused undergo an examination with the object of revealing his 
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pact, his personality and the nature of hic defence. The 1958 
Code decided that the president was to examine the accused and 
take note of his declarations but he wes under a duty not to 
disclose him opinion as to guilt. 
The president will ask the accused about his personal background, 
including previous convictions, the charge will be read to him 
and excerpts from the witnesses' statements will be put to him, 
If the accused disagrees with a statement made by a witness or 
gives evidence contrary to it the president will frequently cross 
examine him vigorously, in the same manner as cross-examination 
at a British trial. He will certainly, do so if he thtnke the 
accused is lying or withholding evidence. The president's role 
is that of an investigator and not an arbiter, although to the 
outsider his actions can give the impression that he is more of a 
prosecutor than a Judge. 15 
The accused is not on oath and may at any time refuse to answer 
which sometimes reduces the president's examination to nothing 
more than a monologue. However the accused cannot avoid being 
interrogated and his demeanour and attitude are adaminicloc of 
evidence which the court may take into consideration. Accord- 
ingly although silence does not amount to a tacit confession of 
guilt, it will not only result in the court drawing an adverse 
inference, but it will also reinforce the prosecution ovidence. 
In any event the prosecution, who are not subject to any 
restriction on comment, will make the most of the accused'c 
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silence. 7 It follows that there is considerable pressure on the 
accused to answer the president's questions, 
The trial court may also consider any statement made by the 
accused to the police or fuge d1instruclon and once again the 
right of the court to what Professor Pieck terms "uncontrolled 
evaluation" 0 means that it can consider the refusal of the 
accused to explain himself when reaching its verdict. 
Once the president has concluded hic examination, the prosecutor 
may question the accused and then the lawyer for the partie 
civile and the accused's own counsel may suggest questions which 
will be put to the accused at the president's discretion, 
although if the examination has been thorough it is unlikely that 
many such questions will be necessary. 
After the questioning of the accused has been completed, the 
president will examine the witnesses who have been cited. "' The 
witness will be asked to give his evidence in narrative form, not 
by question and answer. If the witness's evidence conflicts with 
that of the accused, the president may interrupt the witness and 
question the accused further. Generally there is an absence of 
rigid procedural rules, the court being given as much freedom as 
possible to obtain all the facts about the case. 
After all the evidence has been heard, the partite will address 
the court, the defence having the last ward, and tho court will 
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give it verdict, possibly after an adjournment. There is 
virtually no reliance on precedent, each case being decided on 
its merits. The court, as already noted requires to have a 
profound personal conviction of the accused's guilt before it can 
convict him. 
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10.4 D srussi. on and 'valuation 
it would be an exercise in futility and sterility to compare 
inquisitorial and adversarial methods with a view to proving that 
one was in some way superior to or better than the other, It is 
impossible to view any system of criminal justice in isolation 
from its origins and the nature of the society which it serves. 
A system of criminal justice is strongly related to its under- 
lying historical, social and political environatont, as well as 
the structure of authority on which it is based. Dr Volkmann- 
Schluck, while noting that the same categories of actors with 
roughly similar functions appear in both procedural systems, viz 
police, prosecutors, defence lawyers and judges, points out that 
they "differ in the way they perform, in their self esteem, in 
their social position in society and in their behavioural expect- 
ations. " I Further and fuller reference will be made to this 
point later. 
It ir. noticeable that commentators from one tradition tend to be 
critical of their own methods and to look to the other tradition 
to provide the solution to whatever problem is presently 
exercising them. Thus continental comnentetoro fecod with the 
delays and other problems of the instruction look toward-- the 
Anglo-American tradition for speed, efficiency and openneas while 
Anglo-American jurists emberaused by some scandal such as the 
Guildford Four or alarmed by abuses of plow-bargaining in the 
United States are arguing in favour of inquisitorial method-- and 
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particularly earlier judicial involvement. The article by 
Goldstein and Marcus is virtually the only work by Anglo- 
Americans which is seriously critical of continental procedures 
and while many of their criticisms were based on mistaken 
premises, one of the main burdens of their complaint appeared to 
be that modern continental methods were not sufficiently 
inquisitorial. 
It was previously noted that the two systems have tended to 
converge, and-it is probably fair to say that the systems which 
are fundamentally inquisitorial have tended to move further 
towards adversarial methods than vice-versa. The adoption of the 
jury in France and the introduction of cross-examination in Spain 
(in 1882) are but two of the many examples. 
Certain criticisms which are levelled at inquisitorial methods 
are, it is submitted, more criticisms of the way in which such 
methods are presently applied. They are not necessarily 
criticisms of inquisitorial methods per se and they thus fall 
largely outwith the scope of this work and can be dealt with 
shortly, 
Into-this category falle the claim that judges, and principally 
juges d"instruction, are often young and inexperienced and, since 
they normally begin training straight from university, lacking in 
experience of the "real world, " Sheehan points out that the 
maximua age for entry to the Centre Nationale d'iftude Judir. arc 
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is 27 although an avocat with ten years experience may apply for 
direct entry to the magistrature, which is considered desireable, 
partly because the'Centre Nationale cannot produce enough 
candidates and partly because it widens the spectrum of can- 
didates to the magistrature. Inquisitorial methods clearly 
require a substantial number of prosecutors and judges, and it 
would appear that there is probably less interchange with the 
mainstream legal profession than there is, say, between the 
solicitor branch of the profession in Scotland and the Procurator 
Fiscal service, France tending very much towards acareer 
magistracy. 2A related criticism is that French training methods 
tend to produce stereotype magistrates with little scope for 
individuality. Sheehan observes that even if this criticism were 
justified, it would also presumably ensure a more uniform 
application of justice. 
Likewise the criticism that inquisitorial methods result in undue 
delay before accused persons are brought to trial is, it is 
submitted, a criticism of the application of the methods rather 
that the methods themselves. To say this is not, of course, to 
minimise the seriousness of the problem. It is accepted that it 
is quite insupportable to have a person who is presumed innocent 
incarcerated for for an extended period before guilt has been 
proved, and French law provides several unhappy examples, despite 
the explicit requirement in Article 137'of the 1958 Code that 
pre-trial detention is an exceptional measure. The most extremo 
example known to the writer is the case quoted by Professor 
V 
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Hamoon of a woman detained on a murder charge for four years 
before her first trial which then turned out to be abortive 
because of the inadequate preparation of the case, which had to 
be sent back for an instrucion supplement sire, although 
mercifully the accused was allowed bail at that point. 13 
Clearly the process of instruction is liable to take time, but 
the writer would suggest that there does not appear to be any 
reason why, if the political will existed, the situation could 
not be improved by an increase in the resources available to the 
police Judiciare, an increase in the number of juges 
d'instruction and the imposition of an absolute maximum time 
limit for proceedings, akin to the Scottish 110-day rule. 
Alternatively, German experience shows that the system can still 
operate and retain its fundamentally inquisitorial character even 
if the entire instruction procedure is abolished, albeit at the 
expense of a greater burden on the public prosecutor, whose 
status and integrity must necessarily be high. 4 
The German experience has been controversial and it has to be 
admitted that the jugc d'inmtructJon is a figure who is 
demonstrably independent from the police and who has the power to 
direct their inquiries. Any prosecutor is bound to be much more 
closely identified with the police than a truly independent 
judicial figure and this can lead to the suspicion (possibly well 
founded) that the police are less subject to supervision than 
they ought to be. Goldstein and Marcus say that in Germany "Pro- 
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trial investigation follows Code requirements only as much as the 
police choose to adhere to them. They take their force through 
the degree of obligation felt by the police to follow legal 
rules, rather than through on-the-spot judicial supervision or 
after-the-fact remedies for breach of the Code. " 6 However Dr 
Volkmann-Schluck points out that the German Code does contain an 
exclusionary rule in respect of evidence extorted from the 
accused by physical abuse, drugs, torture, weariness, hypnosis, 
deceit or unlawful threats or promises and the German courts have 
expanded this notion to the concept of Rechtskreistheorie, an 
untranslatable German concept only approximately rendered as the 
doctrine of the sphere of individual rights, which allows 
evidence to be excluded if the police intrude into the 
constitutionally protected sphere of fundamental civil rights. 
To return to the French model, even commentators who are 
sympathetic to French methods concede that there is probably soma 
force in the argument that, notwithstanding the existence of a 
theoretical presumption of innocence, the procedure of 
Instruction by its nature leads to a presumption of guilt at the 
trial stage. One of the main aims of the instruction is to 
prevent persons against whom there is insufficient evidence being 
placed on trial and it is only a short logical stop from that 
point to the assumption that a person who is placed on trial must 
be guilty. 
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Sheehan comments that in the tribunal do police and tribunal 
correctionnel the presumption of innocence may sometimes be "more 
theoretical than practical" since the president of the court, 
having read the police report or dossier before the trial must 
often find it difficult not to pro-judge the case. In the tour 
d'assises jurors likewise may sometimes be influenced by the 
knowledge that the accused has only been committed for trial 
after exhaustive pre-trial inquiries, At the time when Sheehan 
did his research, the acquittal rate of the tribunal 
correctionnel was around 5%, but some of this was due to 
extraneous factors such as prescription and amnesty and the 
overall conviction rate was "exceedingly high". Sheehan- 
acknowledges that it is virtually Impossible to form any firm 
conclusion as to the reason for this situation and contents 
himself with the observation that it "may prove the efficacy of 
pro-trial inquiries in ensuring that no innocent person is 
wrongly sent for trial, or alternatively it may be taken to prove 
that such inquiries do effectively pro-judge the case. " ' 
Anton, who regards French procedure properly applied as 
"scrupulous in the interests of the accused, " makes a similar 
point when he comments that, "The immensely careful preliminary 
investigations of the fuge d'instruction make it unlikely that 
persons who in France are sent for trial are guiltless. While 
they are still in law presumed to be innocent, a common sense 
appreciation of the situation suggests that they are in fact morn 
likely than not to be guilty. That in France acquittals do from 
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time to time take place seems to be more a reflection of the 
French juryman's traditional generosity of sentiment and 
suspicion of authority than a reproach to the quality of work of 
the juges d'instruction. 11 $ 
There would not appear to be any easy answer to this problem, if 
indeed it is a problem, other than to trust the intergity of 
those charged with adjudication at the trial. Nevertheless, the 
role which the presiding judge to required to adopt at the trial 
must make it difficult for all but the moct detached individual 
to separate his "common sense" from his judicial function, and it 
must contribute to the blurring of the distinction between 
prosecution and judgment which is sometimes criticised, However, 
Professor Vouin, who is never slow to criticise his own country's 
institutions, thinks that the role of the presiding judge, and 
particularly his discretionary power to, take any step which he 
believes of value for discovering the truth, is as likely to be 
of benefit to the accused as to be a threat to him. 0 
The presiding judge's role also means that the accused is lace 
dependent on legal representation the quality of which may be 
poor} that evidence is less likely to be distorted by unfair or 
manipulative cross-examination" and that the outcome of the trial 
is less likely to be influenced by the suppression of evidence or 
ability of pleaders to influence the jury. Whether any or all of 
these points are "good" or "bad" is of necessity a matter on 
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which differing views can sincerely be hold and little would be 
gained by discussing them further in the present context. 
Of much more interest in the present discussion is the French 
attitude towards the questioning of the accused. At the start of 
this work the right to silence was defined as "the right of the 
accused not to testify at his trial and the right of the suspect 
to refuse to answer police questions without incurring adverse 
consequences such as a penal sanction, a presumption of guilt or 
adverse comment at the trial. " It is clear that while a French 
accused is not liable to a penal sanction if he refuses to speak, 
any such refusal, certainly before the jugo d'instruction or at 
the trial, will result in adverse comment being made and an 
unfavourable inference, if not a presumption of guilt, being 
drawn, and therefore a French accused does not enjoy the right to 
silence as it is understood in Britain. 
It is important to appreciate that the French attitude stems at 
least in part from the fact that, unlike the British position 
where the pre-trial and trial phases of the process arc clearly 
separate entities, with the latter boing virtually self- 
contained, the French view the whole procedure as a continuum 
with the trial`being simply the final Otago in a continuous 
process, rather that an end in itself. The French accused is 
brought into the process at a much earlier stage that he would be 
in Scotland or, even more co, in England, Professor Hamcon 
suggests that it would, in France, be thought "most grossly 
414 
improper" if the inquiry were conducted ox Parte without the 
presence of the person principally interested in its outcome. 
The presence of the suspect during the process of Instruction is 
regarded as an important right. "That an official should be 
allowed to gather together evidence against a citizen and to 
construct a case against him without his knowledge and without a 
right in him to make representations to that official and to put 
forward his own view of the situation from the start - that would 
generally be judged in France to be monstrous, " I* It follows 
from this that the accused is expected to participate in the 
instruction, in order that the truth may be determined, and if 
he does not, adverse conclusions are inevitable. In fact it 
appears that few French accused remain completely mute. An 
important reason for this, which is absent in Britain, in that 
there is no separate hearing or procedure for determining 
sentence and an accused who totally refüces to respond will 
forfeit the opportunity of being heard on the question of 
punishment. 
The distinction between the pre-trial and trial phases of the 
case which is so noticeable in British procedure is, it is 
submitted, largely artificial and conaiderahly disadvantageous. 
In Britain things done (or not done) by the police without 
Judicial supervision, or, at the moot, under theoretical 
supervision by the Procurator Fiscal, can have a profound effect 
on the outcome of the trial. This can work both ways and can 
produce results which are undesiroable from the point of view of 
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ascertaining the truth, On the one hand, evidence can be 
obtained irregularly and the means of obtaining it can be 
suppressed leading to a wrongful conviction such as that of the 
"Guildford Four. " Even where there is no deliberate intention to 
mislead, the tendency of the police to assume that a suspect is 
ipso facto guilty can blind them to alternative views of the- 
facts and lead to the under-estimation, or possibly even 
suppression, of important evidence pointing to a conclusion which 
does not fit the established police view. Factors such as these 
played important parts in the miscarriages of justice in the 
Timothy Evans " and Confait 1: 2 cases. It in submitted that it 
is both unreasonable and illogical to expect the police, 
particularly in England where they are by long tradition much 
closer to the prosecution process than in Scotland, to act at all 
times in a "quasi-judicial" spirit. Such a role is theoretically 
unsound and to borrow Lord Devlin's colourful expression, 
"Undoubtedly a practical, resourceful and adaptable man can fly 
quite a long way contrary to theory, but theory, if it in cound, 
must in the end get him down. " '3 
On the other hand, a technical infringement of an exclusionary 
rule, which may in itself be obscure or complex, can lead to the 
exclusion of important evidence and the collapse of the case 
against a person who is, on any objective criterion, guilty of 
the crime with which he is charged. The Australian writer G. E. P. 
Brouwer puts this point succinctly when ho says, "The common law 
system's evidentiary rules are quite distinctive in the way in 
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which they exclude evidence which, although logically relevant, 
is regarded as unfair or as dangerously misleading. Ironically, 
many of the rules themselves are often misleading on account of 
their subtlety and the refined sophistry with which they are 
imbued. " 'I Even if the transgression is blatant or the result of 
something other than ignorant inadvertance, it is not necessarily 
self-evident that the acquittal and release of a dangerous 
criminal is an appropriate response. In a sense the courts are 
in a no-win situation since the repeated acquittal of guilty 
persons as the result of the exclusion of evidence can lead 
public opinion to conclude that the courts are "soft on 
criminals" and failing to protect the public. On the other hand 
the repeated condoning of police illegalities would inevitably 
tend towards an erosion of civil liberties, Such a development 
would be liable to be particularly sinister since the ordinary 
person is unlikely to feel that he requires protection from the 
police by means which allow dangerous criminals to go free until 
the police illegalities cease to be tolerable, by which time the 
situation may be beyond redemption. 
Problems of this natura are at their most acute in the United 
States where the legitimate efforts of the police and other law 
enforcement agencies can come close to being frustrated by 
exclusionary rules. Nevertheless the Scottish taut of "fairnece 
to the accused", while being less rigid than the ruler, applied in 
some other jurisdictions, may be subject to the criticism that it 
is vague and lends itself to capricious application by the 
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courts. A. A. S. Zuckerman has, in a different but related 
context, described the notion of "fairness" as "unhelpful since 
it can refer to a multitude of aspects and merely furnishes an 
excuse for achieving whatever result is wanted without rigorous 
justification" 'a and Lord Scarman, a most eminent judge, has 
referred in scathing terms to the "last refuge of legal thought, 
that each case depends on its facts. " '6 The present writer 
would submit that these comments are eminently applicable to the 
present state of Scottish law, and it is unsatisfactory that the 
question of guilt should be determined on the basis of a test 
which defies analysis and which can vary at the whim of the 
triers of the facts. 
Such issues simply do not arise in French procedure whore, for 
most practical purposes, all evidence is admissible and subject 
to evaluation by the court on a quantum valeat basis. Indeed it 
is no exaggeration to say that the present work, consisting as it 
does of lengthy discussion of admissibility of evidence and 
sufficiency of proof, could not have been written about the 
French legal system since such concepts are unknown thorn. It 
also, follows that. since French law does not have to cope with 
concepts of admissibility or the problems posed by the 
prohibition of inferences from silence, French courts arc spared 
the need to wrestle with the type of illogical rule condemned by 
Professor Cross as "gibberish. " 17 
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In practical terms, the French police are, of course, likely to 
be heavily involved in evidence gathering before the Instruction 
has commenced. As in any other country it is necessary to strive 
for a balance between controlling the pre-trial activities of the 
police and ensuring that they are not hampered in their invest- 
igations. The French approach allows the police wide but care- 
fully regulated powers in the early stages of the case when they 
are most likely to be needed, the results of which are then 
subject to scrutiny by the procureur and in more serious cases by 
the fuge d'instruction and the chambre d'accusation. 
Nevertheless, the police can operate secure in the knowledge that 
only evidence obtained by methods of outright illegality will be 
excluded. 
Opinions differ as to whether the system leads the French police 
to press for a confession. Brouwer argues that the fact that 
French law does not attach any particular importance to a 
confession correspondingly places less pressure on the police to 
obtain one 10 and Sheehan takes a similar view. Is 
on the other hand we have teen how, oven when they are acting" 
within the law the police themselves are loft to take certain 
crucial decisions themselves, particularly the point at which 
they should atop questioning a suspect. Stephen tironoo arguac 
that the system itself almost invites abusot 
"In general, however, a coerced confession is not 
rejected per -a if, after analysing all the 
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evidence, the court feels that the confession is 
sincere and true. Thus the rights of suspects in 
France, to a large degree, depend on the 
subjective evaluation of very difficult issues - 
the sincerity of a confession, the substantiality 
of the infringement of the rights of the accused, 
and the motives of the interrogator. The police 
abuse is not the focal point of the review. 
Furthermore the accused's right to be informed by 
the jugs d'tnstruction of his right to remain 
silent and to have a lawyer may become 
meaningless, ... since the suspect may be 
interrogated before appearing for the first time 
in front of the jugs d'instruction. ... tTlhe 
confession made to the police ... goes into the 
suspect's dossier and, in effect, can be used 
against him regardless of whether he claims the 
privilege against self-incrimination later in the 
proceedings. " 
At the end of the day one comes back to the point that system, of 
policing and criminal justice cannot be soon in isolation from 
the nature of the societies in which they have dovelopod, 
Professor Lloyd Weinreh puts it thusi 
"Unless one starts (and finishes) with a view of 
man according to which his nature is not 
determined much at all by his surroundings, it is 
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Implausible that criminal process should be 
everywhere alike. The particular forms that it 
takes are much more a reflection of society's 
ground rules} its social and political philosophy 
and institutions, than is generally remarked. 
French procddure pdnale for example is profoundly 
affected by the concept of L'Etat, the state as an 
entity whose authority is not to be questioned 
(even when it is not precisely obeyed)". 2' 
There is a particular danger in assuming that what is irregular 
or illegal in one society is or ought to be equally irregular or 
illegal in another. Thus the interrogation of the accused by the 
presiding judge which would be simply unthinkable in Scotland or 
England is a normal and accepted part of French procedure and 
fully justifiable on the norms and philosophies on which the 
French system proceeds. When one looks beyond the trial procoas, 
there are similar dangers in assuming that because the police in 
one country are required to behave in a particular way, the 
police in another country ought to behave similarly. 
A particularly interesting light has been shed on this issue by 
Professor Mirjan Damatka of Pennsylvania University 22 who has 
constructed two models of authority which he calls tho 
"hierarchical" and the "coordinate" and which represent 
continental and Anglo-American procedures respectively. He 
argues that by using these modele, previously inexplicable 
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differences between the two systems can be understood once the 
conventional trial-centered models are displaced by another set 
of organising concepts. According to Aamatka, systems which 
follow the continental "hierarchical" model have "a strong 
tendency to arrive at uniform policies through the centralisation 
of authority; the rigorously hierarchical ordering of agencies 
participating in the administration of justice; the preference 
for precise and rigid normative directives over more flexible 
standards; and finally the great importance accorded official 
documentation. This general bureaucratic style of exercising 
authority tends to be sustained 
everywhere by chosen methods of 
training, recruiting and promoting officials. " 23 
Ontthe other hand, "animating the coordinate model is the aim of 
reaching the decision more appropriate to the circumstances of 
each case. Certainty of decision making is recognised as an 
important value, but is less weighty than in the hierarchical 
model; what appears to be the best solution in a particular case 
will not be readily sacrificed to certainty and uniformity of 
decisionmaking. Consequently, the distinction between saying 
thata particular decision is just and that it is in accordance 
with the law cannot as easily be made as in the hierarchical 
model. The cast of mind underlying these value preferences 
attaches great importance to the rich variety of experience and 
is sceptical of attempts to impress general otructurea on the 
complexities of life. " 1 
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Applying his hierarchical model to continental police forces, 
Damadka points out that "a general feature of continental police 
forces is a high degree of regimentation and pervasive 
regulation. This feature escapes those observers who identify 
regulation with external normative constraint on police forces. 
However, both a strict hierarchy and a professional tradition 
favour a great deal of internal regulation; uniformity, 
consistency and internal review by superiors are routine. In 
fact the saturation of police forces with internal regulation 
bears a strong resemblence to that of the military. As a result, 
the police tend to assess situations with reference to existing 
internal regulations. Substantial discretion tends to gravitate 
to higher echelons of the police hierarchy; lower levels are 
guided by rules and subjected to extensive internal control. " 2JEý 
Damatka also points out that as far as external conctraintc on 
police behaviour are concerned "relatively few normative 
standards can be located in most continental codes of criminal 
procedure. In his view it is "startling, considering the 
importance of police work in all modern systems, to reflect on 
the meagre regulation of police inquiries as compared to that of 
prosecutorial or judicial investigation, " Howover, in all but 
the most minor crime, continental countries generally deny the 
police themselves the right to institute criminal procoodingc and 
the different position of the victim also acts as a check on 
unfettered police discretion. 
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Against this background it becomes easier to appreciate why 
continental systems are less in need of the exclusionary rules of 
evidence that British and American procedures find so vital. It 
is also much easier for the continental policeman to understand 
and appreciate the reasoning behind such exclusionary rules as do 
operate. 
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Chapter 11 Conclusions 
11.1 Silence. Admi, csiblity and Related Issues 
The discussion in this work has ranged far and wide, indeed 
rather further and wider than the writer originally intended, but 
it is now proposed to return to return firmly to the Scottish law 
and to examine, in light of what has been learned both about the 
Scottish system itself and the problems and solutions in other 
jurisdictions, what changes might be made to the way that con- 
fession evidence is dealt with in Scotland. 
Although certain bodies, notable the Scottish Council for Civil 
Liberties and the Glasgow Bar Association, are currently campaig- 
ning for changes in individual aspects of the law, there are, at 
present, no active governmental or other proposals for a major 
overhaul of the Scottish criminal justice system. Indeed it is 
somewhat depressing to reflect on how few of the many proposals 
made by the Scottish Law Commission actually find a place in the 
legisiaive programme. With . all due respect to the S. C. C. L and 
the C. B. A. , they are first and 
foremost pressure groups and given 
the level of interest shown by the government in Scottish crim- 
inal law it seems probable that the systoms of evidence and 
procedure described in this work will continue without signif- 
icant change, certainly for the foreseeable future. There to 
little likelihood of the wholesale introduction of the 
inquisitorial system into Scotland and experience has shown that 
attempts to isolate individual elements from one homogenous 
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system and transplant them elsewhere are unlikely to cuccocd. 
Although the analogy is not exact, this view is in part 
reinforced by the lack of success enjoyed by the trial-within-a- 
trial in Scotland. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that, within limits, 
change either cannot or should not happen. It was pointed out at 
the start of this work that the otructure and powers of the 
Scottish prosecution system meant that it was quite possible for 
the law to be materially altered in practice while remaining 
literally. unchanged. It will also be apparent that the major 
pendulum swings in the admissibility of confession evidence and 
certain. important procedural changes, notably the introduction of 
the trial-within-a-trial Just mentioned, have coma about, without 
any form of legislative intervention, simply as the result of 
judicial decisions. Whether this state of affairs is desirable 
or not is a matter on which the writer expresses no views but it 
is self-evident that if the judiciary wore so minded major 
alterations could be made, virtually overnight, In the way in 
which Scottish law approaches confession evidence. 
There would not appear to be any pressing reason or need for 
major changes in the right to silence as it precently exints in 
relation to the Scottish police, There is no sustainable 
argument for change in Scotland whether based on "sophinticated 
professional crime" or anything also. Thic view has uniformly 
been supported by all those Scottish commentators and others who 
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have considered the issue including Lord Cameron, the Thomson 
Committee, Sheriff Macphail and the Scottish Law Commiscion. 
Indeed in the present writer"c view there would be considerable 
dangers in moving away from the present position. If it is 
considered necessary to give the police powers to require answers 
in particular cases, this should be done by legislation tailored 
to the requirements of the specific issue. The right to expect 
an answer could so easily become the right to expect the expected 
answer and although tape recording is a major stop forward in the 
protection of the accused, it is by no means a complete answer to 
possible police malpractice since it can only record what takes 
place in the tape-recording room. The fundamental weakness of 
tape-recording is that it still leaves open the problem which 
Lord Cameron referred to in relation to the judicial' declaration 
in Menuel vH . L4, Advocate 
' namely that it does not assist in 
determining "whether the accused or suspect had boon brought to 
the point of emitting a statement by pressure or inducement 
exercised or offered by the police. " 
The writer would also repeat hie previously expraocad view that 
non-police government investigators whose activities arc not 
specifically regulated by statute should, from the porcpectivo of 
the right to silence, and indeed of fairness generally, be acoim- 
ilated to the police. It seems to him illogical that the right 
to silence should exist only in respect of the police and not in 
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respect of others employed by the state to enforce compliance 
with the law. 
It is submitted that different criteria apply in relation to the 
accused who is before the court and when one turns to consider 
judicial proceedings, both pre-trial and trial, the present 
Scottish law on the right to silence is a hotch-potch of legis- 
lative compromises and vague judicial discretionc exercised on an 
ad hoc basis and in the writer's view it is simply a moss. In 
case the writer's views are though to be unduly hawkish, it 
should be borne in mind that the scales are already loaded two to 
one against the prosecution since Scottish law obstinately 
adheres to the historical anachronism of the not proven verdict. 
The modern form of judicial examination is, in the writer's 
experience, in danger of becoming nothing more than an irrelevant 
waste of time and resources. This is largely duo to the practice 
of many, if not all, solicitors advising accused persons simply 
to refuse to answer questions. While that is a perfectly proper 
position to take in terms of the current interpretation of the 
law, it is hardly in accordance with the intentions of the 
Thomson Committee who, as the result of representations medo to 
them, considered that Judicial examination would inter alia 
afford to an accused at the earliest possiblo stage in the, 
judicial process an opportunity of stating his position an 
regards the charge against him, 2 Thomson also envisaged judicial 
examination as preventing the fabrication of a (aloe line of 
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defence and also as protecting the interests of an accuced who 
has been interrogated by police officers by ensuring as far as 
possible that any answers or statements had been fairly obtained 
and not distorted out of context. .3 On the current atato of 
matters such aims are not even being addressed, let alone 
satisfied. 
The first and most pressing need is for the High Court to state 
clearly and unequivocally that legal advice is not a legitimate 
reason for failure to answer proper questions at judicial exam- 
ination. At a suitable opportunity it should be made clear that 
the decision in MgGheg v H. M, Advocate 4 is purely on its own 
facts and does not derogate from Alexander v 11, M, AjyQcmj9 41 and 
McEwan yHM Advocate, 'a Secondly it is submitted, that thoro 
should be more robust use of Judicial comment. While the trial 
judge in McObee went hopelessly off the rails on a factual basic, 
it is submitted that the general tenor of hie comments is quite 
appropriate in a situation where the accused is told expressly 
that adverse inferences are liable to be drawn if he fails to 
mention at judicial examination a fact which he later relics on 
in hic defence. It is also thought that the High Court could, 
with advantage lay down some general format for the judicial 
admonition, possibly by Act of Adjournal. 
Turning now to the trial stage, while the writer would not bn in 
favour of the accused becoming compellable at hic QWt trial, a 
position which would conflict with the principle of the advers- 
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arial system, he would respectfully suggest that a second look 
should be taken at the proposals of the Thomson Committee to 
permit the prosecution to comment on the failure of the accused 
to give evidence once a prima facie case has been established 
against him. This would do little more than homologate the 
present position. The question of whether inferences should be 
drawn from the accused's failure to give evidence is rather more 
difficult, but an explicit provision permitting the drawing of 
inferences along the lines proposed by Thomson would, once again, 
probably do little more than regularise what in fact already 
happens. While making no inroads into either the presumption of 
innocence or the burden of proof on the Crown, such a provision 
would have the result that the accused and'his advisers would 
know that he remained silent at his peril and it would also 
materially simplify the judge's task-tn charging the jury. 
When one turns to consider the issue of admissiblity, it is 
submitted that there are overwhelming reasons of policy against 
the unfettered admissiblity of all confessions. The extreme 
example of Northern Ireland shows just what can happen when the 
controls of the normal legal process are removed. Northern 
Ireland apart, the general record of the police policing 
themselves does not inspire great confidence. 
Accepting then the need for the courts to have the power to 
exclude confessions, it has to be conceded that the feirnoce tect 
is likely to remain the basic of the law for the forooccabla 
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future and a rigid exclusionary rule would be quite contrary to 
the history and spirit of Scottish law. However, it is submitted 
that the fairness test is in danger of moving too far in the 
direction of unfettered admissiblity, if indeed that point has 
not already been reached, One of the main reasons for this state 
of affairs is the failure of the High Court to articulate the 
policy or rationale of exclusion in Scots law, Mirfield has 
provided a masterly exposition of the principles behind exclusion 
in English law I but such an exercise would simply be impossible 
in Scotland. One of the few attempts to rationalise and expound 
the Scottish position was made by the Thomson Committee who noted 
that Scots law has 
"proceeded not so much on any fundamental con- 
stitutional or philosophic basis, such as tha 
privilege against self-incrimination, as on a 
conception of fairness and a determination by the 
courts to control police activity in the interests 
of fairness. What has bean in issue has been not 
so much the truth of the accused's statements as 
the propriety of the circumstances in which they 
were made. Statements improperly obtained are not 
evidence , however reliable or obviously true. 
They are excluded by the courts because an 
exclusionary rule is the only effective weapon 
possessed by the courts to control police 
interrogation. It is of course true that 
statements extorted by unfair means are for that 
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reason unreliable, but Scots law excludes not only 
those statements but also statements whose only 
taint is that they were made at a certain stage of 
the investigation. " 
This statement bringe Scots law close to what Mirfield calls the 
"disciplinary principle" and which he explains thus: 
"It looks to cases which have not yet arisen. If 
the police are denied the use of evidence in the 
present case because of their failure to achieve 
acceptable standards of conduct, they will be more 
likely to achieve acceptable atandardo. in future 
cases. In the short term, both the policemen 
involved in the present-case and other policemen 
who get to know about the decision of the court to 
exclude the evidence will be deterred. In the 
logg term, perhaps, the courts will, by Mining 
the boundaries of proper conduct in euch n 
concrete fashion, educate policemen to respact 
those boundaries. " 
This statement in a sense returns the present issue to its 
starting point. Now can the police be expected to learn leocons 
if the courts do not articulate the reasons for exclusion beyond 
such an unhelpful statement as "moans which place cress- 
examination, pressure and deception in close company" 10 the 
elements of which can mean what the courts went them to mean, ºr 
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and which begs more questions than it answers? When doeo it 
cease to be legitimate to "keep asking questions and probing and 
probing and probing" 12 and shade into "interrogation cross- 
examination and pressure"? '3 The answer will certainly not be 
found in any of the cases examined in this work. 
To put the point the other way round, if the exercise of the 
exclusionary discretion is intended at least in part to send 
messages to the police, what lessons are the police likely to 
learn when the decision on fairness is effectively left to the 
jury with its inscrutable verdict? It might be argued that the 
jury are the arbiters of what is acceptable to society, but even 
if it were apparent that they had acquitted the accused because 
they held a confession to have been unfairly obtained, the 
conclusion that the police would most probably to draw is that 
the jury members were anti-police. In the writer's experience 
the last thing that the police are likely to do is to consider 
that they themselves were in some way at fault. The position 
would of necessity be different if the trial judge (or the appeal 
court> were to spell out clearly and unequivocally the reason for 
the exclusion as has happened in some of the cases on cautioning, 
notably H. M. Adyocete v Docherty ', * and a*, is 
Accordingly, if the underlying rationale of Scottish law in 
indeed a desire to control police behaviour in the intcroatc of 
fairness, it is respectfully submitted that the Scottich 
judiciary should look beyond the bare facts of the the case 
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before them and should explain clearly, and in a way likely to be 
understood by the police, exactly why a confession to excluded, 
In addition, judges should be encouraged, if not actually 
required, to give juries guidance as to what factors should be 
taken into account in assessing fairness. 
The issue of-legal advice during police questioning to another 
fraught area and a subject on which reasonable people may 
sincerely hold diametrically opposing opinions. The writer's 
view is that if the legitimacy of investigative police 
questioning is accepted, as it clearly is, and provided there is 
an accurate record of what took place, there is no pressing 
reason for a change in current Scottish practice. If there was 
to be a right to legal advice during police proceedings such a 
change could not, it is submitted, simply be introduced in 
isolation and many other aspects of the law would require 
reconsideration. At the most basic level, there in at present no 
provision for extending the six hour detention period under 
Section 2 of the 1980 Act. What would happen if the police 
legitimately and properly detained a serious criminal under 
Section 2 but his regular lawyer, no doubt for good and 
sufficient reason, was unable to attend the police station for 
three hours? Should the police have the power to extend the 
period of detention so that the six hours starts to run when the 
solicitor arrives? Could the suspect properly be interrogated in 
the presence of, say, a duty solicitor he had never mot before? 
McGhee v H. M. Advocate appears to suggest that the absence of the 
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accused's "own" solicitor is a legitimate reason for failure to 
answer at judicial examination. Should the fact that the accused 
has been questioned in the presence of a solicitor load the 
courts to comment adversely on his silence as appears to be 
happening in England? If so, the wording of the caution should 
surely be altered as it is clearly unfair to comment adversely 
when the accused has been told that he need not answer and this 
in turn throws the entire argument back to the Collision between 
the right to silence and the need for investigative police quest- 
ioning which, as was previously pointed out, is the basis of most 
of the problems in relation to confession evidence. 
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11.2 Areas, - Iciency- and _SjAff 
It is no longer a logically tenable position to argue that nobody 
can be convicted in Scotland solely on the evidence of his own 
extra-judicial confession and the writer hopes that be has 
convinced any sceptics that as a practical issue Scots law offers 
no more protection to the accused against false or fabricated 
confessions than does English law, the consequences of which can 
be seen in the Timothy Evans and Guildford pour cases to name but 
two infamous examples. The lessons are not new - Dickson 
identified most of the potential danger areas over one hundred 
years ago. The writer has already made clear his opinion that 
the issue of sufficiency of confession evidence in Scotland 
requires urgent and complete reappraisal if this country is not 
to produce similar miscarriages. It is to be hoped that the 
recent comments of the Lord Justice-Clerk ' will mark the 
beginning of such a reappraisal. 
Scots low will require to decide for once and for all whether an 
extra-judicial confession does or does not require to be 
corroborated and, if the latter, what level of supporting 
evidence will be necessary, The present parlous state of the law 
has coma about entirely as the result of judicial decisions and 
it would be open to the High Court to reverse the trend without 
any need for legislative intervention. 
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In the writer's view no confession to the police which has not, 
at the very least, been tape recorded should be admissible unless 
the prosecution satisfies the court, beyond reasonable doubt, 
that there were compelling reasons for the failure to record, 
The requirement to tape record should be extended to all police 
interviews and not just those conducted by the C. I, D.. In 
particular it should be extended immediately to terrorist 
suspects. Experiments should be carried out with video recording 
with a view to establishing whether it offers material advantages 
over tape recording. 
The special status of the confession as a source of evidence 
should be ended as should the assumption that a confession, being 
against the accused's interest, is likely to be truo. It should 
become merely one source and as such should require corroboration 
consisting of a second wholly independent source. In other words 
the historic Scottish concept of corroboration should be 
reasserted. 
While there is undoubtedly scope for the continued existence of 
the special knowledge rule, this should be returned to the true 
principle set out by Alison and. restricted to, ideally, facto 
known only to the perpetrator of the crime and unknown to the 
police or, at the very least, to facto which arg known only to 
the police and the perpetrator. Caces like ra 
M. M. Advocete and MacDonald M. Acivo e, t n3 fail entirely to 
address the issue of the protection of , the accused and should be 
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reconsidered and overruled at the first opportunity. Where the 
facts are known to the police as wall as the perpetrator, and the 
confession is denied, the judge should be required to warn the 
jury expressly of the dangers inherent in confescion evidence, 
there being an existing precedent in the case of identification 
evidence. a 
It is somewhat ironic that one of the judges most responsible for 
the current state of the law, Lord Justice-General Emsito, should 
have written the following: 
In all our criminal courts in Scotland the object 
of the trial is to enable the Crown to secure the 
conviction of the guilty by proof beyond reason- 
able doubt upon evidence sufficient in law; and at 
the same time to ensure that the protection which 
the law seeks to afford to the innocent is denied 
to none. What is at stake in a criminal trial is 
the interest of the community, and it must never 
be forgotten that that interest requires of a 
civilised system of criminal law - which the law 
of Scotland undoubtedly is - that even if its 
administration results In the acquittal from time 
to time of the apparently guilty it should involve 
the minimum of risk at any time of the conviction 
of the innocent. Some may nowadays be heard to 
say that the protection which our law affords to 
the accused is too great and that it should be 
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reduced to simplify the conviction of the 
criminal. The arguments of the advocates of 
change are familiar but, in my opinion, no change 
deserves serious consideration, in spite of the 
laudable object, if the result of its adoption 
would be to increase to any significant extent the 
risk of the conviction of the innocent. If an 
increased risk of convicting the innocent is the 
price of a greater prospect of convicting the 
guilty, then as far as I am concerned it is a 
price which no sound and just system of law can 
seriously afford to pay. "" 
It ie tempting to suggest (with respect, of course) that it might 
have been no bad thing had his Lordship and his brotheren borne 
these reflections in mind particularly when dealing with the 
issue of the special knowledge confession. Smith v N. 4. 
Advocate. 6 decided a more four years after the above passage was 
written, set off a trend which is only now being recognised as 
having indeed led to a real danger of the conviction of the 
innocent. 
As in co many other areas of modern life, technology is now 
beginning to make its mark in Scotland's criminal justice cyctem 
and the introduction of modern electronic methods in police 
stations will, it is hoped, lead to a considerable improvement in 
the accuracy of the record and hence enable prosecutor e, tourte 
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and ultimately the public at large, to have greater faith in 
confession evidence. 
However, there is not, and never must bei any room for 
complacency, English and Northern Ireland experience have shown 
the terrible dangers which can arise from unsupervised and 
unrecorded police interrogation. Scotland appears so far to have 
avoided a major confession-based miscarriage of justice. It must 
never be allowed to happen. 
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